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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the efforts to introduce governance reform and anti-corruption measures 
from Indonesia‘s independence in 1945 until the end of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono‘s 
(SBY‘s) presidency in 2014. It is divided into three main parts covering Sukarno‘s ‗Old 
Order‘, Suharto's ‗New Order‘, and the reform period. The first part discusses how the new-
born state of Indonesia balanced asserting its independence with efforts at institution building. 
It analyzes the power struggle between the diametrically opposed nationalist camp led by 
Sukarno and the administrator camp led by Vice President Hatta. It also examines Army Chief 
General Nasution‘s push for anti-corruption initiatives under Sukarno‘s guided democracy. The 
second part analyzes the roots, causes and development of corruption under President Suharto. 
It looks at how, in the early period of the New Order, Suharto enacted a number of anti-
corruption policies in response to demands especially from students, how this political alliance 
ended as Suharto was able to consolidate his political authority, and how this undermined the 
checks-and-balances system. It also analyses the impact of the increasing corruption on 
Suharto‘s political capital as the Indonesian middle class demanded greater transparency and 
accountability, ultimately – along with 1997 Asia Financial crisis – leading to Suharto‘s 
downfall in May 1998. The third part of this thesis examines the efforts by the post-Suharto 
presidencies to tackle the legacy of corruption from the New Order period.  It discusses the 
dynamics between the reformists within the executives and legislatures who worked together 
with civil society and the conservative/pro-status quo groups and oligarchs, as well as the 
impact of a more democratic political governance structure, the emergence of a free media, the 
greater freedom of expression, and the functioning of the most effective anti-corruption agency 
in Indonesia‘s modern history – the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). 
            This thesis advances three arguments: First, that despite all the rhetoric in championing 
the cause, governance reform was never seen as a long-term endeavor and therefore was never 
applied consistently from independence to the SBY era. Second, the anti-corruption drives 
predating the KPK in 2004 were mostly arbitrary, with limited impact, selective in nature, and 
politicized. Third, the establishment of the KPK changed the sense of impunity among the 
political elites, albeit only in a limited sense. On the one hand, that allowed the KPK to sustain 
and even accelerate the anti-corruption drive during the two terms of SBY‘s presidency but, on 
the other, it left the overall political, economic and social structure and with it the persistent 
institutional failure that induced and incubated the wave of corruption largely intact.  
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HIPPI Himpunan Pengusaha Peribumi 
Indonesia  
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INPRES  Instruksi Presiden  Presidential Instruction Decree  
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Association of Supporters of 
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Commerce and Industry 
KAK Komite Anti Korupsi  Anti Corruption Committee  
KK Komisi Konstitusi  Constitutional Commission  
KAMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Indonesia 
Indonesia Student Movement 
Union  
Kapolda Kepala Polisi Daerah Chief of Police in Province 
Kapolri Kepala Polisi Republik Indonesia Chie of Indonesia Police 
Kassospol Kepala Staf Sosial dan Politik Chief of Staff of Social and 
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Military 
Kaster Kepala Staf Teritorial  Chief of Staff of Territorial Affairs 
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KIPP Komite Independen Pemantau 
Pemilu 
Independent Committee for 
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KK Komisi Konstitusi  Constitutional Commission  
KNIL Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch 
Leger 
Royal Netherland East India Army  
KNIP  Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat Indonesia National Central 
Committee 
KON Komisi Ombudsman Nasional National Ombudsman 
Commission 
KOPKAMTIB Komando Operasi Pemulihan 
Keamanan dan Ketertiban  
Operational Command for the 
Restoration and Security Order 
KORPRI Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia Indonesian Civil Service Corps 
KORTAR Komando Operasional Retooling 
Alat Revolusi  
Supreme Command for Retooling 
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KOSTRAD  Komando Cadangan Strategis 
Angkatan Darat 
Army Strategic Reserve Command 
KOTI Komando Operasi Tertinggi Supreme Operational Command 
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KPKPN Komisi Pemerikasaan Kekayaan 
Pejabat Negara 
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KEPPRES Keputusan Presiden  Presidential Decision Decree 
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Nepotism  
KSSK Komite Stabilitas Sektor Keuangan  Financial Sector Stability 
Committee 
KPU Komisi Pemilihan Umum National Election Commission 
KUHAP Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum 
Acara Pidana  
Criminal Procedure Code 
KY Komisi Yudisial  Judicial Commission  
LAN Lembaga Administrasi Negara  Institute of National 
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LeIP Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi 
untuk Independensi Peradilan 
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LPS Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan Indonesia Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (IDIC) 
LPSK Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan 
Korban 
Witness and Victim Protection 
Agency 
LSI Lembaga Survei Indonesia Indonesia Survey Institute  
MA Mahkamah Agung Supreme Court  
MANIPOL/ 
USDEK 
Manifesto Politik, Undang- Undang 
Dasar 1945,Sosialisme Indonesia, 
Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi 
Terpimpin dan Kepribadian 
Indonesia  
Sukarno‘s political manifesto 
consists of 1945 constitution, 
Indonesia Socialism, Guided 
Democracy, Guided Economy and 
Indonesia‘s personality. 
Masyumi Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia Council of Indonesian Muslimin 
Association, the Major Islamic 
Party in 1950s 
Malari Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari The tragedy of 15 January 1974, 
when there was huge riot after 
students‘ demonstration in the 
wake of the state visit by Prime 
Minister of Japan.  
MenkoPolsoskam Menteri Koordinator Politik Sosial 
dan Keamanan  
Coordinating Minister for Political, 
Social and Security Affairs 
MenkoPolhukam Menteri Koordinator Politik Hukum 
dan Keamanan 
Coordinating Minister for Poiltical, 
Law and Security 
MenPAN Menteri Pendayagunaan Aparatur 
Negara 
Minister of State Apparatus  
Empowerment  
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MK Mahkamah Konstitusi Constitutional Court  
MPR  Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat  People Consultative Assembly 
MTI Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia  Indonesia Transparency Society 
MURBA Musyawarah Banyak  Party of Mass Consultation  
NASAKOM Nasionalis Sosialis Komunis Nationalist Socialist Communist, 
ideology introduce by Sukarno  
NU Nahdlatul Ulama  Revival of the Religious Scholar, 
Indonesia Islamic traditional 
largest organization 
NKK Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus Normalization of Campus Life 
OPSTIB Operasi Tertib Discipline Operation  
OPSUS Operasi Khusus Special Operation, intelligence 
operation conducted by Ali 
Moertopo, Suharto‘s Personal 
assistant in politics.  
ORBA Orde Baru  New Order era, the Suharto era 
1966 – 1998 
PAH 1 Panitia Ad- Hoc 1 Ad Hoc Committee I. The special 
committee established by the 
MPR, which tasked overseeing the 
constitutional Amendment.  
PARAN Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara Committee for Retooling State 
Apparatus 
PD Partai Demokrat Democrat Party  
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia  Indonesia Democratic Party 
PDIP Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan  
Indonesia Democratic Party 
Struggle 
PEKUNEG  Pengawas Keuangan Negara State Financial Supervision team  
PERHUTANI Perusahaan Kehutanan Indonesia Indonesia Forestry Corporation  
Perindra Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raya Indonesia Greater Union Party 
PERTAMINA Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas 
Bumi Nasional 
State Oil and Gas Company  
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa National Awakening Party 
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia  Indonesia Communist Party  
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PKS Partai Keadilan dan Sejahtera Justice and Welfare Party 
PMA Penanaman Modal Asing Foreign Direct Investment 
PMDN Penanaman Modal Dalam Negeri Domestic Direct Investment  
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia Indonesia Nationalist Party 
PPA Perusahaan  Pengelola Aset  State Asset Management 
Companies 
PPATK Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis 
Transaksi Keuangan  
Financial Transaction Report and 
Analysis Center 
PPKI Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia  
Preparatory Committee for 
Indonesia Independence 
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan  United Development Party  
PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik 
Indonesia 
Revolutionary Government of 
Republic of Indonesia, rebel 
government formed under Sukarno 
era 
PSHK Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan 
Indonesia 
Indonesia‘s Law and Policy Study 
Center. 
PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia  Indonesia Socialist Party  
PSII  Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia  Indonesian Islamic Association 
Party 
PUKAT UGM Pusat Kajian Anti Korupsi UGM  Research Institute on Corruption at 
Gadjah Mada University 
PUSPOM TNI Pusat Polisi Militer Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia 
Indonesia Military Police  
PWI Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia Indonesia Journalist Association  
REPELITA  Rencana Pembangunan Lima 
Tahun  
Five Year Development Plan  
RIS Republik Indonesia Serikat  Republic of the United States of 
Indonesia (RUSI) 
SAK Satuan Anti Korupsi  Anti-corruption unit within BRR 
Samak Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti 
Korupsi 
Solidarity Against Corruption 
Society 
SBY Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Acronym for President Yudhoyono  
SEKNEG Sekretaris Negara State Secretary  
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SKK Migas  Satuan Kerja Khusus Pelaksanaan 
Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak dan 
Gas Bumi 
Special Task force for Upstream 
Oil and Gas Business Activities 
SKPP Surat Keterangan Penghentian 
Penuntutan  
Letter of order to stop prosecution 
SOBSI Serikat Organisasi Buruh Seluruh 
Indonesia  
Indonesia Labor Union  
SP3 Surat Penghentian Penyidikan 
Perkara 
letter to Stop Investigation on the 
Case 
STAN Sekolah Tinggi Akuntansi Negara State Accounting School  
TGPTPK  Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan 
Tindak Pidana Korupsi 
Joint Team for Corruption 
Eradication 
Timtas Tipikor  Tim Koordinas Pemberantasan 
Tindak Pidana Korupsi 
Interagency Coordination Team for 
Corruption Eradication 
Tipikor, 
Pengadilan 
Pengadilan khusus Tindak Pidana 
Korupsi 
Special court for Corruption 
Criminal Act  
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia Indonesia National Military  
TPK Tim Pemberantasan Korupsi Corruption Eradication Team  
UI Universitas Indonesia University of Indonesia  
UKP3R  Unit Kerja Presiden Pengelola 
Program Reformasi 
President Delivery Unit for 
Program Implementation and 
Reform under first term of SBY 
presidency 
UKP4 Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang 
Pengawasan dan Pengendalian  
Pembangunan  
President Delivery Unit for 
Development Monitoring and 
Oversight  under second term of 
SBY presidency  
YLBHI Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum 
Indonesia  
Indonesia Legal Aid Foundation  
YPPI Yayasan Pengembangan Perbankan 
Indonesia  
Indonesian Banking Development 
Foundation 
YPTE Yayasan Pembangunan Territorial 
Empat 
Social Foundation for 
Development Territorial Four 
YTE Yayasan Teritorial Empat  Social Foundation of Territorial 
Four 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
After Independence was declared in August 1945, there was a divergent vision among 
Indonesia‘s elite regarding the country‘s future direction on the formation of governance 
structure. This polarization was embodied by the two top Indonesia leaders – President 
Sukarno and Vice President Mohammad Hatta. Soekarno envisioned that Indonesia had to 
posses its own governance structure that centered on himself as president, who was able to 
understand and articulate the will of the people, especially the dispossessed. Meanwhile, Hatta 
and his allies had different ideas and, supposedly influenced by their Dutch education, felt that 
parliamentary democracy coalesced with an independent judiciary would be better for 
Indonesia. Eventually, Soekarno and his allies were able to mobilize political support from the 
public at large, as demonstrated by the fact that they won the national election in 1955 that 
diminished Hatta and his allies‘ political influence. Eventually, Soekarno was able to 
consolidate further his authority when he was able to dissolve parliament and subsequently 
disempowered the judiciary through introducing an authoritarianisque governance structure 
which he called ‗guided democracy‘ that commenced in 1959.  
  In 1965, the Chief of Army‘s Strategic Reserves (KOSTRAD) Major General Suharto 
maneuvered himself into the center of Indonesian politics, under the justification to protect the 
country from a communist take-over that was triggered by murdered of Chief of Army A. Yani 
six others army officers by group of mid-ranking officers that was suspected of being support 
by Indonesia Communist Party (PKI).  Ultimately in 1967, Suharto formally assumed the 
presidency. During his three decades of rule, his legitimacy was closely tied to his policies of 
developmentalism, but under more consolidated authoritarian political structure.   In the 1990s, 
however, it became clear that development was increasingly being undermined by corruption 
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across all sectors of government.  When Indonesia‘s economy then virtually collapsed during 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, students and civil society organizations took to the streets, 
calling for a cleaner, accountable, and democratic government.  Not surprisingly, the fight 
against corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) became the rallying cry of the reformasi 
movement which ultimately forced Suharto to step down. 
Subsequent to the fall of Suharto, Indonesia embarked upon a process of 
democratization, which was welcomed by the international community and praised by foreign 
decision-makers. As US President Barack Obama stated that Indonesia democracy was 
‗sustained and fortified by its checks and balances.‘1 Similarly, UK Prime Minister David Cameron 
applauded Indonesia for having achieved a transformation (toward democracy) ‗in just over a 
decade.‘2   
 However, while many observers, politicians and academics have hailed the success of 
Indonesian democratization, scholars such as Vedi Hadiz
3
  and Dan Slater
4
 have argued that 
the reform simply allowed the old elites, to reinvent themselves, thereby enabling them to 
resume their corrupt activities. This was echoed by Teten Masduki, who called them ‗predator 
elites.‘5 Thus, according to the pessimistic observer, there was no significant change since the 
fall of Suharto, as corruption remained rampant and the New Order Era elite persisted.  
This thesis examines the efforts to eradicate corruption and governance reform at the 
national level, focusing mainly on the policy of the Central Government from the Sukarno 
                                            
1
 Barack H. Obama, Indonesia‘s Example to the World (Speech given at University of Indonesia, Jakarta, 10 
November 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/10/remarks-president-university-
indonesia-jakarta-indonesia. 
2
 David Cameron, Indonesia can Lead the World (Speech given at Al Azhar University, Jakarta, 12 April 2012), 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/transcript-prime-ministers-speech-at-al-azhar-university/ 
3
 Vedi Hadiz, ‗Reorganizing political power in Indonesia: A reconsideration of so-called ―democratic 
transitions‖,‘ The Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, Year 2003, pp. 591-611. 
4
 Dan Slater, ‗ Indonesia's Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition,‘  
 Indonesia, No. 78 (Oct., 2004).  
5
 Teten Masduki, ‗Mengadili Elit Predator (To Convict Predator Elites),‘ Kompas, 27 June 2012, 
http://cetak.kompas.com/read/2012/01/31/02292537/mengadili..elite.predator  
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period of the 1940s up to the end of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)‘s period in 2014. It 
will examine the roots, causes and dynamics of corruption under Sukarno and Suharto, before 
proceeding to analyze the post-Suharto era.  The analytical focus of this thesis is on the 
political aspect of government policy in pushing for governance reform and anti-corruption 
initiatives. This research intends to address several key research questions; specifically, what 
was the key determinant in the success and failure to address corruption under each 
administration? Did the reformists have insufficient political clout to institute governance 
reform in Indonesia? What was Indonesia‘s trajectory in terms of governance reform and anti-
corruption from independence to the SBY period?  
Thesis Structure  
This thesis will be structured chronologically in four parts: the Sukarno era, the Suharto era, 
the post-Suharto era and the SBY era. Each part will be divided into a couple of chapters that 
combine a historical approach with political analysis.  The second chapter will focus on the 
various governance reform efforts and anti-corruption measures after Indonesian 
independence, mainly led by Vice President Hatta, representing the administrator/technocrats 
faction in government. The reform effort was eventually dismantled as the administrator was 
outmaneuvered by the solidarity maker group, led by Sukarno. In chapter three, the focus will 
be on the anti-corruption efforts led by the head of the Army A.H. Nasution, and the economic 
reform efforts of PM Djuanda, that never went far due to a lack of political support. The 
limited accommodation of the students‘ demand that Suharto should address corruption during 
the early New Order era, that proved short-lived, leading to the students‘ criticism of his wife‘s 
involvement in an Indonesian amusement park, will be discussed in chapter four. 
Subsequently, chapter five will analyze and discuss on the political dynamics of the rivalry 
between the technocrats and the nationalists group, especially in the context of economic 
reform in the New Order era.  It also discusses the widespread public discontent with Suharto 
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because of the corruption associated with his government and family, which accelerated his 
downfall in May 1998.  
The chapter six will discuss the first generation and more substantive governance 
reform undertaken in the post-Suharto era when, inter alia, constitutional amendments were 
completed to ensure a democratic political structure. Moreover, the start of the most aggressive 
anti-corruption campaign in Indonesia, led by SBY and KPK, coupled with the reform initiated 
by the technocrats‘ ministers, is discussed in chapter seven. Then, chapter eight will assess the 
legacy of SBY, especially his record on governance reform and anti-corruption efforts.  
Finally, the conclusion in chapter nine will summarize the findings, organized into four 
periods: Sukarno, Suharto, post-Suharto (Habibie, Gus Dur, and Megawati) and SBY.  Also, 
using international indices and indicators, it will analyze the trajectory of the governance 
reform and anti-corruption efforts in Indonesia from the late Suharto period to the end of the 
SBY period.  
Literature Review and Historiography 
The following section will provide a survey of the literature and the scholarly debates on this 
topic. It will start by looking at the general literature on corruption and anti-corruption, starting 
with the concept and its application in Indonesia. It will then proceed to discuss the governance 
concept, followed by an examination of patronage and a discussion of the concept of the 
patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism state in the Indonesian context. Subsequently, the 
theoretical discussion starts with the concept of oligarchy as well as political cartels. The 
literature review ends by outlining the application of political pluralism supplemented by the 
theory of political actor action as the analytical framework for this thesis.  
 
31 
 
Corruption as a Development Issue in the Indonesian Political Context until the New 
Order Era 
During the Cold War, corruption was no more than a side issue, as most scholars focused on 
security issues and the rivalry between the communist and western blocs. Yet, this limited 
debate on the fringes paints a controversial picture. Joseph Nye has argued ‗corruption can be 
beneficial by contributing to the solution of three major problems involved: economic 
development, national integration, and governmental capacity.‘6 Others, like Huntington7 and 
Leff
8
 have even advocated that corruption could be used as a means of welfare improvement.  
However, as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, and the United States became de facto 
the only superpower, corruption started to become part the scholarly debate in line with the 
need for democracy, accountability, freedom and transparency.
9
 Because of this shift, 
corruption received much more attention from policy-makers, academics and development 
practitioners.  
Moreover, corruption was no longer cast as tolerable, but as detrimental to both 
economic and political development. Daniel Kauffman in his research demonstrated that there 
is a positive correlation between bribery and the time lag that managers needed in order to deal 
with bureaucrats, meaning that bribery did not produce bureaucratic efficiency.
10
 Furthermore, 
                                            
6
 Joseph S. Nye, ‗Corruption and political development: a cost-benefit analysis,‘ The American Political Science 
Review, vol. 61, no. 2, year 1967, pp.417-427. 
7
 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).  
8
 Nathaniel Leff, ‗Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption,‘ American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 
8. No. 8, year 1964. 
9Jonathan Rosen, ‗The Impact of Corruption in Democratic Stability,‘ Miami International Studies Journal, Issue 
1, year 2012, p. 59.  
10
 Daniel Kauffman,‘ Research in Corruption: Critical Empirical Issues,‘ in  Arvind K. Jain (Ed.), Economics of 
Corruption (Massachusetts: Kuwler Publishing, 1998),  pp. 129-176 and Daniel Kauffman and S. J. Wei, ‗Does 
Grease Money ―Speed-up‖ the Wheels of Commerce,‘  International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper,  no 
WP/00/64, year 2000. 
32 
 
Gupta et al have shown that the health and education services in countries with a high level of 
corruption were of a much lower quality.
11
  
There is also no consensus on the academic definition of corruption and corrupt 
officials. Michael Johnston defines ‗corruption as the abuse of public roles or resources for 
private benefit.‘12 Johnston believes that a lack of distinction between the public role and 
private benefit can be a useful indicator of institutions‘ weaknesses. The United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) defines corruption as ‗the misuse of public power, office or 
authority for private benefit—through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, 
speed money or embezzlement.‘13 Robert Klitgaard‘s definition focuses more on corrupt 
officials, whom he sees as deviating ‗from the formal duties of a public role because of private-
regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains…‘14 Meanwhile 
Susan Rose Ackerman identifies two types of corruption: petty corruption and grand 
corruption. Petty corruption ‗can lead to the inefficient and unfair distribution of scarce 
benefits ….encourage officials to create red tape…. and lower state legitimacy.‘ As for grand 
corruption, it leads to state failure because certain branches of governance may organize as a 
‗bribe machine,‘ nominal democracy may have a corrupt electoral system, and high-level 
government officials can collect kickbacks from private contractors.
15
   
The UNDP employs a similar categorization. Petty corruption involves a small amount 
of transactions, because of the difficult economic situation, and has a more direct impact on the 
poor. This is also referred to as ‗needs-based‘ corruption … as ‗citizens who need services may 
                                            
11
 S. Gupta, H. Davoodi and R. Alonso-Terme, ‗Corruption and Provision of Health Care and Education Services‘ 
in Arvind.K. Jain (Ed.), The Political Economy of Corruption (London: Routledge, 2001). 
12
 Michael Johnston, ‗Corruption and Democratic Consolidation‘, paper presented at a conference on ‗Democracy 
and Corruption,‘ Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies, Princeton University, 12 March 1999, p. 6.  
13
 United Nations Development  Programme (UNDP), Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance (New York: 
UNDP, 1999), p. 7. 
14
 Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 23. 
15
 Suze Rose Ackerman, ‗Corruption and Government,‘ International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No. 3, June 2008, p. 
331. 
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have no option but to pay.‘16 Grand corruption usually occurs during periods of normal and 
high economic growth, the amount involved is large, and the actors are usually high-level 
officials who collude in order to receive bribes from corporations.
17
  
Since this thesis investigates government policy as implemented by top officials at the 
national level, the term ‗corruption‘ in this study refers to the abuse of public office along with 
its resources as well as its authority by high level officials for their private, commercial, 
political or family benefit, as evident in Suharto‘s case. As a result, the scope of corruption 
constituting grand corruption, that involves a vast amount of money or resources from the 
public domain that tended to implicate high-level officials, has a direct impact on policy at the 
national level, while petty corruption affects the daily lives of the poor and involves public 
officials at the micro political level, its scale and direct impact on policy at the national level is 
relatively miniscule. Therefore, it is outside the scope of this study to discuss petty corruption.   
In the Indonesian context, the analysis of corruption dates back to the colonial era when 
the Dutch arrived in the 17th century through the United East India Company or Verenigde 
Oost Indische Companie (VOC). Following the collapse of the VOC due to, among other 
factors, corruption, and the Dutch government took control of the East Indies in 1789. They 
ruled indirectly through the traditional aristocracy, especially in Java, known as pamong praja, 
who were employed by the VOC and later by the Dutch Government.
18
 These administrators 
depended on Dutch power rather than popular legitimacy.  Therefore, they exploited their own 
people as long as the Dutch were happy and popular revolt was contained. 
                                            
16
 Ibid. 
17
 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Tackling Corruption Transforming Lives: Accelerating 
Human Development in Asia and the Pacific(New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2008), p. 20. 
18
 Harold Crouch, the Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 293. 
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Then in post colonial era, after independence in 1945, the level of corruption declined. 
Dwight Y. King argues that this was the result of: a sense of idealism emanating from the 
revolution and the republic founders; the successful containing of inflation; the existence of 
freedom and a critical press; and an independent judiciary.
19
 When Sukarno introduced 
‗Guided Democracy‘ in 1959, the parliamentary system was dissolved, the press restricted, 
foreign companies nationalized, and monopolies created that lead to rent-seeking 
opportunities.
20
 Indeed, according to Jamie Mackie, corruption became endemic under 
Sukarno‘s ‗Guided Democracy‘, when ‗financial accountability virtually collapsed because of 
administrative deterioration.‘21 
Most of the scholarly debate on corruption in Indonesia focuses on Suharto and the 
New Order regime. One school of thought in the western scholarship sees corruption as 
connected to notions of Javanese power and culture. For instance, Anderson highlighted the 
similarity between Suharto‘s Javanese concept of power and Max Weber‘s patrimonialist 
state‘s concept, where the government was an extension of the person of the ruler.22 Similarly, 
Adam Schwarz argued that the large-scale corruption during the New Order had its roots in the 
ancient cultural traditions and the dispensing of government largesse was one of the personal 
prerogatives of the Javanese ruler.
23
 However, Sri Margana disagrees with Anderson and 
Schwarz, arguing that the patrimonial state was established by the VOC during the Dutch 
colonial era which aimed to maintain feudalism, which breeds corruption.
24
 The origin and 
                                            
19
 Dwight Y.  King, ‗Corruption in Indonesia: A curable cancer?,‘ Journal of International Affairs, Vol.53, No. 2, 
Spring 2000, p. 607. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Jamie A. Mackie, ‗The Commission of Four Report on Corruption,‘ Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
Vol. 6, No. 3, year 1971, pp. 87-88. 
22
 Anderson, ‗The Idea of Javanese Power‘, p. 37. 
23
 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 90s (Sydney: Allan and Unwin, 1994), p. 136. 
24
 Sri Margana, ‗Akar Historis Korupsi di Indonesia {the Historic Roots of Corruption in Indonesia}‘ in 
Wijayanto and Ridwan Zacharie (eds.), Korupsi Mengorupsi Indonesia: Sebab, Akibat, dan Prospek 
Pemberantasan (Jakarta, Gramedia, 2009). 
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more extensive debate within the patrimonial and neo-patrimonial state concept particularly 
under the New Order era will be discussed further in the following section.  
 Another scholar viewed corruption as connected with the military and civilian 
bureaucracy. Indeed, William Liddle argues that corruption has ‗less to do with culture than 
with political needs of the rulers and lack of popular accountability in the political system.‘ 
Therefore in the context of political competition, Liddle asserts, ‗Corruption has been critical 
means of gaining resources and support, to the point that it is now an essential – indeed, normal 
– aspect of most government decision-making and implementing process.‘25  
 Before the early 1990s, the discussion of the impact of corruption on development 
within the international academic literature was very limited. It was only in the early to mid-
1990s that corruption came to the attention of academic research. The treatment of Indonesia 
by the international community became more critical, especially with respect to the 
authoritarian nature and corruption record of Suharto. As R.E. Elson observed, Suharto no 
longer enjoyed unconditional support from the West, as was the case during the cold war era.
26
 
There were also two significant changes on Indonesia‘s domestic front: first, the middle 
class had increased more than ten-fold under the New Order and became a voice for 
democratization and clean government; second, Suharto‘s six children were growing up and 
aggressively establishing their Nepotistic business. According to J Wanandi, this resulted in 
increased corruption and eroded Suharto‘s political capital.27 
The convergence of international criticism and Indonesian middle class dissatisfaction 
with Suharto propelled corruption issue into the public discourse. In May 1999, Time 
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Magazine‘s cover story revealed how Suharto and his family had allegedly accumulated an 
estimated $15 billion of assets over his 30-year reign.
28
 This was followed by the publication 
of Transparency International on corrupt political leaders, which ranked Suharto as the most 
corrupt politician in the world, with an alleged embezzlement of $15-30 billion, ahead of the 
former President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos.
29
 As a result, Suharto‘s association 
with corruption strongly resonates among the Indonesian public, even today.  
As for the discussion about governance and corruption in the post-Suharto era, most 
leading international scholars and analysts apply an oligarchy, cartel or pluralism analytical 
framework. Each of these analytical frameworks will be discussed below in more detail.  
Anti-Corruption Initiatives and its Application in Indonesia  
One of anti-corruption specialist Jon S.T. Quah identifies three patterns of anti-corruption 
initiatives in Asian countries. The first pattern is where there exists an anti-corruption law but 
no independent anti-corruption agency; the second pattern is where there is an anti-corruption 
law with multiple anti-corruption agencies; and the third pattern is where there is an anti-
corruption law with one independent anti-corruption agency. Quah argues that the third pattern 
is the most effective anti-corruption model, because an independent agency that solely focuses 
on combating corruption would not be sidetracked by other priorities.
30
 However, simply 
adopting the third pattern is no guarantee of success. As shown in the cases of Hong Kong and 
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Singapore, political support is crucial in providing the agency with sufficient resources, 
competent staff, and broad authority, especially in prosecuting corruption cases.
31
  
Michael Johnston and Sahr J. Kpundeh argue that social action coalitions linking public 
and private actors are needed to mobilize participation and advocacy.
32
 These coalitions can be 
set-up as an anti-corruption strategy. They are confident that ‗if sustained by a careful planning 
and a diverse set of incentives, they can reinforce political will and enhance the strength of 
civil society.‘   
 In addition, in my view, the anti-corruption activity is focusing on the prosecution of 
large scale corruption cases or those that implicate high profile officials. As a result, the nature 
of their activity is to create a deterrent effect, focusing more on investigation as well as 
prosecution, and most of the activity encompasses short-term or, in some cases, medium-term 
horizons. Therefore, the anti-corruption initiatives outlined in this thesis tend to focus on the 
prosecution of corruption cases at the national level, or corruption at the regional level that has 
a national profile, for instance the earlier cases handled by the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) involving regional heads (e.g, Governor of Aceh and Governor of North 
Sumatra).  
The plethora of anti-corruption initiatives or ad-hoc teams under Sukarno and Suharto‘s 
New Order Period tended to be temporary, under-resourced, easily subverted and, more 
importantly, lacking political support from the top-leaders, as will be outlined in detail in the 
empirical chapters. Even so, in the post-Suharto era, several anti-corruption related institutions 
or teams faced resistance from vested interests, especially among the judiciary. Eventually, 
these institutions, like the Joint Team for Corruption Investigation (TGPTPK) and the State 
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Officials Wealth Audit Commission (KPKPN) were dissolved either by the Supreme Court 
ruling or through the enactment of the new Anti-Corruption Commission.
33
 These set-backs 
frustrated both lower-income people who were longing for a well-functioning impartial law 
enforcement system and international donors, whose economic assistance was crucial as 
Indonesia had just been through a crucial economy recovery after the Asian economic crisis in 
1998. The business community was also frustrated with the judiciary, especially concerning 
various issues such as contract enforcement and commercial legal disputes.
34
  
Learning from the failures of these anti-corruption initiatives in the past, reformers in 
the government and parliament, with support from international donors, came to an agreement 
that drastic action needed to be taken by enacting an important law on KPK in 2002.
35
 The 
formation of the KPK was expected to provide a solution to the endemic problem in the 
judiciary and to avoid systemic corruption among the law enforcement agencies.
36
 However, 
when the KPK organizational had functioning in 2004, real progress was made in terms of anti-
corruption initiatives; in particular, the KPK was equipped with its strong mandate and broad 
powers, including the authority to prosecute corruption cases. In my view, the key to the 
success of this crucial institutional building effort by the KPK was the fact that they obtained 
crucial political and resource support from the SBY government.  
The literature on the SBY presidency and the fight against corruption in Indonesia has 
tended to treat these two issues separately.  Some of the academic literature has focused on the 
role played by Indonesia‘s civil society in the fight for democracy and against corruption in the 
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post-Suharto era.  Setyono and McLeod highlight the role of anti-corruption in civil society at 
both a strategic level (by pushing for anti-corruption-related legislation and a practical level 
(by creating public awareness, capacity building for the citizen and reporting corruption cases 
to the law enforcement agency and the KPK).
37
 Marcus Mietzner also highlights how civil 
society successfully mobilized popular support using social media as well as partnering with 
the mass media when conservative elites, through the police and AGO, tried to bring criminal 
charges against the KPK leaders in 2009.
38
  
Two articles were published by Sofie Schutte that adopts two very different angles but 
focusing solely on the KPK, without mentioning the role of SBY government. The first article 
focuses on her analysis of the sequential selection process of the KPK leadership in 2003 and 
2007 by both government and parliament. Despite its shortcomings, she praised the selection 
process as having successfully ensured the independence of the KPK leaders‘ work. 39 In the 
second article, she analyses how the KPK overcame obstacles in challenging Indonesia‘s 
governance environment by demonstrating that corruptors in high office no longer enjoy 
impunity.
40
 
The role of the KPK and SBY in addressing corruption is initially examined by 
Davidsen et al. They argue that the KPK, during its first two years, performed well despite 
being a new organization with limited resources. This was because the KPK initiated a growing 
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number of investigations and prosecutions, with a conviction rate of close to 100%.
41
 Also, the 
KPK managed to develop its organization and recruit qualify staff.
42
 
Crouch also admitting that anti-corruption drive during SBY period including the 
emergence of KPK was more progressive compare to his predecessor, like Habibie, Gus Dur 
and Megawati.
43
 Meanwhile Butt highlight that the KPK and the Constitutional Court were 
able to perform their work effectively without interference from SBY, perhaps out of 
sensitivity to negative public opinion.
44
 
Governance Reform as a Pertinent Development Issue in Indonesia 
The concept of governance reform as development is widely used not just in the academic 
discourse, but also in policy discussions that involved the public at large, therefore risk of 
being multi interpreted and certainly provokes a contentious debate on this issue.  The sectoral 
governance reform concept that focuses on economic issues, for instance, in the 1990s was 
about dismantling the state intervention to economic affairs through liberalization, among other 
things, in the fields of trade, finance or capital flow, as pushed by the International Financial 
Organizations, like the World Bank and IMF, in less developed and developing countries. This 
policy was known as ‗structural adjustment‘ or the ‗Washington consensus‘45 Another limited 
definition of governance reform that focusing on the judiciary centered on the need to 
strengthen the law enforcement system in less-developed and developing countries, as Lindsey 
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argues, in order ‗to build legal institutions and systems that allow diverse participation and 
strengthening civil society...‘46 
 Meanwhile in the ‗post-Washington consensus‘, in which the World Bank departed 
from their previous stance for small government, in the late 1990s to early 2000s, they 
advocated the need to strengthen the government capacity to formulate and implement policy 
in the context of managing the country‘s economic resources for development.47 This 
definition, that emphasized the empowerment of the government to implement policy, was also 
advocated by leading academics, like Pierre and Peters.
48
 
 Furthermore, two leading political academics measured the quality of governance using 
dimensions that were quite different. Fukuyama used two important dimensions to measure the 
capacity of the government to deliver public services: autonomy and capacity. The country 
quality of governance is determined by the interaction between these two dimensions,
49
 whilst 
Macintyre prescribes that the quality of governance is determined by the political architecture 
from the deeply concentrated authority to the extremely dispersed authority. These two 
extreme points posit different governance challenges, so a configuration in the middle-ground 
would be preferred to avoid such problems.
50
 The USAID country report assesses the state of 
democratization and governance in Indonesia and identifies two main challenges: the lack of 
effective, democratic local governance that provides meaningful public services, and the failure 
of the justice sector effectively to combat endemic corruption and inspire public credibility.
51
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 This study will apply the broader governance definition as opposed to some narrow 
concept as outlined above because, as Bevir argues, that governance is more pluralistic than 
government that entails an interaction between the state (government, legislature and judiciary) 
with civil society.
52
 In my view, governance reform is defined as a conscious and concerted 
effort by the reformist element either within the state, sometime forging an alliance with civil 
society and the media, to build democratic governance to ensure political freedom as well as 
the equal civil and political rights of its citizens. Thus, the level of democratic governance, as 
Croissant and Bunte outline, ‗shows the extent to which citizens are free to participate and act 
in democratic system‘.53 Therefore, in my view, governance incorporates the formal and 
informal rules that regulate the state as well as other social and economic actors in their 
interactions in the context of decision making process. In addition, this thesis emphasizes the 
political aspect of governance reform although it does not completely disregard the economy 
and other social factors in its analysis. Also, in terms of the time frame, in my view, the 
governance reform was seen as an effort to enact policy that has long-term implications, with 
the ultimate goal of strengthening and preserving the democratic political structure in 
Indonesia that includes an effective executive, a more robust parliament and a credible as well 
as independent judiciary. Thus, in this thesis, governance reform can be categorized into 
several areas that depend on the policy priority of each respective presidency, including 
economic reform, military reform, civil service reform, constitutional amendments and judicial 
reform.  Therefore, governance reform, in my view, should be seen as a long-term endeavor, 
and therefore should be carried out consistently or even accelerated, with one of the main goals 
being to contain or neutralize corruption. This is the link between governance reform and 
corruption, in my view. Therefore, anti-corruption initiatives that are supposed to create a 
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deterrent effect, especially with regard to high-level officials, should be seen as complementing 
or even reinforcing governance reform in addressing corruption in the long term. 
Patronage, Patrionalism and Neo-Patrionalism: State-sponsored Corruption?  
One of the findings of this study is that patronage is an important feature of Indonesian politics, 
from the Sukarno era to the SBY era that highlights the inability of the state to distribute its 
resources for the public interest.  In a number of works on politics, there are various definitions 
of patronage, such as the narrow definition that constitutes the exchange of positions in the 
public sector for political support.
54
 Meanwhile, other academics are focusing on the usage of 
resources of the benefits from public office in which the patron is a public official or someone 
with access to the state resources.
55
  However, for this thesis, in my view, it would be suitable 
to use the basic tenets of the definition by Ashcroft, in which patronage is the material resource 
that is acquired from public resources and channeled for private or a particular group‘s 
benefit.
56
 The emphasis on material resources, in my view, constitutes a move towards the 
economic aspect of patronage, albeit there are some political and social components to it. This 
definition is also applied by Aspinall in a number of his works that investigate the patron-client 
relationship in Indonesian or Southeast Asian politics that breed corruption.
57
 However, 
contrary to Hatchroft, in my view, the political actor does not necessarily have to be in public 
office, since other non-state officials are also able to provide resources from private or other 
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sources for down-payments but with the end goal of plundering public resources. Patronage is 
one of the key features in this thesis, as it persisted from its peak under the New Order era until 
the SBY period.  
The various analyses of the patronage pattern in Indonesian politics since independence 
tended to centre on the role of the state that is patrimonial, borrowing the concept of the 
patrimonalist state from Webber, which identifies that, within the state, the separation between 
the public and private interest is blurred and does not uphold the citizens‘ equality, a 
characteristic of the modern state.  In contrast to the modern state, the traditional authority was 
used as an instrument by the ruler to oppress its citizens and exploit the state resources for their 
private or certain political group‘s gain in an organized fashion, which breeds systematic 
corruption.
58
 
As a result of using Weberian notions of the patrimonialist state, Anderson in his 
seminal work drew parallels between the old concepts of power dating back to the tenth 
century in the Kingdom of Java with the way in which Soekarno ruled. Anderson identifies that 
the King of Java maintained his power by controlling the financial sources and distributing the 
spoils to maintain the loyalty of his subordinates. However, he also argues that Soekarno was 
excellent understanding the behavior of charismatic leader embodied in Javanese ruler that he 
successfully mobilized mass political support despite his increasing authoritarian penchant  
which positioned him as the ruler that destined to concentrating all of power.
59
  At the micro 
political level, Greetz also used the patrimonial state approach to explain the Balinese state 
during the colonial era, in which power was emanating from ‗exemplary centers‘ within the 
power structure that are also often in conflict with the class structure of the Balinese state. 
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Contrary to Anderson, Geertz does not attempt to find a corollary between the Balinese and 
Indonesia state.
60
 
However, the culturalist approach was criticized, especially for its assumption that 
culture is static and does not evolve. Pemberton is the leading critic of this approach, especially 
of the analysis that employs the Javanese culture approach. Through his research, he argues 
that Javanese culture actually evolved from the pre-colonial era and entered the colonial 
period, in which the former interacted with the Dutch state while the latter was the usage of 
Javanese traits in Suharto‘s government to justify his rule. It showed that, in this case, the 
culture was evolving due to its interaction with the respective social and political leaders in 
each era. 
61
 
 As the cultural approach started to lose its clout, patrimonial theory evolved into neo-
patrimonial state theory, especially for analyzing Suharto‘s New Order era. This approach sees 
that the economy or commercial motives drove the behavior of the state instrument, like the 
military, the police and the bureaucracy. A number of leading Indonesia expert, especially in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, used this approach to analyze the network of patronage during 
Suharto‘s New Order era based on the interaction between the state instruments and capital.  It 
assumes that the state is autonomous, can act independently as one entity and, in most cases, is 
able to impose its authority on people. This approach was initially applied in Thailand by 
Riggs, whereby he introduced the Bureaucratic polity concept.
62
 Subsequently, Riggs‘ 
analytical framework was applied in Indonesia by Jackson and also King,
63
 but later Emmerson 
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developed this into a new concept called Bureaucratic Pluralism, in which he explained that the 
state as not cohesive, as Riggs and Jackson argue, since there is still an opportunity for debate 
and rivalry, not just about patronage but also about the real policy between the respective state 
instruments, like the military, bureaucrats and technocrats, but admittedly the political space to 
maneuver is still very limited by the nature of the political authoritarian structure under 
Suharto.
64
  
 The classic work by leading Indonesia expert using the neo-patrimonial approach, like 
Jackson, Emerson, King and Crouch, is certainly groundbreaking by using systematic analysis 
to uncover corruption practices through patronage that previously only dominating the 
Indonesia political gossips or through the scattered and fragmented exposure of corruption 
cases by the Indonesia press. Still, in my view, the analytical framework offered by this 
approach still has its limitations, as is too state-centered and, in extreme cases, views the state 
as monolithically.  Also, it fails to take into account a political actor that is not part of the state 
apparatus, for instance civil society. The next section will discuss several other streams of 
political thought and, subsequently, the political pluralism theory that will be applied mostly in 
this thesis. 
The rule of Oligarchy or Cartels in Indonesia’s Political Governance Structure? 
The classic work of Karl Marx on the political and social ramifications of industrialization in 
Europe in the mid-19
th
 century that created class-conflict in society notes the emergence of the 
bourgeoisie, who possessed a vast amount of capital due to exploiting the lower class. The 
contemporary Marxists have shifted their focus from class-conflict towards the political 
                                                                                                                                          
Patrimonial Regime or Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime – What a Difference?‘ in Benedict R. Anderson and 
Audrey Kahin (eds.), Interpreting Indonesian Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 104 – 116.  
64
 Donald K. Emmerson, ‗Understanding the New Order: Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia,‘ Asian Survey, Vol. 
23, No. 11, Nov., 1983, pp. 1220-1241. 
47 
 
agenda, from the local to even the global stage to contain powerful elites who aggressively 
expand their influence under the banner of ‗Neoliberalism‘, as introduced by Harvey.65  
 The application of the Marxist or structuralist approaches in Indonesian politics initially 
gained public recognition through Robison‘s classic work of 1986,66 in which he argues that 
the emergence of the business class under the New Order era encompasses of Indonesian 
Chinese business, indigenous business and Suharto family was facilitated by the state apparatus 
known as the ‗Politico-bureaucrat‘. Thus, this group of ruling capitalists used the state to 
accumulate their wealth as their influence in the political sphere was growing. The members of 
the ruling capitalists were further diversified when Suharto intentionally included a number of 
Islamic group elites in the mix in a bid to counter the influence of the military and Indonesia‘s 
Chinese group.  
Working with his student Vedi R. Hadiz, Robison developed further the structuralist 
approach when entering the post-Suharto period by introducing the concept of Oligarchy. 
Hadiz and Robison describe that the existing nature of the political system in Indonesia as a 
‗complex oligarchy‘: 
 .. In which virtually all political power is held by a very small number of wealthy people who 
shape public policy primarily to benefit themselves financially…while displaying little or no 
concern for the broader interests of the rest of the citizenry.
67
 
According to them, the political, social and economic structure of Indonesia remains 
unchanged, whereby ‗Many of the old faces continue to dominate politics and business, while 
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new ones are drawn into the same predatory practice‘. As a result, any attempt at governance 
reform by the technocrats/ civil society would only bring about piecemeal change.
68
  
However, Robison and Vadiz are not the only prominent academics that introduced the 
Oligarchy concept and its application in Indonesia politics. Through the more strict definition 
of Oligarchy under the aegis of structuralist approach, Jeffrey Winters is not focusing his 
analysis on the overall political system but on very wealth powerful individuals with the quest 
to protect or even expand their fortune. Winters sees that, in the New Order era, Suharto was 
the Sultanistic oligarch – the first among equals – who was able to tame the less political 
influential oligarchs. After Suharto‘s fall, other oligarchs became more powerful as well as 
independent, and so were able to exploit the weak legal system to have a significant influence 
on determining the political leaders in the post-Suharto era, even using democratic means. This 
problem was exacerbated by the weak, poorly-organized civil system that was supposed to 
contain the oligarchs.
69
Therefore, the main argument by Winters is that:  
Oligarchs are disproportionately influential actors within Indonesia political economy, that they 
arose and gained power during Suharto‘s New Order, and that the transition to democracy does 
not constitute a significant disruption or even diminution of their power.
70
   
In Indonesia there are a lot of followers of Oligarchy theorist including the leading Indonesia anti-
corruption NGO Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW). Like other Oligarchist advocates ICW argue that 
the pattern of corruption was changing from corruption by one oligarchy to multiparty 
oligarchy corruption in post-Suharto era, in which the democratic system deficiency was being 
exploited by the elites through power sharing. As a result, these ruling elites were able to 
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hamper any attempts by the reformists to reform the public services, political system or 
judiciary.
71
  
While Robison, Hadiz and Winters theory quite persuasive in interpreting Indonesia 
political dynamic, in my view, it is overstated the role of business elite. While these elites 
clearly has advantage with their massive wealth, but in practice in it was not easy for them to 
manipulate the state as much as they please for their wealth accumulation agenda. In Some 
cases, for instance, Indonesia Chinese business under Suharto clearly had less political 
leverage that they have to entertain the economic and commercial need of much influential 
military leader.  
Another caveat for oligarchist theory is that it too much focusing on one variable that 
triggered political action, which is wealth accumulation. There is an array of examples shows 
that political, social, cultural or global variable have more influence on the policy outcome of 
government. This shows that in terms of policy making that is dynamic, complex and 
unpredictable, wealth accumulation is only one part of many determining variables.  
Another theory that quite similar to oligarchy theory is the cartel theory. This theory 
was widely applied in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, because since then Indonesia political 
party became an important political avenue in determining the national policy. The cartel 
theory is originated from Katz and Mair when they analyzed the phenomena of cartelization in 
Europe political parties. According to Katz and Mair theory cartelization emerges because 
political parties had deprived its income from declining, therefore there is a need for political 
party to exploit state resource through collusion among each other. To make matter worse, as 
political party more detach from society and taking care of each other by distributing the 
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spoils, there no genuine competition among parties and lack of grass-root support. Therefore an 
election is only façade, the opposition become toothless, since they would prefer to get share of 
the spoil from government. As a result the same cartel would likely come back to power in 
every election, with only marginal change in its composition.
72
 
The ‗cartelization‘ concept of Katz and Mair is applied to Indonesia by Dodi Ambardi 
and Dan Slater. They argue that Indonesia‘s political elites in the post-Suharto era are more 
accountable to each other than to their voters. Therefore, this cartel appointed their proxy in the 
cabinet for the distribution of spoils that was emanating from the state resource.
73
 As Slater 
argued, this breeds accountability deficits where democracy is still vulnerable and can be easily 
dismantled by authoritarian leaders.
74
 Cartelization theory has broad followers in Indonesia in 
addition to its originator, Ambardi, like Hargens, Noor and Tjandra.
75
  
Again similar to structural/ oligarchist theory, the main weakness of cartel theory that 
the only variable in its analysis on political action is solely economy or commercial motive, not 
taking into account other factors which in my view is also important like, politics or social 
variables that reflect the complexity of political process in Indonesia. Another limitation in 
cartel theorist that it assumes that consensus among political party leaders can be forged 
strongly and consistently. There is still degree of competition between Indonesia political 
parties due to its fragmentation of its constituent support. Beside, as it will be shown in the 
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empirical chapters, under post-Suharto era presidents there were many difficulties facing to 
maintain coalition disciplines despite the rebel party was officially part of governing coalition 
and was given portfolio in cabinet. This was happening during SBY period where Islamic party 
PKS was very critical and even join opposition in some of government policy in parliament 
despite a couple of its cadres was a cabinet member. 
The Case for the Application of Political Pluralism in Indonesia politics 
This thesis will mainly use political pluralism as its analytical framework. The theory, in my 
view, is able to fill in the gaps arising from the weaknesses that emerge from either a state-
centered patrimonial or neo-patrimonial state, structuralist emanating from the Marxist 
approach, or even cartelization, as outlined above.   
The political pluralism approaches which advocate the need for high quality democracy 
became internationally recognized by the American leading political scientist Robert Dahl, 
from his early writing in the 1950s
76
 to his seminal book of 1998 entitled ‗On Democracy‘. The 
main feature of Dahl‘s proposition is that democracy can only flourish in a market-oriented 
economy, not a non-market-oriented one. However, as the economy grows, a tension arises 
between democracy and the market economy and they also reshape each other continuously.
77
 
Also, according to Dahl, the market system becomes an impediment to achieving high quality 
democracy because it also creates inequality within political resources, including wealth, 
income, organization, information, education and knowledge.
78
   
The implications of Dahl‘s theory is, in my view, twofold: the focus of the analysis 
instead on macro political structure should be complemented on the level of the political actors, 
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especially with regard to how they mobilize resources and distribute them democratically 
through the state institutions to reduce inequality. As many studies show, at least in the context 
of Indonesia, the political resources under the authority of the political actors who aim to enact 
reform are highly limited, while other players, although few in number, like oligarchs, possess 
a substantial amount of political resources. Dahl also shows that wealth is not only an 
important resource to achieve political goals, as mentioned above.  
Dahl‘s approach can also be linked to the concept of the state of Midgal, in which he 
argues that, rather than seeing a state as a single entity, it actually represents a competitive 
arena for rule making authority between the state or non-state political actors or political 
groups consisting of these two actors.
79
 In this case, the state officials can collaborate with non-
state actors like civil society or the media to enact reform, competing with the more 
conservative group. On the other hand, for instance, oligarchs can work with conservative state 
officials to derail or even dismiss any attempt at reform. Furthermore, Peppinsky developed 
further the political pluralism approach by outlining the importance of policy as an object of 
political contestation between political actors. He argues that ‗political actors engage in politics 
to produce policies that they favor‘.80  
 The application of the political pluralism approach in the case of Indonesia is actually 
relatively similar to Dahl‘s thinking had just gain international recognition. The seminal work 
of Feith in 1962, analyzing the political rivalry between the administrator group led by Hatta 
and the solidarity-maker group led by Sukarno in the parliamentary democracy era from the 
1940s to the 1950s, also mentions the number of governance reforms pushed by the 
administrator group and the corruption that implicated mainly the solidarity-maker group. The 
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administrator group aspired to create a modern state of Indonesia with an impartial 
bureaucracy, civilian supremacy over the military, a functioning judiciary and a well-
established parliamentary system, following the Dutch or UK model. Meanwhile, the 
solidarity-maker group was led by Indonesian leaders, who were skeptical about what they 
regarded as a ‗foreign implant‘ parliamentary democracy system and passionate about 
advancing the revolutionary struggle for their nationalists agenda.
81
 It was suspected that Feith 
was influenced by his supervisor in Cornell University George Mc Kahin who applied the 
same approach in his book about Indonesia national revolution in 1945.
82
 
 During Suharto‘s New Order era, a number of leading Indonesia expert amalgamate the 
political pluralism theory with patrimonial state theory. They observe that, despite the prowess 
of Indonesia‘s military rule, which in the last ten years became the personalization rule by 
Suharto, there was still space for political rivalry. The competition between political actors or 
group under the authoritarian rule of Suharto not necessarily had to be on wealth or resource 
accumulation, but also on fundamental policy. For instance, in the context of rivalry on 
economic policy under Suharto‘s government between the technocrats and nationalist or 
political rivalry between the military and ruling Golkar politicians. Emmerson and King are 
using bureaucratic pluralism for this stream of analytical framework. Another literature that is 
focusing on economic policy reform under Suharto that center around the role of technocrats 
using modified pluralism framework is outline by Bresnan
83
 as well as Soesastro.
84
 Even, in his 
first book, Winters also applied some sort of quasi-pluralism approach that also highlights the 
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competition between the technocrats and the nationalist group in the context of economic 
reform under the New Order era.
85
  
 In post-Suharto Indonesia, most of the literature seeks to evaluate the state of 
Indonesia‘s state of democracy in the context of the international democracy literature that 
analyzes the success and otherwise of countries that experienced the transition from 
authoritarianism towards a more democratic political structure.  Leading international 
democracy experts, like Linz, Stepan and Diamond, identify a number of countries in their 
systematic studies that have consolidated a democratic system.
86
 In developing further his 
theory on democratic transition, Diamond introduces several criteria that constitute a basic 
standard for democracy that includes: universal, adult suffrage; free and competitive elections; 
more than one serious political party; and alternative sources of information. If a country 
achieves these basic criteria, then the quality of democracy will be determined by the progress 
in these issues: political and civil freedom, popular sovereignty (in demanding accountability 
from public officials), political equality and standards of good governance (transparency, 
legality and responsible rule).
87
 Therefore, in this thesis, the analysis will take into account 
these democracy criteria as well as assessing the degree of Indonesia‘s democratic 
consolidation. According to a number of leading international democracy experts, democracy 
can be considered as consolidated when there is broad support and deep-rooted engagement 
from society at large as well as a view that democracy is the only political framework for 
governing society and channeling its political interests, whether these be those of the ruling or 
opposition party. Therefore, they all comply with rules and practice, although the result is 
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dissatisfying at times.
88
 However, regarding the political history of Indonesia, there has been a 
set-back in terms of democratization, which led to an authoritarian political structure under 
Sukarno‘s guided democracy and Suharto‘s three-decade reign under the New Order era. This 
retreat from democracy is seen by a number of leading international experts as democracy 
rollback that usually features the dismantling of the checks-and-balance system, like 
parliament and the judiciary, and strengthens the government‘s dominance over these crucial 
institutions.
89
 In extreme cases, it closely resembled the personalization of government.  
Therefore, this thesis will not only take into account the consolidation of democracy, but also 
the democratic regression, or democratic rollback, in its analysis.  
Along the line of Diamond, Linz and Stepan thinking, a number of international leading 
scholars on Indonesia politics that apply the political pluralism approach after the fall of 
Suharto. These leading scholars in my view can be divided into two groups: the Democracy 
optimists and Democracy cautious optimists. The former, such as Greg Barton have focused 
their analysis on Indonesia‘s strong civil society, peaceful elections, the introduction of direct 
elections and the withdrawal of the military from politics.
90
 Meanwhile, Ramage and 
McAntyre argue that Indonesia‘s ‗presidential-style framework of democratic government has 
been progressively refined and bedded down‘.91   
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More cautious optimism has been expressed by scholars such as Edward Aspinall and 
Harold Crouch. Aspinall acknowledges that Indonesia has been successful in building a 
functioning procedural democracy as a result of the relatively smooth transition from 
authoritarianism because of the accommodation of the New Order elite that undermined the 
quality of democracy in Indonesia. 
92
 However, he argues that the trade-off between 
democratic success and its quality was worth is justified.
93
 
According to Crouch, the constitutional amendments from 1999-2002 indicate that 
Indonesia achieved international democratic standards, as evidenced by the national and 
regional election, which reflected the true preferences of voters.
94
 However, Crouch admitted 
that the patronage system that part of surviving segments in New Order had remained intact. 
95
 
The cautious optimistic approach was also the position of the World Bank through their report 
that was pleased with democratic progress, but concern with old elite‘s effort to regain 
power.
96
  
With a more somber assessment than Aspinall and Crouch, Jamie Davidson argues that 
the lack of democratic rule of law will dissuade ‗formal rights and freedoms of political 
equality and civic participation‘.97 Davidson also believes that the militarization of society 
continues to hinder the democratic consolidation effort.
98
Prominent international political 
scholar Donald Horowitz also observe that despite progress, Indonesia merely achieve electoral 
democracy since without the safeguards and protections necessary for fully democratic status.  
This was because a constant attack by opposition to achieve robust democratic system, like 
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continuous attack on KPK and an effort to politicize electoral system.
99
Also, Mietzner in his 
latest article is quite critical in the state of democracy in Indonesia where he argues that SBY 
two term of presidency in 2004 - 2014 was a missed-opportunity to achieve a substantial 
democracy consolidation.
100
 
However, the political pluralism analytical framework will not sufficient, in my view, 
to analyze the various challenges and opportunities that political leaders must navigate to 
ensure that they can deliver desirable political outcomes to improve the quality of democracy. 
Thus, in my view, Liddle makes a relevant point about the need for an additional framework in 
order better to articulate and analyze how these political leaders push to improve the quality of 
democratic governance, amidst the unequal political resources identified by Dahl.
101
 
As a result, to complement political pluralism, political actor theory will be employed, 
including the political aspect of public policy that was introduced by John W. Kingdon in his 
classic book, ‗Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policies‘. Kingdon developed his theory based 
on 23 study cases of policy decision making in the United States for the period 1977-1981. 
According to Kingdon, the successful policy was driven by what he called policy entrepreneurs 
who may be drawn from the government, parliament or even non-state actors. These policy 
entrepreneurs possess important quality traits: experts in the field or able to articulate policy on 
behalf of their constituents; strong political connections as well as high negotiation skills; and 
persistency in pushing for the policy that he or she advocates.
102
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This policy entrepreneur must be able to maneuver effectively in three independent 
situations: identifying the problem, crafting a policy proposal, and dealing with political 
events, known in short as problems, policy and politics.  An effective policy entrepreneur will 
be determined by whether he can identify when these three streams of situations merge and 
how to act based on this window of opportunity with skills and knowledge to solve the 
problem. Since these three situations are volatile, the policy making process is uncertain, 
complex and sometime cumbersome.
103
 This thesis aims to identify a number of policy 
entrepreneurs as well as determine the sequence of problems, policy and politics in the context 
of governance reform and anti-corruption measures in each Indonesian presidential period 
since independence. Subsequently, it will analyze how this policy entrepreneur managed to 
maneuver effectively among the problems, policy and politics aspect that led to governance 
reform or effective anti-corruption efforts.  
In addition to Kingdon, there is another political actor theory to analyze the leadership 
aspect of political leaders. James M. Burns, in his seminal book on political leadership, 
classified the types of political leaders based on the interactions between them and their 
followers into two categories: transactional leadership and transformational leadership. 
According to Burns, transactional leaders approach followers for merely exchanging one thing 
for another, like jobs for votes, or subsidies for campaign contributions, like in the legislature 
or political parties.
104
 On the other hand, transforming leaders are more compelling, because 
they emerge from the fundamental wants, needs, aspirations and values of their followers. 
Thus, transforming leaders are expected to produce social change and will satisfy their 
followers‘ needs.105 However, in my view, another category should be added, which is semi-
transformational leadership. This type of leadership would bring about credible changes but 
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these would be less far-reaching than under transformational leadership, and also vulnerable, as 
the changes could be reverted but, unlike transactional leaders, semi-transformational leaders, 
in my view, do not enact changes based solely on the value exchange motive, but out of 
personal idealism or, in the case of groups, collective idealism. By applying Burns‘ framework, 
with a slight modification, this thesis aims to evaluate each presidency of Indonesia in terms of 
its leadership traits with regard to governance reform and an anti-corruption drive, but it also 
seeks to evaluate the leadership of other political actors who were able to execute policy that 
brought about significant progress in the context of governance reform and anti-corruption.  
The Importance of the Subject 
Most of the literature on anti-corruption initiatives in developing countries shows that these 
have not proved very successful.  The notable exceptions are Singapore and Hong Kong, which 
were successful due to their small population and area, as well as their more developed and 
relatively homogenous society. This case study hardly works as a model for larger, more 
complex developing countries like Phillpines, Egypt, Vietnam, India and Indonesia.   
Therefore, the importance of the subject of this thesis is fourfold. First, it provides a 
comprehensive study of the whole anti-corruption campaign and governance reform of the 
Indonesian government at the national level, from independence to the end of SBY‘s term, by 
utilizing sources from the UK National Archives, the National Archives of Australia and 
recently published US Embassy cables from Wikileaks.  Second, this thesis is an assessment as 
well as a comparative study, which expects to identify the source of the progress and failures of 
governance reform and anti-corruption initiatives in each era or presidency.  Third, the thesis 
aims to contribute to the available Indonesia contemporary political history literature, focusing 
on governance reform and the anti-corruption campaign at the national level.  Most of the 
available literature has focused on either Indonesian politics in general within a certain period 
or research on particular political institutions in Indonesia, such as the military, parliament, the 
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political parties and the Supreme Court. Fourth, this study of governance reform and anti-
corruption initiatives at the national level in Indonesia may serve as a model for other, large, 
complex developing countries that undertake a similar multifaceted set of challenges.  
Conceptual/Analytical Framework  
This thesis will draw mainly on the political pluralism conceptual frameworks in order to 
analyze the political dynamics concerning anti-corruption initiatives and governance reform by 
each presidency from 1945-2014.   Contrary to the Oligarchy or Cartelization theorists, where 
the accumulation of wealth dominates the motives of the political actors, in my view, the 
pluralist theory is the most feasible tool for describing the complexity of the multiple political 
actors with differing motives who are competing to influence policy. The competition between 
the political actors is in the context of one group who was pushing for governance reform and 
an anti-corruption agenda, while the other group was maintaining the status quo through 
economic patronage that circumvents the formal political institutions.  As Aspinall aptly states: 
‘That these struggles are complex, and take place in contradictory and fragmented ways, 
involving ever-shifting political coalitions and conflicts, reflects the complexity of Indonesian 
democracy…‘106 Another case that supports the application of the pluralist theory, based on 
Pepinsky‘s argument, is the fact that: ‗Critical pluralism has the capacity to produce 
hypotheses….that test the link between political actions by or on behalf of those with great 
material wealth and the outcomes of contestations over policy‘.107For more reference on the 
argument for the application of political pluralism theory along the critics on oligarchy and 
cartel theory is discussed in detail in the previous section.  
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As a result, the political pluralist theory analytical framework, along with the other 
analytical framework will be mostly applied in this thesis following the structure below: 
First, to analyze the anti-corruption measures and governance reform from the Sukarno 
to the SBY era, this thesis mainly applies the political pluralism analytical framework. It 
emphasizes the political contestation between the reformists who pushed for the governance 
reform agenda versus the conservative elements within Indonesia‘s political elites, who 
preferred a revolution agenda supported by informal economic patronage to influence policy 
outcome in government, particularly in Sukarno‘s era, as Indonesian civil society had not yet 
developed into a formidable political force. During Sukarno‘s era, this thesis will apply Herbert 
Feith‘s analytical framework of the contestation between two competing political groups: the 
administrators versus the solidarity-makers. However, on entering the guided democracy era 
with a different set of political structures, the analysis will emphasize the competition between 
the Army and the Indonesian Communist Party in vying for Sukarno‘s political 
accommodation to influence government policy.  
 Second, for the analysis of Suharto‘s New Order era, we will also employ mostly the 
political pluralism approach, albeit with some modifications regarding the evolving political 
structure that centered on Suharto, the dominant political figure during that era. In the New 
Order era, we will analyze the dynamic of political competition between, among other bodies, 
the military, students, the opposition group, the nationalists‘ business group, and the 
technocrats. During this period, the technocrats, the student activists, the reformist element in 
the military, the reformist faction in the ruling state party Golkar and other reformist elements 
were trying to push for governance reform and the anti-corruption agenda, while facing 
resistance from the oligarchs or the nationalists group.  
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 Third, for the post-Suharto era, from President Habibie in 1998 to President 
Yudhoyono in 2004, we will also utilize the political pluralism approach to analyze the 
competition between the political actors within the government, parliament and other crucial 
state institutions in the context of advancing the governance reform and anti-corruption 
endeavors. However, this section will evaluate whether Indonesia underwent a transition from 
an authoritarian governance structure.  This determines whether Indonesia, after SBY, 
achieved democracy as ‗the only game in town‘, as Linz and Stepan described it108 or, as 
Diamond argues, whether democracy was already so institutionalized that it had become so 
much the norm and profoundly legitimate in society that it was unlikely to break down.
109
Also, 
a similar democratic consolidation framework is applied in the previous chapters on Suharto 
and Sukarno‘s era to supplement the political pluralism analytical framework in an attempt to 
identify the trajectory of democratic consolidation or regression from Indonesia independence 
to the SBY period. 
 Fourth, in supplementing the political pluralism approach from Indonesia‘s 
independence until the SBY period as well as democratic consolidation theory, it will apply 
Kingdon‘s framework of politics of public policy analysis to identify the policy entrepreneurs 
in each era who played an important role in pushing for substantial governance reform and 
anti-corruption policy by taking into account the problem, policy and political aspects of it. 
Furthermore, Burns‘ framework will also be utilized in the empirical chapters and as a base for 
the general conclusion to discover what type of leadership each president and other political 
leaders possess in the context of pushing governance reform and an anti-corruption drive 
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during the respective periods. Kingdon and Burns‘ analytical frameworks were already 
discussed comprehensively in the previous section.  
 Fifth, to complement the analytical framework above in analyzing Indonesia‘s domestic 
political dynamic, a country-level analysis will be utilized widely, employing governance, 
democratization or corruption indices that assess the cross-country performance and annual 
trends in those issues. These international indicators include Transparency International‘s 
Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank‘s Governance Indicator and the Freedom 
Index. It was anticipated that the usage of these various international indicators would help us 
to identify Indonesia‘s governance reform and anti-corruption measure performance 
trajectories from independence in 1945 to the end of SBY period in 2014.   
The utilization of Governance and Corruption Indicators: its Strength and Weaknesses  
The methodology applied in a number of governance and corruption indices that is publicized 
by international institutions, like Transparency International, the World Bank and Freedom 
House has certainly attracted criticism. The most common objections that the indicators are 
based on expert or informed opinion, systematically gathered and arrayed with or against other 
perceptions and surveyed views, and therefore prone to subjectivity and opinion bias.
110
 
Furthermore, a number of academics criticize the methodology‘s soundness in collecting the 
data to produce these indicators; for instance, the statistical issue in processing the data and the 
categorization of the data variables,
111
 while others go even further by questioning the political 
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motives or implications of the governance indices, and thereby urging the need to depoliticize 
this indicator‘s measure.112 
  It is outside the scope and expertise of this thesis on political history to discuss in depth  
the merit of statistics and the quantitative methods of the various governance and corruption 
indices, as features in several of the academics articles mentioned above.  While 
acknowledging some merit of this criticism, its wide-ranging nature also demonstrates that 
there is no general consensus about what constitutes an ideal instrument or valid methodology 
for measuring the country‘s level of governance and corruption. As mentioned in the previous 
section and to add complexity, there is not even any consensus between leading international 
scholars about the general concept and definition of governance and corruption itself, despite 
their strong theoretical or methodological justification in backing-up the arguments. Therefore, 
in my view, the variety of definitions, interpretations as well as strengths and weaknesses of 
the methodology‘s application should be acknowledged in a transparent and accountable way 
as part of the academic discourse, including in this thesis. Besides, the World Bank, TI, 
Freedom Foundation and the Economist, in my view, have made a contribution towards 
enriching the academic debate by comprehensively outlining their methodology and even 
responding to criticism directly either on their website or more rigorously in the form of 
academic papers published in various leading academic journals.
113
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  However, for this thesis, in my view the World Bank‘s Governance, TI governance 
index and Freedom Indexes provide sufficient tools for providing cross-country comparisons, 
considering that they covers most of countries in the world and were produced by a relatively 
impartial credible international institution. The problem with most recent second generation 
governance indicators is that they still have their own methodological impediments, limitations 
in scope and lack of international stature. Besides, despite their weaknesses, these indicators 
have gained international and national acceptance, as they are widely quoted in international, 
leading or national mass media, like the New York Times, Washington Post, Tempo, Kompas 
and others. Some government and international organizations like the US Millennium 
Challenge Corporation use the WB governance indicators as one of the bases for making their 
decisions, and even SBY‘s government used TI‘s Corruption perception index as one of the 
performance indicators for their anti-corruption program.
114
 Within the academic community, 
although acknowledging its limitations, a number of leading international political and 
economic experts as well as leading Indonesian political experts used one or more of these 
governance  and corruption indicators in their academic writing as one of their analytical tools 
in the leading academic publications in their respective fields.
115
 Even two of the world‘s 
leading democracy experts, Alfred Stepan and Larry Diamond, use these governance and 
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corruption indicators in their analysis of the state of Indonesia‘s democracy, so this thesis 
follows a distinguished precedent in using these indicators as an analytical tool.
116
  
As a result, based on its international exposure as well as widespread (if not universal) 
acceptance in academic circles and some of its methodological strength, the governance 
indicators based on the aggregation of expertise or business community perceptions, in my 
view, could still provide a suitable contribution by this study by identifying Indonesia‘s state of 
governance and corruption trajectories from the late Suharto era to the SBY era, at least in the 
business community or international experts‘ perception. Using these indicators as analytical 
tools, in my view, will enrich and complement the theoretical basis of this thesis by 
contributing to the existing Indonesian political academic literature.  
The application of various governance and corruption indicators as one of the analytical 
tools in this thesis as well as the acknowledgement of some bias in Indonesia‘s case will be 
discussed thoroughly in the conclusion section. Also, the purpose in using several governance 
indicators for this study is to reduce the potential bias and pitfalls associated with using only 
one indicator. Also, applying multi governance indicators can also be seen as a corroboration 
mechanism, should certain indicators produce a biased or inconclusive result.  
Thesis Arguments 
This thesis will advance three arguments that will encompass and interlink the various 
chapters: the first is that, despite all of the rhetoric about championing the cause, governance 
reform has never been seen as a long-term endeavor and therefore was never applied 
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consistently from independence to the SBY era. As a result,  the technocrats/professionals 
within the government did not have sufficient political capital, adequate critical mass support 
from within each institution, nor sufficient resources to be able to push for a more 
comprehensive and considered reform. Therefore, the governance reform within the 
government and state agencies has, so far, been limited, uneven and, in some cases, even 
reverted. Second, these anti-corruption drives from Indonesian independence until the 
inception of the KPK in 2004 were mostly arbitrary, with a limited impact and also selective in 
nature amid the political inclination. As consequence, these anti-corruption initiatives never 
went far in addressing the crux of the problem which was dismantling the patronage at the 
epicenter of power which meant prosecuting high profile corruption cases indiscriminately. 
Third, the prosecution of high profile corruption cases by the KPK during SBY‘s presidency 
changed the sense of impunity among political elites implicated in corruption cases, albeit not 
considerably, considering that the other law enforcement agencies failed to step-up their work 
– some of their own members were even arrested by the KPK. Thus, despite the promising 
performance by the KPK during the decade of SBY‘s presidency, their impact remained 
limited, since the KPK‘s organizational and resource scale was still too miniscule compared to 
that of the Police and the AGO. Therefore, despite the KPK‘s ability to sustain and even 
accelerate the anti-corruption drive during the two terms of SBY‘s presidency, overall, the 
political, economic and social structure as well as the persistent institutional failure that 
induced and incubated corruption remained largely intact.  
Original Contribution 
The literature discussed above shows that, while the available academic literature on the anti-
corruption initiatives and governance reform measures has focused on Indonesia‘s political 
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history, this analysis has often centered on more general discussions of a single episode in 
Indonesia‘s political history from the Sukarno or Suharto period117 as well as the transition to 
democracy in the post-Suharto era. Other academic works are fragmentary, disconnected and 
highly-specialized, such as studying exclusively the military,
118
 parliament,
119
 judiciary,
120
 and 
political parties.
121
  
This thesis attempts to fill the literature gap by focusing on the link between two 
prominent issues – governance reform and anti-corruption initiatives – in Indonesia‘s political 
history that are often mentioned but rarely examined in a single comprehensive study covering 
multi-period presidential terms. The scope of the study that is outlined is not too general, but 
neither too specialized, so that it can identify the trajectories and measures the trends in 
governance reform and the anti-corruption initiative issue at the national level in Indonesia 
from the Sukarno to the SBY periods.  
The aim of this study is also to complement the existing academic work on political 
history that applies the political pluralism analytical framework and provides a more complex, 
nuanced picture of the political dynamics of the fierce rivalry between the reformists, who 
were determined to push governance reform as well as implement an anti-corruption effort, 
while facing vested interests that tended to be political oligarchic forces and conservative 
elements in government that were aiming to maintain the status quo.  
Sources and Methodology 
This thesis is based on empirical research undertaken through a wide variety of primary 
sources.  The chapter on corruption during the Old Order and New Order is mainly based upon 
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non-Indonesian archives.  The rarely-used primary sources are from the UK, and Australian 
embassies in Jakarta, available at the British National Archives and the Australian National 
Archives, while the recently published US Embassy cable was accessed via the Wikileaks‘s 
website. The Indonesian newspapers were accessed from the Indonesia National Archives in 
Jakarta as well as the Institutes of Southeast Asia Studies (ISEAS)‘s library in Singapore, like 
Pedoman, Indonesia Raya, Kompas, Sinar Harapan, Tempo and Suara Pembaruan. Also, from 
ISEAS library, the Far Eastern Economic Review and Asiaweek were obtained.  
  On the post-Suharto period, the minutes of the Indonesian National Parliament and 
correspondence relating to the deliberation processes regarding the KPK Law in 2002 were 
utilized. There are also various state official documents like People‘s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) decrees, government decrees, and ministerial decrees. The court decision documents 
from the anti-corruption court on a number of corruption cases that implicated high state 
officials as well as regional leaders were also obtained.  
Other documents were used as primary sources from a number of leading anti 
corruption NGOs in Indonesia, like Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) and Transparency 
International Indonesia (TII). These documents are analytical reports, press releases and annual 
reports.  I also obtained materials from other NGOs that focus on good governance and anti-
corruption issues from their interactive as well as resourceful websites, such as Indonesia 
Transparency Society (MTI) and Indonesia‘s Law and Policy Study Centre (PSHK).  
Material from the international donor agency, including quarterly reports as well as 
other briefing materials particularly from the World Bank Office and Asian Development Bank 
Office in Jakarta was also utilized. The primary sources from other donor agencies that played 
a key role especially during the post-Suharto era, including documents or material from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), were also employed.  
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The Indonesian government has been posting Laws, Government Regulations (PP), 
Presidential Decision Decrees (Keppres), Presidential Instruction Decrees (Inpres) as well as 
Presidential Regulation Decrees (Perpres) via the Cabinet Secretary‘s website 
(http://sipuu.setkab.go.id/ ). Most of the laws and government regulations as well as 
presidential decrees obtained from this government‘s official website were used for this thesis.  
Also, during the SBY period, the US Embassy‘s cables, published by Wikileaks, are 
employed in this research as a primary source. Certainly, there is controversy surrounding the 
use of Wikileaks as a source for academic work, especially concerning some ethics as well as 
legality, since the documents are not properly declassified.
122
 Nonetheless, the US officials 
admitted that the security damage to US foreign policy was contained and merely an 
embarrassment to their country‘s counterpart.123 Furthermore, there is also a question regarding 
the validity of the data, as they have not been properly vetted in the US disclosure policy.
124
  
However, the US embassy cables used in this thesis are neither the main nor the only primary 
sources employed. At best, the cables provide complementary information for this research and 
act as an instrument for checking the consistency of our other primary sources, especially 
weekly magazine and newspaper articles. Besides, the information contained in the cables is a 
subjective interpretation of political events, and therefore should be divided rigorously from 
other primary sources, like policy decrees or interviews with the main political actors.  
  Nonetheless, it is difficult to ignore the rich resources of the US Embassy cables 
provided by Wikileaks, especially in a field like International History, where primary sources 
are fundamental in strengthening the research methodology.  As Gabriel argues, ‗information 
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provided by Wikileaks provides valuable insights into a wide variety of areas that are relevant 
to research…and offers an expansive source of data‘.125 Therefore, to find the correct balance 
between utilizing valuable sources and security concerns, the cables used in this research were 
carefully selected so that they will not have any ramifications for US security interests. 
Besides, a large amount of academic work in reputable journals utilizes the US cables from 
Wikileaks as the main primary source for their respective research.
126
 
The documents from archives, government institutions and NGOs will be further 
supplemented by newspapers from Sukarno‘s period, the New Order Era and the post-Suharto 
period. From the Sukarno period, leading newspapers like Pedoman and Indonesia Raya are 
used. From the New Order era until the post-Suharto period, the focus will be on national 
newspapers and current affairs magazines, such as Kompas, Tempo, Gatra, Media Indonesia, 
Seputar Indonesia, Jakarta Post and Jakarta Globe.  This research will also use articles from 
leading Indonesian news websites, like kompas.com, detik.com, Tempo.co, vivanews.com, and 
Okezone.com. 
Written historical records and documents will be further supplemented by interviews. 
This is particularly important as Indonesia has an oral rather than a written culture, as a result 
of which documentation can be sparse.  I have conducting more than 80 interviews with high-
ranking government officials, state officials, MPs, Indonesian and foreign businessmen, 
Indonesian and international Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) activists, Indonesian 
and foreign journalists, as well as academic researchers specializing in Indonesian politics.  
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The interviewees involved in my research (2011-2014) in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Singapore, 
Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Singapore are outlined in the Bibliography section. These 
interviews serve the purpose of adding detail to the written documentation and exploring the 
motivation behind the key decisions. As personal memories are sometimes unreliable
127
 and 
there are also issues regarding objectivity,
128
 this research will address these shortcomings by 
corroborating information across interviews and carefully assessing the data obtained.
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Chapter 2: Rationalization and Revolution: the Battle of Ideas and Policy on 
Governance Reform and Anti-Corruption during Indonesia’s parliamentary 
democracy era 
 
 
When Indonesia eventually attained international official recognition as an independent 
country in December 1949, it faced an exigent task of Governance Reform. The challenge for 
the political leaders was to work together towards achieving common goals, but divisions 
among the elites started to emerge, making this formidable yet necessary mission even more 
complicated.  
This chapter will chart the debate on the analytical framework for the administrator 
group versus the solidarity maker group in the context of policy battle ideas under the 
parliamentary democracy era. Then, this chapter starts by presenting an overview of how Sutan 
Sjahrir – who later became the first Prime Minister – managed to secure huge concessions from 
Sukarno in accepting the application of a parliamentary democracy system in Indonesia during 
the early post-revolutionary era. Furthermore, this chapter highlights how Hatta led the initial 
governance reform effort in pushing for, inter alia, the rationalization of Indonesia‘s military 
and civil service.  Then, as the country entered the parliamentary democracy system era, this 
chapter will highlight the struggle between two relatively opposing camps: the administrator 
group led by Hatta, that was a group whose power depended on their skill in managing a 
modern government and that placed great emphasis on economic as well as administrative 
problem solving.  On the other hand, there was the solidarity marker group - that emphasized 
the revolution and ideology over the rational solution of economic, administrative or other 
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problems - led by Sukarno.
130
 In the end, this chapter will also analyze a number of governance 
reforms as well as anti-corruption initiatives which were led mainly by the administrator group 
leaders but that proved ineffectual and even failed to garner public support.  
There are nine sections in this chapter. The first section will outline the academic 
literature debate by interpreting the parliamentary democracy period in which huge political 
rivalry existed between the political group led by Sukarno on the other hand and the other 
group led by Hatta. The enactment of the parliamentary democracy system soon after 
Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 and the early rationalization policy pushed by 
Hatta will be discussed in the second section. Subsequently, the third section will illustrate the 
start of the struggle of the political group known as the administrator group, which tried to 
push for governance reform led by Hatta, which was supported among others by the Islamic 
party, Masyumi, and the Indonesia Socialist Party (PSI). The group faced the other political 
group known as the solidarity makers, led by Sukarno which was supported, among others, by 
the PNI and Indonesia Communist Party (PKI).  Then, the fourth section will examine the 
continuous struggle between the administrator group and solidarity maker group under the 
government led by Prime Minister Sukiman and Wilopo. The open conflict between the army 
and civilian government led to the 17 October 1952 affair and its aftermath that culminated in 
the dismissal of Chief of Army A.H. Nasution, will be outlined in the fifth section. Moreover, 
the sixth section will examine Wilopo‘s cabinet‘s mixed result in terms of pushing for 
governance reform. The politicization of bureaucracy as well as growing patronage in Prime 
Minister Ali Sastroamdjojo‘s government and continuing conflict with the military will be 
highlighted in the seventh section, while the eighth section will outline how Prime Minister 
Burhanuddin Harahap‘s government managed to organize a successful national election in 
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1955 and pushed for a number of anti-corruption measures, although their impact was limited. 
The ninth section will provide the conclusion of this chapter.  
Several arguments will be advanced in this chapter.  Firstly, the administrator group, at 
the peak of their influence when Hatta was vice president and prime minister, would have been 
able to influence the government policy outcome when he assigned the administrator group 
type of leader to the important cabinet portfolios, such as finance and commerce.  Also, with 
the support of the Minister of Defense, the Military Chief and, more importantly, the Army 
Chief, Hatta was able to push the military reform.  However, the second argument posits that 
Sukarno‘s political skills, with support from the solidarity maker group, managed to derail the 
governance reform and anti-corruption initiatives proposed by the administrator group near the 
national election in 1955. The third argument advanced is that the administrator group was 
unsuccessful in translating the benefits of the governance reform effort into an effective and 
populist message to galvanize political support from Indonesia‘s electoral voters as shown by 
the disastrous result at the 1955 national election, which cost Burhanuddin‘s government 
political support.  
The rivalry of the Administrator versus the Solidarity Maker Group and the Diminished 
Parliamentary Democracy Legitimacy 
 
There were a number of criticisms of the application of the political pluralism framework  
between the ‗administrator group‘ versus the ‗solidarity makers‘, as introduced by Herbet Feith 
in his seminal book, ‗Declining Constitutional Democracy.‘ Harry J. Benda argues that Feith 
ignored the intrinsic elements of Indonesian society, history and politics, where the deep roots 
of Javanese-Hindu and its resilience were manifested in Indonesia-driven economic and 
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societal development. Therefore, the failure of the ‗administrator‘ group in pushing for 
parliamentary democracy should be expected.
131
  
 The twice Prime Minister of Indonesia, Ali Sastroamidjojo, also objected that the 
Administrator versus Solidarity Maker framework was too narrow to explain in terms of 
merely ‗good‘ versus ‗bad‘ without taking into account the complexity of the problems in the 
country.
132
 Sastroamidjojo argued that, during the transition period, when it was still influenced 
by feudalism, it was necessary to have leaders who possessed ‗charisma‘. Therefore, the 
administrator group should share the blame on causing the economic crisis.
133
 
In supporting Benda‘s propositions, Notosusanto outlined that parliamentary 
democracy was abandoned because it had been prematurely adopted since the majority of 
Indonesians remained poor and ill-prepared to espouse the system, and so were exploited by 
self-interested politicians.
134
  
Meanwhile, McVey argued that, when the administrator group discovered that the 
populace did not share their ideas about what needed to be done and the mounting  PKI threat 
to their political  position, they began‘ to look beyond the other framework of parliamentary 
politics for puissant support‘.135 
The other experts focused on the role of Sukarno‘s political skill as a charismatic 
leader.  Koe and Kiliang see Sukarno as a charismatic savior, reflecting the chain reaction 
between the frustration and expectations of Indonesian society under social and economic 
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duress.
136
 Pauker argues that since, during the colonial period, the Dutch had discouraged 
political organizational activities; the Indonesia elites took advantage of this and had 
‗transmitted them to the unorganized masses through rhetoric alone‘. 137 Nevertheless, Wilson 
defended Sukarno, as he had intervened out of concern about the endless political parties‘ 
bickering and the threat of separatists in several regions.
138
 
Meanwhile, Slater highlights that the fierce political factionalism among the Indonesia 
elites at the end of the revolution could only be held together by cumbersome governing 
coalitions.  As a consequence, this triggered mass spending on patronage, that contributed to 
‘dyadic, clientelistic, and disorganized‘ state-business relations.139  
Bertrand, in line with Slater, meanwhile, explicitly outlines that political factionalism 
existed between the nationalists, Islamists and communists‘ camp, adding that the failure of 
parliamentary democracy in Indonesia was due to the small size of the middle class and its 
insufficient economic strength to support a democratic regime.
140
 
However, in my opinion, assuming that the fall of parliamentary democracy was 
inevitable involves overlooking the political contestation among the Indonesian elites between 
those who supported the parliamentary democracy system (Hatta and the administrator group) 
and those who did not (Sukarno and Nasution). The competition of interest/power between 
these political groups was bona fide, based on their contending vision of these Indonesian 
political figures – where Sukarno had a strong conviction that he would achieve his 
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revolutionary goals at all costs while Hatta adopted a more technocratic, and gradualist 
approach. 
In the end, the administrator group‘s entanglement in political bickering undermined 
their effectiveness in pushing governance reform.   Taufik Abdullah argued that this political 
bickering perpetuated the myth that parliamentary Democracy did not fit in with the ‗national 
character‘ and provided Sukarno with the subsequent legitimacy to intervene with help from 
the army.
141
 
The government in the early post-independence era, led by the administrator group, was 
facing a difficult economic structural issue, especially given the continuing domination of the 
Dutch over the economy, where an estimated around 1000 colonial civil servants were retained 
in senior positions within the bureaucracy. This made the administrators vulnerable to political 
attack from the solidarity makers, which in the end successfully weakened and subsequently 
thwarted the administrator group in the late 1950s.
142
 
The Enactment of the Parliamentary Democracy System and the Rationalization Policy 
during the Early Post-revolutionary Era.  
Subsequent to Indonesia‘s proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945, the new nation 
had to face multiple challenges for the next four years both domestically and internationally. 
After the defeat of Japan, which had occupied Indonesia since 1942, the Dutch did not 
recognize Indonesia‘s independence proclamation and wanted to reclaim their former colony.  
 The political tension just the day after Indonesia independence declaration reflected the 
different vision among Indonesia leaders about the direction that the new country was heading. 
It started when on 18 August 1945, the preparatory committee for Indonesia independence 
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(PPKI) by acclamation appointed Sukarno and Hatta as Indonesia‘s first president and vice 
president and subsequently was replaced by the Indonesia National Central Committee (KNIP).  
Vice President Hatta along with young intellectuals led by Sjahrir wanted to apply 
parliamentary democracy system and rejected Sukarno vision to have a strong presidential 
system with one party system in which they saw as undemocratic.  Sukarno was 
outmaneuvered when Hatta turned the advisory body KNIP with legislative power by issuing 
‗decree x‘ on 16 October 1945, responding to petition submitted by 50 KNIP members. This 
decree stipulated the establishment of the Working Committee that was headed by Sjahrir.  
 The working committee was eventually used by Sjahrir to lay ground for establishing 
parliamentary democracy system by rejecting Sukarno appeal for one party system and 
established multiparty system. Sjahrir later founded the Socialist Party then splintered into PSI, 
while Sukarno established the PNI and other big party including the Masyumi, the PKI and the 
Catholic party.  
In consolidating further the parliamentary system and his authority, Sjahrir announced 
that ministers were responsible to KNIP not the president. Sjahrir was appointed formateur by 
KNIP and later became the first prime minister of Indonesia on 14 November 1945.
143
 
According Dahm, within four weeks of the proclamation of independence, Sukarno‘s role had 
been reduced to merely a figurehead president within the framework of the parliamentary 
democracy system.
144
  
Although Sukarno enjoyed strong mass appeal domestically, he lacked any 
international standing due to his previous close collaboration with Japan and his well-known 
                                            
143
 Rudolf Mrazek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 
1994), p. 274.  
144
 Bernard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1969), p. 328.  
80 
 
history of opposing the Dutch.  Therefore, Sukarno needed Sjahir, inter alia, to deal with the 
western ally in diplomacy for international recognition in exchange for parliamentary 
democracy application.
145
 Hatta defended the parliamentary cabinet as necessary to help to 
protect Sukarno from the international community‘s pressure.146 
After the communist rebels were crushed by the Indonesian military in 1948, the US 
developed a more positive perception. This, combined with the negative international image 
created by the Dutch after their military operations in 1946 and in 1948 with the persistent 
diplomacy by Sjahrir and Hatta, prompted the US along with the UN to pressure the Dutch, 
which eventually withdrew their intention to re-occupy Indonesia, since the US was their major 
financial donor. It was agreed that the Dutch would accept the Republic of Indonesia‘s 
existence through a Round Table Conference and would not create another federal state. 
During the Round Table Conference held in The Hague from 23 August-2 November 1949, 
Hatta, it was agreed that the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) would be 
established, with Sukarno as President and Hatta as both Vice President and Prime Minister.
147
   
When Hatta was Prime Minister, he pushed for governance reform by reducing the 
military and integrating the armies of the Republic with the remaining KNIL (the Royal 
Netherland East India Army) and also pushed for the rationalization of the civil service as part 
of implementing the Renville agreement. Hatta defended both governance reform program that 
                                            
145
 Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, pp. 328-329.  
146
 Mohammad Hatta, Memoir (Jakarta: PT. Tintamas, 1979), p. 480.  
147
 From Sir P. Nichols to Mr. Attlee, letter (No. 448, confidential), ‗The Round Table Conference in Indonesia 
held at the Hague, 23rd August-2nd November 1949: An Account of its Result‘, 10 December 1949, Further 
Correspondence Respecting Indonesia part 3: January-December 1949, FO 480/3, The UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), Public Record Office (PRO), London, pp. 100-101.  
81 
 
‗Rationalization is not about transferring labor from an unproductive to a productive sector, but 
also about improving the effectiveness of governance and public administration.‘148  
Hatta started his first term as Prime Minister in January 1948, when he inherited the 
disarray arising from his predecessor on the nationalization of the military, which bloated them 
to 463,000 men. At that time, there were nine admirals but no warships in Indonesia‘s navy 
that left Hatta little option but to push for the rationalization of the military.
149
 He asked eight 
admirals to resign and demoted Indonesia‘s top-ranking military leaders.150 
 Whilst Hatta was pushing the rationalization of the military, he found an ally within the 
military - Colonel A.H. Nasution - who was promoted in early 1948 to Deputy military chief.  
Besides Nasution‘s credible technical expertise, this appointment was also seen as a 
government effort to balance Sudirman‘s influence over the military.151 Nonetheless, when 
executing the rationalization, Nasution was attacked by the opposition armed militia left-
leaning group called the People‘s Democratic Front (FDR), who had a close link with the PKI.  
The FDR-PKI alliance led by Musso challenge the Republic in September 1948, but 
easily squashed by Let. Gen. Sudirman.
152
Due to this rebellion, the Military Chief, Sudirman, 
and Army Chief, Urip, realized that the initiatives had triggered a crisis within the military and 
pushed for the rationalization to be delayed, which frustrated Hatta.
153
 
When Sudirman passed away in January 1950 after a long illness, there was a change of 
leadership within the military.  The newly-appointed Military Chief, T.B. Simatupang, was a 
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strong supporter of the democratic government system, in which respect civilians held 
supremacy over the military, and Nasution was promoted to the influential post of Army Chief, 
who provided crucial support for Simatupang.  
After Sudirman passed away in 1950s due to illness, both T.B Simatupang and A.H. 
Nasution were promoted to the Military Chief and Army Chief respectively. As a strong 
proponent of the military reform, Simatupang and Naustion were working together effectively 
with Hatta as Prime Minister when the government replaced the federal state with a Unitarian 
state in 1950. Later, when highly respected Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX was appointed 
Minister of Defense with Simatupang, and Nasution, they represented the reform faction in the 
military.
154
 At the same time, Hatta‘s government in 1948-1950 was able to make progress in 
reducing the vast bureaucracy - the 240,000 Republican and 180,000 Federalist civil servants 
combined.
155
 Therefore, the administrator group was at the peak of their influence in pushing 
the crucial governance reform in the civil service and military reform during Hatta‘s stint as 
prime minister.  
The end of the Revolution and the Start of political rivalry in the Parliamentary 
Democracy setting in the Context of Governance Reform. 
 
The revolutionary struggle for independence officially ended when the Dutch transferred 
sovereignty on 27 December 1949 to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI). 
The newly-inaugurated House of Representatives and Senate elected Sukarno as President and 
Mohammad Hatta as Vice President as well as Prime Minister.
156
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Sukarno himself had felt uneasy when Indonesia was pressured to accept a 
parliamentary democracy system.  According to Sukarno:  
We strove desperately to garner the approval of the world. And so when friends and 
sympathizers overseas applied pressure to reshape the organs of state to fit Holland‘s pattern of 
democracy, our leadership, being mostly Dutch-educated, became unsure and yielded.
157
 
 
Sukarno nevertheless played along with the constitutional structure, but with a series of 
assertive actions to resist any restrictions imposed on him by appealing directly to the people 
and effectively meddled in the policy-making of the cabinet.
158
  
This rivalry during the early 1950s, according to Feith, reflected the rivalry between 
Sukarno that represented the ‗solidarity makers‘ camp on the one hand and the other camp 
called the ‗administrators,‘ led by Hatta, which offered  two competing visions of the country. 
The definition of each group is already stipulate in the introduction section of this thesis.  
  Merely a few weeks after the formation of the Republic of the United States of 
Indonesia (RUSI), in August 1950, its structure was crumbling, due to the pressure of 
nationalism by Sukarno and his group.
159
  As a result, the unitary state - the "Republic of 
Indonesia" - took shape.
160
   
After the formation of the unitary state in the 1950s, there were 17 political parties and 
other groups based on the government‘s estimate of the political strength of each respective 
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party.
161
 The political parties were grouped into two large parties which were the Islamic 
Masyumi and the PNI, followed by five medium and 10 small factions.
162
  
The personal politics also had an influence on the formulation of major policy in 
Indonesia. Hamengkubuwono IX acted as an important conduit between the civilian leaders 
and the Indonesian army.  Hamengkubuwono IX, Sukarno and Hatta during parliamentary 
democracy often exerted a political influence that transcended the political parties.  
When the new unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia was inaugurated on 17 August 
1950, Sukarno immediately asked the widely-respected Mohammad Natsir from the Masyumi, 
the administrator group, to form the cabinet.
163
 In the end, Natsir managed to form a cabinet 
with a small majority, which was led by the Masyumi.  
After the Minister of Defense‘s nomination was rejected by the army, the relationship 
between the Army and Natsir‘s cabinet improved overall, since Hamengkubuwono IX as 
Deputy Prime Minister helped to mediate this. Furthermore, the fact that the Army was 
inadequately paid and equipped led to many soldiers engaging in looting or smuggling to fulfill 
their basic needs, which made the Army marred by corruption.
164
 Therefore, the agenda for the 
professionalization of the Army became more urgent under leadership of the Military Chief, 
T.B. Simatupang and the Chief of Army, A.H. Naustion an administrator group ally.
165
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Sukarno himself was increasingly discontent with Natsir, as he saw that the cabinet had 
formulated a policy that was skewed towards the preferences of Hatta and Natsir. Therefore, 
Sukarno allied with the ‗solidarity maker‘ group within the opposition in the parliament.  
Overall, in a relatively short period of time, Natsir‘s cabinet was able to pursue an 
economic reform policy, for instance, by lessening the dominance of the seven large banks 
over Indonesia‘s economy.166 Under Natsir‘s cabinet, the military reform was progressing with 
the improvement of discipline and the absorption of the former guerilla warriors into civilian 
life by creating employment opportunities through financial credit.
167
  
Eventually, the alliance between Sukarno and the ‗solidarity maker‘ group managed to 
bring down Natsir‘s government, which was also related to Natsir‘s closeness to the army. The 
chief reason why politicians resented the ascendancy of the Army‘s role was because they had 
to share the significant economic patronage.
168
 Eventually, Natsir was forced to resign as Prime 
Minister in March 1951, since the element within Masyumi conspired against him.
169
 
The continuing rivalry between the Solidarity Makers camp and the Administrator camp 
in Sukiman and Wilopo’s government. 
 
The two big parties in parliament – the Masyumi and the PNI – had a common understanding 
that they had to work together in order to establish a stable government.
170
 After it was agreed 
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that the Masyumi and the PNI had an equal number of people in cabinet, Sukiman from the 
Masyumi became Prime Minister.
171
  
However, there were neither members of the Masyumi Party from Natsir‘s faction nor 
representatives from the PSI in the new cabinet and even the highly-respected 
Hamengkubuwono IX was excluded.  Although politically stronger than its predecessor, the 
cabinet lacked individuals with technical expertise.
172
  
It is important to note that, during this period, 1951 – 1952, the public began to resent 
Indonesia‘s political leadership due to their continuous political infighting and its subsequent 
failure to get things done.  In regard to the political life during that period, Feith observed that 
‗in the government service, they saw laziness, corruption and clique infighting…In the political 
elite, they saw more cliques and factions and, in addition, luxury, social climbing, and cocktail-
party affection.‘173 
After the two formateurs from the Masyumi and the PNI failed, Sukarno announced 
that he had appointed former Minister of Economic Affairs Wilopo from the PNI as formateur. 
As the process of negotiation progressed, it became clear that Wilopo intended to side with 
Prawoto, who had strong links with Natsir‘s faction in the Masyumi.  
Although Wilopo was from the PNI, his policy leaning was towards the administrator 
group. The Wilopo case showed that the PNI had a faction that sympathized with the 
administrator group while, vice versa, Masyumi also had supporters among the solidarity 
maker group, like Isa Ansyari.
174
 In March 1952, Wilopo form cabinet with majority 
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administrator type of politicians from the PNI and Masyumi, including the PSI for Minister of 
Finance position.
175
 Hamengkubuwono IX was reinstated as Minister of Defense in the 
expectation that a positive relationship would develop between the politicians and the army. 
Ironically, it was during Wilopo‘s term that Civil-Military relations became strained publicly 
for the first time in the parliamentary democracy.
176
  
One of the crucial governance reform effort was when Wilopo government had to make 
drastic cuts in government expenditure and eradicate unnecessary waste, because of 
government was facing budget deficit of Rp. 4,000 million in 1951. 
177
 This austerity measures 
including, stopped rice distribution scheme and Idul Fitri celebration bonuses for government 
officials.
178
  
Then, as part of the governance reform and to respond to the economic slump, the 
Wilopo cabinet pushed for the elimination of patronage, the supervision of all government 
spending, and planed military and civil service rationalization.
179
 Sukarno, felt uneasy about 
the Wilopo cabinet since, like Natsir, provide challenges to him about the scope of Presidential 
prerogatives.
180
 Therefore, the Wilopo cabinet limited presidential speeches, reduced the 
budget for the presidential office and restricted his state visits.
181
 As a result, Sukarno took 
advantage of any political movement, both in parliament and within the PNI, to undermine 
Wilopo‘s cabinet.   
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The 17 October 1952 Furor and Disagreement on the Military Reform 
The economic crises that implicated the Army budget accelerated the gradual demobilization 
of 80,000 Army personnel, of whom 40,000 were dismissed due to lack of 
professionalism.
182
The military reform, led by Defense Minister Hamengkubuwono IX was 
executed vigorously by the Military Chief, Simatupang, and the Army Chief, Nasution, where 
they faced resistance from two fronts: the regional commanders, who felt threatened by the 
army‘s high command centralization policy, and the revolutionary veterans, who felt 
threatened by more highly skilled officers. In the end, Hamengkubuwono IX and his associates 
over-reached themselves, as the opponents of military reform found a powerful political ally, 
especially with the PNI led by Sidiq‘s faction.183 Sukarno was also not pleased with the 
military reform as it curbed his influence through the rotation of the regional commanders 
close to him.
184
  
The tension between Sukarno and his followers and the military leadership, which was 
supported by the administrator group for military reform, originated when a number of motions 
proposed by MPs requested an inquiry into the whole aspect of the military reform. After this 
motion was passed decisively on 16 October 1952 by 91 to 54 in Parliament, it created a 
rupture in Wilopo‘s cabinet.185   
The conflict culminated in the 17 October 1952 affair, when 30,000 demonstrators 
gathered before the state palace to demand the dissolution of parliament. Subsequently, 17 
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military officers met Sukarno and other political leaders to demand that parliament be 
dissolved and an election held. This request was rejected by Sukarno.  
In the end, Hamengkubuwono IX and his associates in the Military clearly 
miscalculated the impact of the 17 October affair.  With Sukarno‗s popularity and power 
strengthened by the incident, there was a move against the Military leadership by the 
overthrow of the local territorial commanders in East Java, South Sulawesi and South 
Sumatra.
186
  
This unfortunate political development for Hamengkubuwono IX and his associates 
forced them to compromise on the military reform agenda. In November 1952, they forged a 
compromise to focus strictly on the bill for the general election and the inquiry to censure the 
Ministry of Defense and its military reform program was forgotten. As part of this deal, the 
cabinet announced the first wave of suspensions within the Army leadership on 5 December 
1952, which included Army Chief Nasution. Based on his reflection, Nasution thought that 
using too much of a technocratic approach for reform without mobilizing political support 
provided a means for his adversary to remove him from office.
187
   
Furthermore, on 16 December 1952, the cabinet appointed Col. Bambang Supeno, who 
was close to Sukarno, as acting Army Chief. Subsequently, Hamengkubuwono IX resigned in 
January 1953, because he was not being consulted by Supeno on new military appointment.
188
 
This showed how the administrator group suffered a set-back in seeking to advance the 
military reform, since no significant support from Sukarno.  
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The Wilopo Cabinet and incremental progress of the governance Reform   
The 17 October affair contributed significantly to the demise of Wilopo‘s cabinet, but this was 
not the only factor.  There were other developments outside the rivalry within the military that 
splintered the political coalition that Wilopo had sought to maintain during his premiership due 
to policy differences and internal conflicts within the two main coalition parties – the Masyumi 
and the PNI.
189
  
Wilopo government‘s effort to keep the deficit down to Rp. 1.8 billion by introducing 
an austerity budget to address the potential inflation was not only affecting exporters but also 
importers.
190
 However, the policy that had the most political ramifications for importers – who 
had strong links with the political elite who benefitted from the patronage – was the fact that 
Wilopo and Minister of Finance Soemitro issued an import restriction. As a result, this 
emboldened the opposition in parliament, leaving the cabinet overwhelmed by political 
pressure.  
In the case of the military reform, the Wilopo cabinet tried to make concessions with 
the military by watering down the four bills on military reform; for instance, by abandoning the 
educational requirement.  Also, the number of soldiers who would leave the service was 
estimated to be around 50-30,000 less than proposed by Hamengkubuwono IX.
191
  In the end, 
because of how the government handled the Tanjung Morawa affair as part of squatting on a 
Dutch plantation, five people died, which triggered the resignation of ministers from 
Masyumi.
192
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Another significant factor that caused a deep division within the government was the 
fact that politically Sukarno and Hatta were no longer compatible. Where Sukarno sympathized 
with the Sidiq group of the PNI, Hatta was more comfortable with the Masyumi and the PSI.
193
 
Despite its limitations, the Wilopo cabinet should be credited with several governance 
reform initiatives. Under Wilopo‘s cabinet, there were few high political appointments within 
the bureaucracy, and corruption was relatively low, with few corruption cases within his 14 
month stint.
194
  
The Wilopo Cabinet enjoyed relative success in managing the state budget by 
introducing an austerity budget and convincing several ministries of the importance of 
significant budget cuts.  Finally, the government successfully improved the budget control 
mechanism.
195
 
The Start of Eroded Trust in Politicians and the Patronage of the Political Party Politics 
under Ali Sastroamidjojo’s government 
 
After the fall of Wilopo government, Sukarno played an active role in the formation of the 
cabinet that led to Ali Sastroamidjojo‘s appointment as Prime Minister in 1953.196 It appeared 
that Sukarno resisted any attempt to include the Masyumi or PSI that would enhance Hatta‘s 
influence and installed his supporter, like Ali, Iskaq Tjokrodisurjo and Iwa Kusumantri.
197
  
Ali‘s government was also blighted by the growing politicization of Indonesia‘s 
bureaucracy due to personnel changes at the higher levels of the Ministerial bureaucracy. Thus, 
this increased the dependency of the civil servants on the political leaders. For example, Ali 
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enacted changes in the secretary general position in six ministries, including Foreign Affairs, 
Economic Affairs and Education.
198
  
 The motivation of all of these parties in power was to acquire political access within the 
civil service as one of the central powers along with the opportunity for commercial patronage. 
The party usually established a network of influence in certain parts of the bureaucracy, such 
as special licensing or depositing government-controlled banks‘ funding in the party‘s bank 
account.
199
 
 As part of the business protection policy, Indonesianization, proposed by Minister for 
Economic Affairs Iskaq was an effort to empower the role of indigenous business.  Iskaq 
introduced various credits, licenses, and protection for a large number of Indonesian firms, 
known as the ‗Benteng Group Firms,‘ which increased from 700 when he assumed office to 
around 2211 business.
200
 
 To make matters worse, this easy credit attracted dubious businessmen with no 
experience, including civil servants. As for the import firms, these new national companies 
were popularly called ‗Ali-Baba firms‘, which were basically dubious firms that resold licenses 
to established foreign or Chinese companies, whereby an ‗Ali,‘ a civil servant, obtained a 
license and his ‗Baba,‘ Chinese associates, managed the business.201  According to Ali, ‗Many 
Indonesians sold their licenses to Chinese businessmen, and became scornfully known as 
‗brief-case businessmen‘.‘202 
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 This policy of preferential treatment that benefitted the PNI and Iskaq‘s associates was 
the target of criticism regarding cronyism and corruption by the opposition, led by the 
Masyumi and PSI. As a result, after a prolonged cabinet crisis, in November 1954, Ali 
reshuffled his cabinet, during which Iskaq, as one of the culprits, lost his post.
203
  
 The appointment of Iwa Kusumasumantri as Minister of Defense in Ali 
Sastsoamidjojo‘s cabinet gradually created a division between the cabinet and army due to 
Iwa‘s subsequent action. Iwa abolished the Chief of Military post that could also be seen as an 
opportunity to retire one of the military modernizers, T.B. Simatupang.
204
  
However, faced with the intrusive intervention by politicians through the ‗Yogyakarta 
Charter,‘ in February 1955, the Army showed its unity. At the conference, around 270 high- 
and mid-ranking officers recommended that any military appointments had to be based on 
merit and also opposed politician intervention in military appointments.
205
   
The army‘s demand was ignored by Sukarno, however, as the conflict became 
ferocious when they boycotted Sukarno‘s favorite, Colonel Bambang Utojo‘s, installation 
ceremony as the new Army Chief on 27 June. Ali‘s Cabinet continued to lobby the army when 
Minister Iwa also resigned as part of the deal in July 1955. Ali felt that the present political 
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situation was exacerbated by the on-going conflict with the army. Eventually, on 24 July, Ali 
tendered his cabinet‘s resignation to Hatta.206  
At this stage in the continuing conflict, the army started to lost respect for politicians as 
they regarded them as incompetent and embroiled in corruption.
207
  As a result, they start 
distancing themselves from the military reform advocated by Hatta and became critical of the 
parliamentary democracy system.  
The Short-Lived Anti-Corruption Measure, the successful national election in 1955 under 
Burhanuddin’s government   
 
The resignation of Ali‘s cabinet in July 1955 certainly strengthened the position of both the 
Masyumi and the PSI vis-a-vis the PNI, the PKI and their associates. They saw this as an 
opportunity to establish a professional cabinet. While Sukarno was abroad, the initial attempt 
to set-up a cabinet led by Hatta as prime minister was rejected by Sidiq‘s group in the PNI in 
August 1955. Hatta then decided to appoint Burhanuddin Harahap, from the Masyumi Party, as 
the prime minister. 
208
 
There was a mixed reaction following the announcement of Hatta about Burhanuddin‘s 
cabinet. The New Finance Minister, Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, embarked on economic 
reform by instituting a plan to balance the budget and curbed corruption by simplifying the 
import licensing system.
209
 However, Burhanuddin‘s cabinet was also criticized due to a 
                                            
206
 From Mr. Morland to Mr. MacMillan, letter (no 77, confidential), ‗Resignation of the Government,‘ 29 July 
1955, Further Correspondence Respecting Indonesia part 9: January-December 1955, the U.K. Foreign Office, 
F0 480/9, Public Record Office (PRO), London, p.21. 
207
 Legge, Sukarno A Political Biography, p. 266.  
208
 From Mr. Morland to Mr. MacMillan, letter (no 83, confidential), ‗Attempts to Form a New Indonesian 
Government,‘ 5 August 1955, Further Correspondence Respecting Indonesia part 9: January-December 1955, 
the U.K. Foreign Office, F0 480/9, Public Record Office (PRO), p.29. 
209
Ibid. p. 38. 
95 
 
number of ministers being implicated in cases of corruption, especially those from the small 
parties.
210
 
 After Burhannuddin‘s cabinet was inaugurated, the Army, arrested former Minister of 
Justice Djody Gondokusumo on corruption in August 1955.
211
 The highly-regarded Attorney 
General, Soeprapto, prosecuted Djody for accepting a bribe of Rp. 40,000 for granting a visa to 
a Chinese foreigner. In January 1956, Djody was sentenced to a year in prison, but later 
pardoned by Sukarno.
212
 There was also an attempt to arrest former Minister of Economic 
Affairs Iskaq from the PNI but he fled overseas.
213
  
Meanwhile, the PNI felt that there was discrimination related to the anti-corruption 
drive by Burhanuddin‘s cabinet, since former ministers from the Masyumi and PSI were not 
prosecuted by the cabinet and army.
214
 Thus, the opposition press was trying to expose the 
deficiency in the cabinet.
215
 
During the first general election held in Indonesia on 29 September 1955 to select MPs, 
around 43 million Indonesians cast their votes for the 257 parliamentary seats. The result of the 
general election sent a shock-wave through Burhanuddin‘s government as the Masyumi and its 
supporters were losing the vote. 
The final result of the 1955 election was that the PNI, with over 8 million votes, 
garnered 57 seats in parliament, followed by the Masyumi, with almost 8 million votes, that 
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also acquired 57 seats. Meanwhile, the NU surprisingly gained almost 7 million votes, with 45 
seats in parliament, followed by the PKI, with 39 seats. The PSI, the Catholic party and 
Parkindo, known for their intellectual cadre, were only able to secure 5-8 seats each.
216
 
Despite the widespread corruption accusations of Ali‘s government, the ruling party PNI 
still won the national election. Based on the observation by Sjahrir, former prime minister:  
Knowledge of graft and incompetence of the previous government, monumental though they 
were, had not seeped down to the people. It is only a relative handful of newspaper-readers and 
radio listeners who have any inkling of the record of that government.
217
 
 
This was also shown by the failure of the administrator group that was unable to construct an 
effective populist message on the benefit of governance reform to society at large, as shown by 
the abysmal result of their political party. With their adversary, the PNI, NU and PKI won the 
national election in 1955, and the Burhanuddin government became de facto a transition 
government. 
Meanwhile, the Burhanuddin Government also realized that the current rules and 
regulations were insufficient to prosecute corrupt officials, while the number of high officials 
with questionable assets was increasing.  Therefore, he announced that his government 
intended to draft an anti-corruption bill whereby officials with suspicious wealth had to prove 
its source, and the bill could be applied retroactively.
218
 
However, in September 1955 the cabinet decided that the anti-corruption bill should 
become an emergency law. They argued that the corruption which was rampant in Indonesia 
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warranted an emergency measure.
219
 The decision was taken against strong opposition from 
Nahdlatul Ulama, whose ministers were accused of corruption.
220
  
In the end, Sukarno refused to sign the Anti-Corruption bill into law, arguing that it 
should be discussed in parliament first.
221
 Finally, the government intended to bring the anti-
corruption bill before the parliamentary committee on 8 November 1955 and Burhanuddin 
promised that his cabinet would consider every input on the anti-corruption bill,
222
 but the bill 
never reached the parliamentary floor.  
In light of the resignation of two ministers from the NU in January 1956 – the Minister 
of Home Affairs and the Minister of Religious Affairs – it appeared that Burhannudin did not 
wish to antagonize both the PNI and NU, especially as the winner of the 1955 election, by 
pushing further for the anti-corruption bill enactment.
223
 This showed how administrator group 
was outmaneuvered by Sukarno and his solidarity maker group through the mobilization of 
masses with their high political skill that made them won the national election 1955 and 
deprived the legitimacy of Burhanuddin government. 
Another important development within the army was that, after being dismissed due to 
the October 1952 affair, Colonel Nasution was making political come back as being reinstalled 
as the Army chief, in the midst of factional bickering in the army and managed to secure 
endorsement from the Masyumi and the NU due to his strong Muslim credential.
224
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When finally Nasution was re-appointed as Army Chief on 7 November 1955, he had a 
more specific demand of the government: inter alia, that the government should allocate a third 
of its budget to the army on a regular basis. Also, he demanded that the army should be 
consulted when a government decree related to security was to be issued.
225
 
After only seven months in power, Burhanuddin‘s cabinet should be applauded for a 
number of reform measures in the economic sector: the rigorous supervision of export and 
import procedures as well as the eradication of fraud, combined with an effort to reduce the 
budgetary deficit from Rp. 3.5 billion to around Rp.2 billion by November 1955.
226
  Under the 
Burhanuddin government, it was the first time during the post-revolutionary era that an anti-
corruption drive reached the high state officials, albeit with the help of the Army. Another 
important legacy of the Burhanuddin Government was that their success in holding a general 
election for parliament and the constituent assembly with a high turn-out.  
Following the national election in 1955, Sukarno embarked on a nationwide tour, 
conducting a public campaign opposing Burhanuddin‘s government.227 After continuous 
pressure by Sukarno and the disappointing national election result, the Burhanuddin 
government finally returned its mandate to Sukarno to pave the way for the new government 
on 3 March 1956. 
Related to the first argument of this thesis outlined in the introduction section, this 
chapter argues that governance reform pushed by the administrator group was not optimal, 
since it was facing resistance from their political rivals, particularly Sukarno and the solidarity 
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maker group. The low public perception of politicians, who were seen as corrupt, also did not 
help the administrator group to accelerate the governance reform, due to the limited public 
support.  
This was also tied into the second argument outlined in the introduction section, that the 
anti-corruption that accelerated during the Burhanuddin government in 1955-1956 remained 
arbitrary and of limited impact. As shown by the attempt to deliberate the anti-corruption bill, 
in my view, the administrator group did not gain political support particularly from Sukarno 
and political allies like the NU because they saw that the initiatives were part of a political ploy 
to undermine their authority. Therefore, the Burhannudin government ceased discussing the 
bill in parliament.  
Conclusion   
In applying the political pluralism approach as advocated by Dahl, as explained in the 
introduction, it is evident that the Hatta-led administrator group, at least before the national 
election in 1955, in my view, possessed a slight advantage over the Sukarno-led solidarity 
maker group. They used their knowledge, organization, information and also international 
network, particularly Sjahrir and Hatta, to outmaneuver Sukarno through exerting international 
pressure to accept parliamentary democracy but gradually their political resources declined as 
the election approached, since Sukarno had skillfully stepped-up his political resources, like his 
charisma, communication and mass support, thus strengthening their political leverage, and 
they won the election in 1955.  
 During the period of parliamentary democracy from the Sjahrir to the Burhanuddin era, 
using the democracy indicator of Diamond and Morleno, at least in my view, Indonesia 
achieved the basic standard for democracy, like competitive elections, more than one big 
political party and an alternative source of information but, as the country had recently gained 
100 
 
its independence, Indonesia‘s quality of democracy, again using Diamond and Morleno‘s 
parameter, still in early stage for instance in achieving political and civil freedom as well as 
standards of good governance.
228
 As a result, during this period, using the democratic 
consolidation framework of Linz and Stepan, Diamond, Merkel as well as Croisant and Bunte, 
as outlined in the introduction section, Indonesia achieved only a basic democratic political 
system.  
 The leader of the administrator group from Sjahrir, Hatta, then Burhanuddin, in my view, 
can be categorized as policy entrepreneurs, using Kingdon‘s analytical framework, as 
described in the introduction section.
229
  They managed to identify the problem regarding the 
need to enact a democratic parliamentary system by skillfully using the momentum of the 
international rounds of negotiation for Indonesian sovereignty in the period 1946-1948 and 
international pressure, especially towards Sukarno. Therefore, in my view, the administrator 
group as policy entrepreneurs managed to enact and later maintain the parliamentary 
democracy system that led to the first relatively free-and-fair national election in 1955.  
 As for the leadership traits of Indonesia‘s political leaders during this period, based on 
Burns‘ political leadership framework, as explained in the introduction section, in my view, 
Sjahrir, Hatta and the subsequent administrator type prime minister with varying degree as 
transformational leaders in the context of governance reform.
230
 They, in my view, created a 
transformational effect in Indonesian politics by introducing and successfully maintaining 
parliamentary democracy until the 1955 national election, although, ironically, their success in 
organizing the national parliament democracy in 1955 led to their political downfall as they 
lost to Sukarno and his close political allies, like the NU and the PKI. Thus, despite the 
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political victory at the elite level since 1945, the administrator group failed to translate the 
benefit of their governance reform and some of the anti-corruption drive to the public at large, 
This was due, in my view, to Sukarno‘s skillfully mobilization of mass support through his, 
among other things, oratorical dexterity and the inability of the administrative group to 
maintain its cohesiveness with its important allies, such as the army, in pushing for military 
reform.  
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Chapter 3: The end of Parliamentary Democracy and the last Anti-
Corruption Measures during the Post-Revolutionary Era 
 
After the national election in 1955, it became evident that the administrator group‘s influence 
was significantly reduced, except the Masyumi, which held the second largest seats in 
parliament. Meanwhile, the Solidarity maker group secured the majority of parliamentary seats 
through political parties like the Indonesia Nationalist Party (PNI), the Revival of Religious 
Scholars (NU) and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).  This chapter will highlight how the 
last parliamentary system government reached the verge of collapse due to both Sukarno and 
Nasution‘s restlessness regarding what they saw as a corrupt politician who caused the 
diysfunctioning of the parliamentary democracy system. Then, the chapter will outline how the 
partnership between Sukarno and Nasution to establish a new political governance structure 
was underpinned by the army‘s more assertive role in politics, called guided democracy. This 
chapter will then explain how the disunity between Hatta and Nasution resulted in a disjointed 
effort towards governance reform and anti-corruption initiatives that was later dismantled by 
Sukarno and his solidarity maker supporter.   
 This chapter is structured into seven sections. The first section discusses the academic 
debate on the formation of guided democracy. The second section illustrates the demise of the 
last parliamentary government led by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo in 1957, as evident 
from the declaration of state emergency by Sukarno.  Then, the start of guided democracy and 
the initial anti-corruption measures by the army will be outlined in the third section. Moreover, 
the fourth section will examine the alliance between Sukarno and the army that was 
successfully dismantling the administrator group as they made several political blunders. Then, 
the fifth section will discuss the anti-corruption measures led by former Minister of Defense 
Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX , the economic reform by Prime Minister Djuanda and then the 
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anti-corruption initiatives by Army Chief A.H. Nasution, that were effortlessly dissolved by 
Sukarno. The last section provides the conclusion to this chapter.  
There are four arguments advanced in this chapter. First of all, Sukarno managed to 
outmaneuver the administrator group through the formation of an authoritarian political 
governance structure called guided democracy with support from the Army led by Nasution. 
The second argument is that Hatta‘s tactical mistake in resigning from the Vice Presidency in 
1956 and the various political blunders by administrator group contributed to the demise of 
their political influence.  Third, Hatta and Nasution and others leaders from the administrator 
group were never able to build a credible political alliance, especially due to their disagreement 
over military reform.  Therefore, there was insufficient political support by the administrator 
group in advancing governance reform and an anti-corruption agenda. Fourth, during the 
guided democracy period, Sukarno, with the support of the PKI, managed to dissolve 
completely the already weakened anti-corruption endeavor led by Nasution and 
Hamengkubuwono IX. The downfall of Nasution and Hamengkubowono IX showed their 
inability to solicit political support from Sukarno. 
The Different Interpretations of the Formation of Guided Democracy  
There are a number of streams of thought on the interpretation of the formation of guided 
democracy under Sukarno in 1959-1966.  The first is that the army instigated the rejection of 
parliamentary democracy since it was well-known that they abhorred politicians who often 
interfered in their internal affairs.  Daniel Lev is arguing that the army since independence has 
been ‗ambitious, interested, assertive and engaged‘ in seeking its place in the foreground of 
Indonesia‘s politics since 1958.231 This view is also espoused by Slater, who argued that, at the 
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time, there was a partial-military take-over of control of the country‘s assets and 
bureaucracy.
232
 
Meanwhile, another interpretation is that Sukarno‘s creation of guided democracy 
reflected his authoritarian streak.  Hatta criticized the fact that ‘Sukarno‘s guided democracy 
has become a dictatorship supported by a certain group.‘233 Meanwhile, Feith observed that the 
relationship between Sukarno and the Army‘s Nasution changed from an equal partnership in 
1958-1962 into the domination of Sukarno toward Nasution from June 1962. 
234
 This view is 
also supported by Widjadjanto, who argues that, in the end, the military was becoming merely 
Sukarno‘s political instrument.235  
Rather than interpreting the political leaders another stream of thoughts seen it guided 
democracy through the structure of Indonesian society. Selo Soemardjan argues that the 
emergence of guided democracy because ‘the institutionalized authoritarian structure of 
Indonesian society‘ since it had been ruled by kings, sultans and other authoritarian types, a 
view that resonates with Abdullah, who added that the structure was protected by ideological 
ideals.
236
   
Nonetheless, there is who challenged the authoritarian streak depiction of Sukarno‘s 
guided democracy. John Legge argued that there was no brutal elimination of the opposition 
and ‗power was widely diffused in fact, even to the point of frustrating the proper 
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authorities.‘237 Meanwhile former Vice President Malik, reflected that: ‘Guided democracy... is 
logical reflection of our original idea ―Centralism of Democracy‖.‘238  
In my view, the authoritarian structure of Sukarno was established based on the 
political dynamic at the time that benefited him. Riding the political momentum emanating 
from his victory in the 1955 election, Sukarno as well as his solidarity maker group exploited 
his political resources, like his charisma and communication skills, so his popular support 
effectively won him the election, subsequently enabling him to build an alliance with the 
military to dismantle the parliamentary democracy. In my view, it would be difficult to argue 
that the military created the initiative, as they were not that unified. When Sukarno‘s popularity 
reached its pinnacle in 1955-1959, it was Nasution who had little leverage rather than vice 
versa.  
Towards the end of Parliamentary Democracy under Sukarno  
After winning the national election in 1955, Sukarno appointed former Prime Minister Ali 
Sastroamidjojo as formateur to set up a cabinet on 8 March 1956 that mainly consist of the 
PNI, the NU and the Masyumi.
239
  
In the end, Ali Sastaroamidjojo‘s second cabinet was formed on 20 March 1956. Even 
though the PNI lead the political party coalition within the cabinet with six cabinet ministers 
including the position of Prime Minister, the important ministerial posts, such as the Minister 
of Finance, Minister of the Interior and Minister for Economic Affairs, belonged to the 
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Masyumi and the NU.
240
 Surprisingly, the administrator group type of figures remained 
influential in the cabinet.
241
 
 However, there was growing dissatisfaction with Ali‘s Government, since their priority 
in the first four months of the cabinet was more the distribution of patronage through 
government appointments.
242
 The problem was compounded by the growing concern that Ali‘s 
Cabinet was failing to implement the anti-corruption efforts of Burhannuddin‘s government.  
Sukarno on 20 July 1956 decided to grant a partial amnesty to Djody Gondokusumo, former 
Minister of Justice, who was convicted by the MA in January 1956
243
, which disappointed 
Vice President Hatta.
244
  
When Major General Nasution was re-appointed as Army Chief in November 1955, he 
used the opportunity to continue the military reform that had stalled after his dismissal in 1952. 
He changed the management structure of the military by creating an Inspectorate for Education 
and Training section to improve the soldiers‘ professionalism.  A further reform was to 
empower the Army Chief, especially with its supervision authority under the state of 
emergency through creating the Inspectorate for Territorial Affairs and People Defense 
office.
245
 
In an effort to dismantle the power of the regional commanders, Nasution undertook a 
major re-assignment within the Army. Started with low- and mid-ranking officers and then 
accelerated, with the main targets being Nasution‘s rivals, like Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel 
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Zulkifli Lubis who would be replaced by August 1956.
246
 This was also part of the military 
reform, creating an orderly promotion arrangement to give soldiers a sense of regularity and 
structure in their career and introduce a merit-based promotion policy by setting-up a 
commission in 1956 to review the army ranks and assignments.
247
  
With the determination of the West Java officers to oppose corruption that was 
mounting under Ali‘s government in August 1955, the Lubis group through troops in West 
Java tried to arrest Minister of Foreign Affairs Roeslan Abdulgani.
248
 Abdulgani was 
summoned by the West Java troops in connection with his dealings with Lie Hok Tay, Deputy 
Director of the State Publishing House, who had been convicted for corruption.
249
  
Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo was concerned that the arrest of Foreign Minister 
Abdulgani would jeopardize his government‘s credibility, and so instructed Nasution that the 
arrest warrant should be rescinded.
250
 Subsequently, Nasution overrode the instruction from the 
West Java troops and Abdulgani was released.
251
  
There was continuing fierce criticism in the press coverage about the alleged corruption 
between Abdulgani and Lie Hok Tay. 
252
 In response, Ali‘s Cabinet established an ad hoc 
committee led by First Deputy Prime Minister Muhammad Roem to hear evidence on 
corruption allegation.  The committee decided that the evidence provided by West Java troops 
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in their attempt to arrest Abdulgani was insufficient and no grounds existed on which to charge 
Abulgani.
253
  
However, to the embarrassment of Ali‘s government, in December 1956, editor of 
Indonesia Raya Mochtar Lubis, in the court managed to demonstrate through convincing 
documents and photos that Abdulgani had indeed received a house and car from Lie and 
violated the foreign exchange regulations by taking foreign exchanges overseas.
254
 In the end, 
Abdulgani was prosecuted by the Attorney General
255
 and, ultimately, in April 1957, found 
guilty for illegally exporting foreign currency.
256
  
In light of the fierce disagreement with Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta‘s resignation in 
December 1956 made the political situation more delicate. It was revealed that, as Vice 
President Hatta was bound by the constitution to give confidential advice, and so felt little hope 
that he would be able to do much amidst the increasing mismanagement and corruption that 
was one of the main reasons that he was resigning.
257
  
Hatta realized that the political constellation was against him, as Sukarno received a 
fresh mandate from winning the election in 1955 through the PNI and their ally (PKI and NU). 
Sukarno‘s intention to dissolve parliament also attracted crucial support from the powerful 
army, led by Nasution, who disdain corrupt politicians.  
During Ali‘s second cabinet, the party and parliamentary government rapidly lost their 
legitimacy due to their inability to solve the governance and economic problems, like reducing 
                                            
253
 A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, jilid 4: Masa Pancaroba Kedua {Tour of Duty part 4: the 
Difficult Moments for the Second Time} (Jakarta: Gunung Agung Press, 1984), pp. 23-24.  
254
 Muchtar Lubis, Catatan Subversif (Subversion Notes] (Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1980), pp. 1-22. 
255
 ‗Indonesian Minister in Court,‘ the Manchester Guardian, 2 March 1957, p. 7.  
256
 Mr. MacDermot to Mr. Selwin Lloyd (no. 67, confidential), ‗Leading Personalities in Indonesia,‘ 11 September 
1957, Further Correspondence Respecting Indonesia part 11: January – December 1957, the U.K. Foreign 
Office, F0 480/11, Public Record Office (PRO), p. 2.  
257
 Letter from Hatta to Jacobs, 20 November 1961 in Noer, Mohammad Hatta: Biografi Politik [Mohammad 
Hatta: Political Biography]), p. 474.  
109 
 
the number of civil servants or remedying the deteriorating infrastructure.
258
 Nonetheless, Ali‘s 
government should also be commended for successfully pushing for legislation on regional 
government whereby, in law no 1 of 1957, inter alia that established a legal framework for the 
financial relations between the Central Government and the autonomous regional 
governments.
259
  
Meanwhile, the attitude of Indonesia‘s political leaders, with their lavish lifestyle and 
embroilment in corruption, increased the resentment toward the political party and 
parliamentary democracy system.  Therefore, in the second Ali Cabinet, trust in the political 
parties and parliamentary democracy hit an all-time low.
260
  
In response to the deep public dissatisfaction, Ali returned his mandate to Sukarno on 
14 March 1957. The Army led by Nasution had ferociously lobbied to declare the state of 
emergency to deal with the rebel in the regions and also avoid internal divisions. Ultimately, 
Sukarno declared the state of emergency.
261
 This marked the end of parliamentary democracy, 
as the state of emergency catapulted the Army into powerful political role.  
The Introduction of Guided Democracy, the Army’s Limited Anti-Corruption Measure 
and its Entanglement in Patronage  
 
After several failed attempts to set-up a new cabinet, Sukarno form a cabinet by himself in 
April 1957, known as ‗the extra-parliamentary Business Cabinet.‘ Sukarno appointed an 
experienced technocrat, Djuanda, as Prime Minister. 
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The cabinet members were appointed as individuals, not for their political affiliation, 
and comprised a number of figures with technical expertise.
262
 The cabinet was still dominated 
by the political parties, however, including four from the PNI, four from the NU and two 
sympathizers of the PKI.
263
 
Under the state emergency, the Army introduced a number of anti-corruption measures 
that grew out of a meeting of the Army leadership in March 1957 about the ever-growing 
problem of corruption among politicians through decrees that gave them the authority to take 
action against corruption.
264
 Even during a state of emergency, the army had the authority to 
confiscate assets from suspect, but limited to corruption offences dating from 9 April 1957.
265
 
The focus of these anti-corruption measures was to investigate politicians who had amassed 
suspicious assets by examining their personal account.
266
  
The anti-corruption measures executed by the Army unnerved many opposition 
political party like from the Masyumi and the PSI, who were concerned about the possibility of 
being targeted discriminately by the Army. For instance, former Minister of Finance Jusuf 
Wibisono from the Masyumi was arrested on March 1957, accused of providing illegal credit 
to his business cronies.
267
 Meanwhile, Soemitro Djodjohadikusumo, was also interrogated for 
corruption related to the PSI fundraising and corruption in distributing credit as Minister of 
Finance. Sensing his imminent arrest, Soemitro managed to flee the country.
268
   Other 
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politicians also faced restrictions on their activities and even arrested. No wonder then that, by 
mid-1957, the emergency law was under continuous attack for its interference in political 
affairs.
269
  
With a number of politicians being investigated, the relationship between the Army and 
the political parties became strained. Nasution finally admitted the shortcomings of the anti-
corruption campaign: ‘It was very difficult to prosecute high officials or former ministers 
accused of corruption because of difficulties in providing evidence‘270   
The state emergency provided an opportunity for the army to broaden its political role 
through their appointments to civil service positions or as the heads of local government.
271
  It 
also provided an opportunity for the Army to expand its role in the state economy by taking 
over the Dutch companies.
272
  For instance, 40 ships owned by the Dutch steamship company, 
KPM, were taken over by the army.
273
Army officers were also assigned in these companies, 
which symbolized the start of the army‘s formal involvement in business.274    
The involvement of the Army in business was well-known in export-producing 
commodity regions like North Sumatra and North Sulawesi to compensate for their limited 
budget by supporting the semi-official smuggling during the mid-1950s. However, these 
activities were very limited and did not provide any opportunities for personal enrichment.
275
  
In contrast, the new opportunities provided by the state emergency implicated some 
army officers in corruption. Nasution and his loyalists were apprehensive about the increasing 
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evidence of corruption and commercialism among the Army and ordered an investigation.
276
 
For instance, Nasution introduced several measures against high-ranking officers, including 
Colonel Ibnu Sutowo,
277
 based on news leaked in November-December 1958, due to the 
involvement in rubber smuggling.
278
  
The corruption cases certainly weakened the Army‘s position vis-a-vis politicians in 
parliament, but this was offset by the low standing of the political parties among the public.  In 
the end, the Djuanda cabinet managed to secure parliamentary approval to extend the state 
emergency law in December 1958 because of Djuanda‘s implied threat of a possible Army 
coup.
279
 
In other political developments, the tension between the government and rebel leaders 
was increasing during 1957 when the army order for the arrest of former Deputy Army Chief 
Zulkifli Lubis.
280
  It culminate the group proclaimed the Revolutionary Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) on 15 February 1958, led by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara as prime 
minister and supported by the rebel military regional leaders,
281
 but PRRI failed to attract 
international support when their plea to the U.S. Federal Reserve to freeze the central 
government‘s funds was ignored.282 The existence of the PRRI and the extension of the state 
emergency had strengthened the Army‘s political position.  
  Meanwhile, there was a deadlock between the President and political party leaders in 
government (the PNI, the NU and the PKI) on the negotiations for the restoration of the 1945 
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constitution in the assembly that took place from April 1959 until June 1959. The deadlock 
occurred because the assembly could not secure 2/3 of the votes. In response, Sukarno 
dissolved the constituent assembly and issued a decree on 5 July 1959 for the restoration of the 
1945 constitution and installed ‗guided democracy.‘ 283  
President Sukarno’s alliance with the Army, the end of the Administrator group  
After the political and military victory by Sukarno and Nasution over the rebel government, 
they managed to dissolve the administrator group turned them into irrelevant political forces. 
Although some of Nasution‘s actions reflected the administrator group, he always had a strong 
commitment to the values of Pancasila (the state‘s five principles) like the solidarity maker 
group.
284
 Thus, after being reinstated in 1955 as Army Chief, Nasution‘s resentment of 
politicians reinforced his political tilt toward supporting Sukarno.   
After Djuanda returned his mandate on 6 July 1959, Sukarno assumed full executive 
authority as both President and Prime Minister to form his own cabinet.  However, he was 
concerned about the growing influence of the Army in both politics and commerce. Therefore, 
he tried to reduce Nasution‘s influence by offering him the Minister of Defense post, but 
Nasution publicly announced that he would take the Minister of Defense position, while also 
retaining the Army Chief post.
285
   
Sukarno then appointed Djuanda as First Minister, who was tasked with running the 
daily governmental affairs and also acting as a buffer between Sukarno and Nasution, the 
political parties, the parliament and other government agencies.
286
  The composition of the 
cabinet that was announced showed the further decline of the political parties with the majority 
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of members being non-party experts.
287
 In the end, the cabinet introduced a new organizational 
structure with the growing influence of Nasution, as evident from the exclusion of the PKI.  
The cabinet consisted of nine core ministers, with each figure responsible for coordinating 
several junior ministers.
288
 
In consolidating his authority, Sukarno announced the composition of the MPR, which 
was the highest authority state institution. The membership consisted of half parliament (DPR) 
and also a cross-section of society groups.
289
 The main tasks of the MPR included electing a 
President and Vice President. With many of Sukarno‘s appointments dominating the 
membership of both the DPR and the MPR, those two high state institutions were practically 
under the subjugation of the executive.
290
 
The alliance between Sukarno and Nasution proved to be based on political mutual 
interest rather than a fundamental agreement, as shown when Acting Attorney General Gatot 
Tarunamihardja in August 1959 re-opened the investigation on trade import bartering at 
Tanjung Periok Port, which implicated powerful Army officers, like Col. Ibnu Sutowo.  The 
Army retaliated by arresting Gatot in September 1959 and was accusing him of involvement in 
illegal textile trading.
291
  In the end, Sukarno agreed on a compromise, in which Gatot was 
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honorably dismissed in September 1959 in exchange for replacing the high-ranking army 
officers who were involved in corruption.
292
 
The Sukarno then took a further step by dissolving parliament on 5 March 1960 and 
replacing with the new one, where all of the MPs were appointed by Sukarno.  The 28 political 
party representations were reduced to nine, with fewer than half of the MPs representing 
political parties.
293
   
However, political rivalry between Sukarno and the army began to emerge.  The army 
started to pressure the PKI in July 1960 through interrogating the member of the PKI central 
committee, Sukirman, in Bandung and another four in Jakarta. Shortly after the pressure by the 
army, Sukarno retaliated by ordering that the two main opposition parties – the Masyumi and 
the PSI – should be dissolved.294  
Due to their involvement with the regional rebel movement, the Masyumi and PSI 
became politically isolated and voluntarily dissolved themselves in September 1960.
295
 This 
marked the end of the ‗administrator group‘s influence on the government that had been 
driving governance reform and anti-corruption in 1949-1957.  Then, in 1961, all of the political 
parties were dissolved except for ten, including the PNI, NU, PKI and Murba. 
The demise of the administrator group is linked to the first argument in this thesis as 
outlined in the introduction section, where governance reform could not be applied 
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consistently. In this case, as a driver of governance reform, the administrative group was losing 
the election to the far more politically savvy Sukarno and solidarity maker group. Without a 
political leader with charisma who was able to mobilize the masses, like Sukarno, the 
administrator group was unable to attain significant votes in the 1955 election. To make 
matters worse, the already weakened administrator group was split over the decision by some 
of their faction to join the rebel government PRRI and lost an important ally, as the Nasution-
led the army decided to support Sukarno and dissolve the parliamentary democracy.  
The Failure to ‘Retool’ the state Apparatus due to a lack of political support  
The Army‘s decisive victory against the regional rebels and the further influence of the 
President not just in the executive but also in the legislative made Sukarno the principal power 
during 1960-1962.  There was close cooperation between Sukarno and Nasution on large issues 
on which they agreed, but there was a mutual distrust. This cooperation between Sukarno and 
Nasution during the 1960s builds a stable political alliance that lasted until the end of the West 
Irian campaign in 1962.  
Meanwhile, the PKI in 1959 had stepped-up its criticism of the government‘s economy 
policy.  One of their criticisms was the involvement of the army in a state enterprise that 
became inefficient and corrupt when they took over the Dutch business at the end of 1957.  
The fact that the army officer‘s managers were seen to be making a profit for themselves 
created resentment from the labor union. In response, the PKI prepared and helped to articulate 
a political attack against corrupt officials or state-owned enterprise managers as ‗bureaucratic 
capitalists‘ and ‗economic saboteurs.‘296  
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In his political manifesto, Sukarno emphasized the need to ‗retool‘ all of the state 
instruments and eradicate the ‗liberal elements.‘297  To implement this task, initially, he was 
setting up the State Apparatus Activities Supervision Agency (BAPEKAN), whose 
responsibilities included supervising any activities undertaken by the state apparatus and 
conducting research.
298
  BAPEKAN also had authority, inter alia, to provide advice based on 
their research and also to manage public complaints to improve the state apparatus‘ 
performance.
299
  Sukarno appointed the highly-regarded former Minister of Defense, Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono IX, as BAPEKAN‘s chief.300  
The BAPEKAN received an enthusiastic response from the public, who had reported 
petty and large corruption cases, like the Rp. 40 million stolen from Jakarta‘s custom office in 
1950-1960 and the Rp. 274,135.49 stolen from Cooperatives within the State Apparatus Bank 
in Karo.
301
 With only 40 secretariat staff, BAPEKAN was overwhelmed with public 
enthusiasm to report corruption that reached 912 complaints by July 1960, 400 of which had 
been processed.  
The second agency to be established was PARAN in January 1960, initiated and 
chaired by General Nasution.
302
  However, Sukarno wanted the PARAN to focus on the 
indoctrination of his revolutionary fanfare, while Nasution wanted the committee to focus its 
efforts on governance reform, particularly reorganization, personnel management and anti-
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corruption efforts.
303
 The initiative by Nasution to focus PARAN on the governance issue was 
seen as an effort to regain public trust in the army, since its image had been tarnished because 
of the corruption in the state owned enterprises.   
However, the existence of PARAN created anxiety among civil servants, especially as 
those who were close to the opposition groups, like the Masyumi and PSI,
304
 to the less 
powerful positions. There was also tension with BAPEKAN, since these two agencies 
overlapped.  The tension increased when PARAN announced its plan to ‗retool‘ BAPEKAN, 
but the conflict was resolved when Hamengkubuwono IX managed to meet Nasution at the end 
of November 1960. They agreed that BAPEKAN should focus on supervision and research, 
while PARAN focused on ‗retooling,‘ which emphasized prosecutions for corruption. 305 
BAPEKAN only lasted for around three years. The trigger for its downfall was when 
Indonesia was selected to host the Asian Games in 1962 and therefore accelerated its 
development projects around Jakarta, such as building, roads and sports facilities, involved 
huge financial resources. BAPEKAN received a number of reports from the public about 
corruption and started to investigate a development project related to the Asian games. Midway 
through this investigation, Sukarno announced the cabinet regrouping in March 1962, where 
the BAPEKAN excluded from the cabinet,
306
 followed by Sukarno‘s disbandment of 
BAPEKAN in May 1962.
307
 Hamengkubuwono IX and the other commissioners of 
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BAPEKAN were discharged honorably in May 1962.
308
 Furthermore, Hamengkubuwono was 
appointed Chief of the Supreme Audit (BPK) in November 1963 that held stronger ground as it 
was attached to 1945 constitutions, which oriented more on financial audit. But, the authority 
still limited to audit financial position of government agencies, while any action on any 
financial discrepancy in the realm of law enforcement agencies, which mostly failed to act.
309
 
To make matter worse, the BPK was further weaken when Sukarno decreed himself to be the 
chief auditor.
310
 
PARAN only received significant support for its indoctrination aspect, since Vice Chair 
Abdulgani was assigned by Sukarno as Spokesperson of his indoctrinasation ideological 
programs.
311
  As a result, Nasution‘s programs in PARAN did not receive support from the 
cabinet, for instance, Nasution‘s proposals to separate the political from the technical positions 
within the state agencies and the standardization of the Organizational Structure.
312
  PARAN 
was constantly attacked since its inception and accused by the PKI of being Nasution‘s 
platform for his presidential run.
313
   
The success of the West Irian campaign in 1962 enhanced the credibility of Sukarno 
among the other army leaders, thereby weakening Nasution‘s political leverage.  Also, 
Nasution‘s anti-corruption drive through PARAN made his corrupt colleague feel uneasy and 
threatened, therefore intensified the division within the Army.
314
Sukarno seized the rare 
opportunity by challenging Nasution‘s authority within the army.  As part of the structural 
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changes to the military‘s organization and hierarchy in June 1963,315Sukarno rotated Nasution 
was rotated as the Armed Forces Chief and forced him to surrender the influential Army Chief 
post to his deputy, Ahmad Yani. Then, all four services chief (the army, navy, air force, and 
police) were promoted to commander, reporting directly to the President, which left Nasution 
with merely administrative coordinator.
316
  In November 1963, Sukarno further reduced 
Nasution‘s influence by separating the Attorney General posts from his Defense and Security 
portfolio.  
With his authority deteriorating, Nasution, as Chair of PARAN, intensified his efforts 
to eradicate corruption through a military operation entitled Operasi Budhi in December 1963, 
with a mission to prevent and prosecute corruption in state enterprises and government 
institutions,
317
 which implicated former ministers, MPs and politicians.
318
  The initial target of 
this Operasi Budhi was the state enterprise (SOE) in which Nasution established a committee 
of experts that formed questioners targeted at SOE‘s CEO who inquired into company financial 
performance and required to submit their wealth report.
319
   
The findings of Operasi Budhi can be categorized into two groups: criminal offence 
findings, whereby the team would give evidence to the law enforcement agencies and 
administrative violations, whereby the team would provide evidence and advice for remedies. 
At the time, around 49 state enterprises/institutions were investigated by the operation
320
 that 
uncovered a hundred million losses because of conflicts of interest, whereby the executives 
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was using state enterprise facilities to run their own businesses, which around Rp. 14 billion of 
state money remained unaccounted for.
321
 
Nasution claimed that Operasi Budhi was successful in preventing around Rp. 11 
billion state losses in its first 3 months of operation,
322
 but it had discomfited Sukarno and his 
associates. The erroneous practice of supplying money to the palace to ensure that corrupt high 
state officials for lucrative posts was quite staggering. According to Rosihan Anwar, each 
official would donate around Rp. 300 million to US$450,000, to secure their job or seek a more 
lucrative position. 
323
 
In the end, the PKI succeeded in persuading Sukarno to dissolve PARAN.
324
  First, 
Sukarno established the Supreme Command for Retooling the Tools of the Revolution 
(KORTAR), led by himself, with Major Gen. Yani as its Chief of Staff, in April 1964.
325
 
Immediately after KORTAR was established, PARAN was disbanded by the President in May 
1964,
326
 in the midst of handling only 10% of their cases.
327
  
The vigor of PARAN in prosecuting fellow Army officers created further friction 
within the army. It was suspected that Yani‘s approval of the PARAN‘s termination stemmed 
from his concern that the corruption investigation had reached his close-aid.
328
 The end of 
PARAN reflected the second argument in this thesis as outlined in the introduction section, that 
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the anti-corruption was arbitrary and also driven mostly by political motives. Therefore, the 
progressive the anti-corruption effort, including through PARAN by Nasution, was easily 
dismantled as it was not securing enough political support especially from the president.  
The turbulent relationship between Nasution and Sukarno shows that Nasution 
possessed a puritanical streak that distanced him from most of Indonesia‘s political leaders. 
Based on Penders and Sundhaussen observation: 
He refused to be drawn into the increasingly Byzantine court culture which revolved around 
presidential palaces, and condemned the corruption which became a hallmark of Sukarno‘s style 
of government.
329
   
While the Indonesian economy continued to deteriorate from 1963 due to the West Irian 
Campaign, it contributed to the heavy external debt related to the arms supply from the Soviet 
Union, where the government had little choice but to finance the budget deficit by printing 
money, which had significant inflationary effects.
 330
  Realizing that the worsening economic 
conditions could dent his popularity, in March 1963, Sukarno delivered a speech to assure the 
public, known as the Economic Declaration (Dekon), which known as economic reform 
proposal. In formulating Dekon, Djuanda requested assistance from political and intellectual 
figures affiliated with the disbanded PSI, through which they were able to incorporate several 
governance reform proposals including bureaucratic reform and decentralized management.
331
   
  In following up Sukarno‘s Dekon speech, First Minister Djuanda attempted to impose 
economic reform, aiming to solve Indonesia‘s economic predicament through various 
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governance reform measures while, he simultaneously pushed for the mission from the IMF to 
come to Indonesia and assess the feasibility of offering assistance.
332
  
Subsequently, Djuanda introduced economic regulations outlining the need to increase 
prices, devalue the currency and deregulation to remove the bottlenecks in the bureaucracy in 
May 1963.  However, this policy reform immediately came under attack from the PKI, who 
were concerned about the prospect of enacting the ‘liberal policy‘.333   
The constant attack by the PKI during July-September 1963 was finally rewarded with 
the statement by Sukarno that the reform program needed to be corrected,
334
 but Djuanda‘s 
economic reform program was shattered by the initiation of Malaysia‘s confrontation campaign 
and his sudden death in November 1963. 
Meanwhile, the political polarization continued, especially between Sukarno – the army 
– and the PKI. This aggravated the political division and the constant cabinet turnover 
hampered any efforts to address the economic morass.
335
  
In the end, on 30 September 1965, the tension between Sukarno (supported by the PKI) 
and the army erupted in the form of an attempted coup by a number of mid-level army officers 
who were Sukarno‘s supporter, who took the life of six army generals, including the Army 
Chief Ahmad Yani. There were many versions of the cause of the attempted coup on 30 
September 1965 that remains controversial even today.  
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The 30 September 1965 attempted coup and its subsequent events will be discussed 
further in the next chapter.  Whatever motivated it, this tragedy gave momentum for the Army 
led by Suharto to consolidate its power, and it eradicated the PKI through the use of force as 
well as politically and eventually taking presidency from Sukarno in 1968. This marked the 
end of Sukarno‘s Guided Democracy. 
Conclusion  
Despite Hatta and Nasution famous for their high integrity and had a drive to push for 
governance reform and anti-corruption drive, but both incapable of expanding their 
distinguished personal character into a formidable political machine. Nasution attempted to 
become directly involved in politics by establishing the IPKI in 1954, but only acquired 4 
parliamentary seats at the 1955 national election.
336
 Although Hatta was de facto leader of the 
administrator group in 1945-1956, he never formally led a political party.  
Initially, Hatta and Nasution enjoyed an excellent collaboration in the late 1940s-early 
1950s over the liquidation of the federal system and military reform.
337
 When Hatta and 
Nasution were both at the peak of their power during the late period of parliamentary 
democracy, philosophical differences arose between them, especially on the role of the army in 
politics. 
338
  
Therefore, based on Dahl‘s political pluralism analytical framework, the political 
resources possessed by Hatta, Nasution and Hamengkubowono like knowledge, education and 
organization were no match in the face of the resources of charisma, communication and, more 
importantly, popular support possessed by Sukarno and his solidarity maker group as reflected 
in Hatta‘s administrator group was losing in the national election 1955. More importantly, the 
                                            
336
 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesia Military Politics 1945-1967, p. 91.  
337
 Penders and Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography, p. 78.  
338
 Noer, Mohammad Hatta: Biografi Politik [Mohammad Hatta: Political Biography], p. 467. 
125 
 
perilous legacy of guided democracy championed by Sukarno in 1959, in my view, created a 
template for the authoritarian political governance structure that undermined the checks-and-
balance system; this was as argued by Linz and Stepan, Diamond and Merkel as democratic 
rollback.
339
 Thus the emergence of guided democracy was the first experience when Indonesia 
was facing democratic regression after the parliamentary democracy was de facto enacted by 
Sjahrir and Hatta in November 1945. 
As for the short-lived anti-corruption endeavor under General Nasution through the 
Committee for Retooling the State Apparatus (PARAN) and the Budhi operation as well as the 
work by the State Apparatus Activities Supervision Agency (BAPEKAN) and BPK led by 
Hamengkubuwono IX, it should be recognized.  In applying Kingdon‘s analytical framework 
as explained in the introduction section, however, both Nasution and Hamengkubuwono almost 
became policy entrepreneurs. Although both prominent figures were able to identify corruption 
as a pertinent issue and were trying to address it through their respective anti-corruption 
efforts, there was insufficient political momentum and support to enable them to bring about 
substantial changes.  
Despite the fact that Sukarno was able to establish a guided democracy by 
outmaneuvering his political rivals, his government was unable to deliver sufficient economic 
and social welfare to the people as well as embroiling them in corruption. Therefore, in 
applying the political leadership analytical framework of Burns as outlined in the introduction 
section, Sukarno during guided democracy was only reflecting transactional leadership instead 
of transformation leadership in the context governance reform and anti-corruption. Despite the 
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strong nationalist rhetoric, in the end, Sukarno merely established a fragile alliance with the 
army and the PKI to ensure his political survival, as both of them needed his political 
popularity. According to Dahm, from the outset, Sukarno‘s efforts to bridge the two main 
political forces‘ opposing camps failed, as the army and PKI had distrusted each other from the 
start.
340
 As Friend sums up, ‗By 1964-1965, despite all of Sukarno‘s talk about socialization, 
Indonesia was becoming laissez-faire, with a corollary of hyper-corruption.‘341 Meanwhile, 
John Legge observed that Sukarno‘s efforts to emphasize the style of politics over the 
substance of the political program protected the status quo of the corrupt elites.
342
 As a result, 
when approaching the end of his reign in power, Sukarno had overseen both the political, 
economy and social crisis that became unravel.  
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Chapter 4: The Uncomfortable Marriage of Inconvenience: Suharto, 
University Students and the Opposition   
 
This chapter examines the early period of the New Order era, which was not only supported by 
the army but also university students who were critical of President Sukarno. Thus, at the time, 
university students had high expectations that Suharto would not simply work to restore 
Indonesia‘s economic growth, but also addressing corruption in a more systematic way. 
However, the partnership between Suharto and the university students reflects a temporary 
convergence rather than a unifying alliance to address the corruption and governance 
predicament in Indonesia.  
This chapter will start by examining Suharto‘s record prior to assuming the presidency 
when he was still commander of the army in Central Java, when he started and molded his 
business venture with a number of close business acquaintances also known as cukong. The 
chapter then discusses how, Suharto responded to the public demand to address corruption by 
setting-up several ad-hoc teams, like the Corruption Eradication team (TPK) and Commission 
Four (Komisi IV).  It was during this period that Suharto‘s good relations with the university 
students initially reached its peak and then plummeted, triggered by the students‘ criticism of 
his family‘s involvement in cronyism. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the growing 
seeds of opposition because of the discontent among Suharto‘s former confidants, senior 
politicians and even former colleagues in the military, who were concerned about the growing 
personalization of state affairs which bred corruption.  
There are seven sections in this chapter. The first section will assess the role of students 
and opposition group in the first two decades of the New Order era based on the existing 
academic literature. Suharto‘s stint as head of Army‘s Central Java Regional Commands which 
revealed his irregular practices in mixing business with military operation will be discussed in 
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the second section.  Furthermore, Suharto‘s effort to address corruption and other irregularities 
under the previous Sukarno government will be illustrated in the third section.  Then the fourth 
section will highlight the start of the uneasy relationship between Suharto and the university 
students in the context of addressing corruption.  Moreover, the exposure of Suharto‘s family‘s 
irregularities in state affairs will be discussed in the fifth section. The sixth section will outline 
the breakdown of the relationship between Suharto and the university students that led to the 
dismantlement of the student activism and the opposition group. Then the seventh section 
provides the conclusion of this chapter.  
Three arguments are advanced in this chapter. The first argument was that the various 
anti-corruption drives by Suharto were more of his reactions to the growing public discontent. 
As a result, Suharto addressed an anti-corruption drive using ad-hoc approaches rather than 
addressing the core of the problem.  The second argument is that, as Suharto consistently 
prioritized the restoration of economic growth as the raison d‘être of his presidency, which 
underpinned by political stability through the authoritarian structure.  Therefore, the anti-
corruption drive, pushed by the students was eventually thwarted – as evidenced by the 
restrictions the students‘ political activity on campus in the late 1970s.  
The third and last argument is that it was Suharto who was sowing the seeds of 
discontent among the senior political elites and the intellectual community that led to the 
formation of opposition group. Although politically weak, this opposition started to create a 
dent in the credibility of Suharto to lead the nation. Although they were cast aside by the 
government, the leader of the opposition group under the New Order were successfully 
established a template for their successor to sustain the oppositional activities, albeit discreetly.  
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Assessing the Role of the Students and the Opposition Group in the first two Decades of 
the New Order 
The role of the students‘ movement in the aftermath of Sukarno‘s fall was relatively supportive 
of the Suharto government in the 1960s especially in addressing corruption. Even in 1968, 
Suharto inaugurated a task force team composed of lecturers and students from the University 
of Indonesia to conduct research on a number of state apparatuses in order to tackle 
corruption.
343
 Even so, some former members of the Indonesia student movement Union 
(KAMI) joined the Indonesian Parliament as appointed MPs
344
that played an important in the 
People‘s Consultative Assembly (MPR) by mobilizing the votes to ensure that Suharto became 
full president in 1968.
345
  
Then, the students were starting to be critical, while targeting their criticism of 
corruption at Suharto‘s inner circle.346 At this stage Suharto still responsive to the students by 
setting up Commission IV to evaluate corruption-implicated institutions and was able to enact 
an anti-corruption law in 1971.  However, as his family members were involved in corruption, 
the relationship between Suharto and the students deteriorated. As the national election 
approached, in 1971, the students adopted a confrontational approach by first criticizing the 
way in which the national election was organized. Then, they targeted Suharto‘s inner circle, 
especially his powerful personal assistant (ASPRI), which culminated in a huge student 
demonstration during the Japanese Prime Minister‘s state visit that triggered riots in Jakarta in 
January 1974, known as Malari.   
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The Malari incident marked the final break in the political rivalry between two 
powerful opposing political groups. The so-called pluralist group consisted of critical students 
allied with Chief of Operational Command for the Restoration and Security Order 
(KOPKAMTIB) Soemitro on the one hand, while the organicist group comprised of ASPRI led 
by Ali Moertopo. The battle was won by the latter group, as pluralist group figures and the 
student leaders who led the demonstration were arrested on charges of civil disturbance 
because of the riots in January 1974.
347
  Nonetheless, without powerful allies in government, 
the students became more radical and launched robust criticism directly against Suharto and his 
family in 1978. This led to a crack-down by the Suharto government that involved disbanding 
the student organizations on campus and applying the Normalization of Campus Life (NKK).  
The crack-down on the student movement in 1974-1978 marked the end of the mass 
mobilization by students for the next eleven years.
348
 Most of the opposition figures at the time 
were either arrested or treated as exiles. Criticism of the ineffectiveness of the student 
movement in the 1970s and 1980s was posited by Indrakusuma by stating that the student lacks 
of boldness in mobilizing people.‘349  But, Sjahrir defended the student by arguing that at least 
they were engaging with the current social and political issues of the time.
350
 
While mass mobilization was an important element in instituting pressure, in my view, 
it was not a chief factor. The opposition was easily dismantled because they did not receive 
support from the middle classes from the bureaucracy and military. The successful economic 
growth under the New Order made the middle class was willing to sacrifice their political 
freedom for their economic welfare. Whilst, the powerful conglomerates, which depended on 
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the state patronage, wanted to ensure the political status quo as political openness would risk 
their business.
351
 To make matters worse, the state intervened constantly to ensure that civil 
society did not become unified against the government.
352
 
Facing greater constrains in the political arena by Suharto approaching the early 1980s, 
some former students activists was continuing their political struggle through engaging in Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs), since the government did not see them as a threat as 
focusing on ‗non-political‘ issues, like poverty, law advocacy and consumer rights and without 
mass mobilization.
353
 As a result, despite a promising start in the early New Order period, the 
students were overpowered by the vested interest that supported by Suharto, which resulted in 
the marginalization of the anti-corruption effort in 1980s.  
Suharto and corruption: the early years  
Before we discuss further Suharto‘s presidency that started in 1968, we should look back more 
than ten years to when Suharto headed the Central Java army command when he set up an 
economy governance structure which epitomized his rigid, domesticated view by mixing 
business interests with state affairs. Then, Suharto would replicate these at the national level 
during his Presidency.  
However, what Suharto practiced in Central Java was not exclusive to him. During the 
1950s, there had been constant conflict between the civilian political leaders and central 
military command that created uncertainty over supplying a sufficient budget. Therefore, the 
regional commanders started to make deals with local businesses to preserve the loyalty of the 
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troops by providing basic needs. However, the lucrative dealings between the regional 
commanders and local businesses involved smuggling in export-producing border areas, which 
also provided the opportunity for the personal enrichment that was becoming the corruption 
pattern that had plagued the military until Suharto‘s presidency.354  
  Therefore, during his appointment in poverty and malnutrition stricken Central Java, in 
1957, Suharto was facing the same budget challenges in order to ensure his troops‘ welfare.355 
He justified his decision in the context of facing the growing influence of the PKI in the 
regions, particularly after the regional elections in July 1957.
356
 Suharto had observed that the 
solutions provided by the PKI to address poverty made them more popular in the region.  To 
advance this mission, Suharto managed to recruit young army officers like Ali Moertopo and 
Soedjono Humardani,
357
 who later became highly influential advisors of Suharto as president.  
In supplementing his troop‘s basic needs and supporting the economic activities in 
Central Java, Suharto set up the Territorial IV Foundation (YTE) to raise funds in June 1957. 
Then, he established the Development Fund Territorial IV Foundation (YPTE) to provide 
financial support to farmers and villagers and retired military officers.
358
 The foundation was 
based on their ability to impose tariffs on goods and services – like, the ownership of radio or 
use of electricity – and also received charity from local business. In early 1959, the YPTE‘s 
capital was around Rp.35 million and an accumulated reserve of around Rp.16 million.
359
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However, Suharto‘s involvement in smuggling while in Central Java got him into 
trouble.  In order to address the food shortage, Suharto with the support of local leaders 
decided that they needed to import rice from Thailand by illegally selling sugar that was 
obtained from the depleted former Dutch company sugar factories to Singapore with help of 
local businessmen Bob Hasan.
360
  
Meanwhile, the Army Chief Nasution intensified the anti-corruption drive in 1959, in 
response to the growing dissatisfaction with the military due to the criticism that martial law 
caused the army leaders to become implicated in corruption, especially those assigned to 
managing the state enterprises.  
Suharto‘s business activities in Central Java thus became a target for inspection by the 
Army brass.  After the investigation in October 1959, the army announced that the 
unauthorized levies found in Central Java had not been found elsewhere.
361
 After three and a 
half years, he was transferred for training to the Army Staff and Command School in 
Bandung.
362
  
Based on Jenkins observation Suharto‘s Central Java stint shows ‗cavalier attitude to 
the ethical issues of fundraising and to the commercialization of office, thereby undermining 
the viability of the Indonesian state.‘363 Jenkins has a valid point on the Central Java episode. 
However, in my view, the mixing of business interests with state or military affairs was not 
exclusive to Suharto, since the regional commanders who applied the same practice, such as in 
West Java or North Sulawesi.  
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Promising Start for Suharto  
As the head of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) Suharto had never been 
expected to be a successor of the charismatic Sukarno. After the attempted coup led by mid-
ranking army officials, that led to the death of Army Chief General Ahmad Yani and five other 
officers in the early morning of 30 September 1965, it gave the Army, led by Suharto, the 
momentum gradually to take power from Sukarno in 1965-1968.  
There has been continuing debate about the account of the murder of the army officer 
on 30 September 1965, especially as it triggered Lieutenant Colonel Untung from the 
presidential guard unit (Cakrabirawa) and his military group claimed that the 30 September 
movement took action based on an unconfirmed report about the planned coup against Sukarno 
by the Council of General, led by the army. The government‘s version was that the PKI had 
planned a coup, for which they had recruited elements of the army and air force to defeat the 
army, and take over the country.
364
 Another scenario was that Suharto was the main perpetrator 
of the plot that, at one stroke, could get rid of his rival in the army, destroy the PKI and topple 
Sukarno from the presidency.
365
 However according to Wanandi, since Suharto‘s military 
position was weak, coalesced with his humble origins, Suharto did not have the capacity to 
design such a complicated plan.
366
 Then, based on ‗the Cornell report‘, it concluded that the 
coup was based on the internal rivalry within the army, whereby a small group from the 
Diponegoro division, led by Colonel Untung, initiated the movement against the generals, and 
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used their association with the PKI and Sukarno to advance their goal.
367
 However, my view 
more inclined toward Rossa‘s research, which is based partly on the self-reflection account of 
Soepardjo, the highest ranking military member involved in the 30 September plot. Rossa‘s 
concluded that the 30 September movement was a clandestine operation endorsed by PKI chair 
Aidit, which was executed erroneously. As a result, the PKI failed to mobilize its masses, 
without back-up plan and failed to receive Sukarno‘s support.368 As a result, Suharto was using 
the momentum of the PKI‘s plot‘s disarray to launch a counterattack and dismantle the PKI 
nationwide.
369
 
Another controversy emerged as Suharto led the army to step up his anti-PKI 
campaign. Then Suharto skillfully positioned himself as a strong leader. Law and order broke 
down, whereby there was a systematic purge not only of members of the PKI but also their 
families. This episode still sparks controversy in Indonesia today, as the Indonesia Human 
Rights Commission concluded that there had been a gross violation of human rights during 
1965-1966, whereby approximately 32,000 people went missing and around 2000 more were 
killed.
370
 Coordinating Minister for Security Djoko Suyatno defended the government‘s action, 
arguing that this would have been the other way round if the PKI had won the struggle.
371
  
It was clearly a mass-killing during 1966-1965, that has been continuously raised by 
leading national and international human rights activists and agencies. The question is whether 
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the killing was justified in defending the nation from the threat of the PKI, especially since it 
was extended to the PKI members‘ families. The truth and reconciliation commission on the 
1965-1966 killings, in my opinion, ought to be established following the same model as in 
South Africa or the recent one involving Indonesia and East Timor to reach a closure for the 
government and the victims. Unfortunately, the truth and reconciliation commission, was 
disbanded by the Constitutional Court (MK) in December 2006.
372
 As a result, the 
controversies surrounding the 1965-1966 killings still linger in Indonesia as no credible 
political mechanism to address this pertinent issue.  
Amidst the controversy surrounding the nationwide purging of the PKI, the action 
enhanced Suharto‘s reputation among the army leaders, who were deeply disappointed by 
Sukarno‘s muted reaction to the killing of the generals.373Then, Suharto pressured Sukarno 
through the mobilization of street demonstrations by students, and then sent three army 
generals to meet Sukarno, demanding the authority to restore order and security.  As a result 
Sukarno issued the 11 March 1966 letter of instruction (SUPERSEMAR).  
Suharto used SUPERSEMAR which was, inter alia, to dissolve the PKI, arresting 
Ministers closely associated with Sukarno and the PKI and establishing a new cabinet filled 
with his supporters.
374
 This created a dual leadership, whereby Suharto expanded its authority 
as evident from his influence over the cabinet composition. Meanwhile, Sukarno was still de 
jure the President.  
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In February 1967, Suharto and his supporter managed to control the MPR and arranged 
assembly to reject Sukarno accountability speech and its addendum.
375
 Finally, on 12 March 
1967, the MPR convened an assembly at which they stripped all Presidential privileges from 
Sukarno and installed Suharto as Acting President. Ultimately, through the provisional session 
of the MPR in 1968, Suharto became a full President.
376
 
 One of the main promises of Suharto was to address the corruption in Sukarno era.
377
 As 
a result, relationship between Suharto and the student activists in addressing corruption reached 
its peak when the army arrested 15 ministers because their connection with the 30 September 
Coup and those who lived in luxurious life.
378
 The prosecution of Chaerul Saleh and Jusuf 
Muda Dalam was not just exposing their governmental incompetence but also delegitimizing 
Sukarno‘s regime. The trial of former BI governor Jusuf revealed Sukarno‘s government‘s 
mismanagement and corruption.
379
 
Furthermore, Suharto as the Army Chief and Vice Prime Minister for Security Affairs, 
established a Financial Supervision Team (PEKUNEG) on 30 April 1966 to focus on 
corruption prevention, led by Army Major General Suryo.
380
  
The PEKUNEG uncovered corruption by businessmen with close-link to Sukarno‘s 
trusted ministers, such as Chaerul and Jusuf through special facilities and business dubious 
practices, like deferred tax payments and the abuse of revolutionary funds. The PEKUNEG‘s 
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work helped the Suharto-led army to shore up his power base in government.
381
 Until 
September 1966, the PEKUNEG team claimed that they could avert a potential substantial 
state loss of more than US$6.1 million, 1.1 million Hong Kong Dollars, and more than 58 
million Yen.
382
  
Then, Jusuf Muda Dalam became the first minister to be tried in August 1966, charged 
on several counts, including smuggling a weapon and its ammunition as well as dangerous 
explosive material into Jakarta and siphoning revolutionary funds worth more than Rp.97 
billion.
383
  
During his defense, Jusuf claimed that what he had done was to support Sukarno‘s 
revolutionary mission based on the cabinet support.
384
  Eventually, he was found guilty by the 
court and sentenced to death and his appeal was then rejected in 1967.
385
  .  
As an acting president Suharto also established the Anti-corruption team (TPK) in 
December 1967. The TPK team – led by the Attorney General Sugih Arto – had the authority 
to lead, coordinate and supervise all of the law enforcement agencies in the investigation and 
prosecution of corruption cases.
386
  
However, the TPK team was unable to prosecute the powerful high-ranking army 
officers. The press criticized Sugih Arto, for paying too much emphasizes on law procedure; 
                                            
381
 Mr. Phillips to Mr. Brown, Letter (Confidential), ‗Indonesia: Annual Review for 1967,‘p.2. 
382
 ‗Pemasukan Uang Kas hasil Pekuneg (The State Cash Revenue generated by Pekuneg) ‘, Kompas, 29 
September 1966. P. 1.    
383
 ‗Jusuf Muda Dalam dimuka Pengadilan Subversi [Jusuf Muda Dalam In front of Subversion Court Trial]‘, pp. 
1-2.  
384
 ‗J.M.D Ingkari Semua Tuduhan: Ketjuali mengenai soal Kawin [J.M.D. refused All Accusation: Except on his 
Marriages],‘ Kompas, 8 September 1966, pp. 1-2.  
385
 ‗Keputusan Pengadilan Subversi: J.M.D. Mati [the Subversion Court Ruling: J.M.D Dead]‘, Kompas, 10 
September 1966, p.1; Supreme Court Decision number 15/k/kr/ 1967 on Cassation Request by Jusuf Muda Dalam. 
386
 Presidential Decree (Keputusan Presiden – KEPPRES) number 228 year 1967 on the Anti-Corruption team 
(Tim Pemberantasan Korupsi – TPK), article 3. 
139 
 
thus, the prosecutions only involved low level officials.
387
Nonetheless, the Deputy Attorney, 
General Sutrisno Hamidjojo revealed the real difficulties for the TPK was the lack of political 
support to prosecute powerful figures.
388
  
In early 1970, the TPK team announced that the investigation had been completed for 
144 cases, but a number of big cases remained incomplete, like on the state -owned oil 
company, PERTAMINA, and the National Logistic board (BULOG), led by Army leaders.
389
  
The Fragile Relations among Suharto and the Students 
After around three years, it was clear that the effort by Suharto to set up PEKUNEG and the 
TPK team to curb corruption had failed. To make matter worse, the head of PEKUNEG, Suryo, 
was also suspected of hiding his assets abroad. Frustrated, the students in Jakarta established 
their own anti-corruption committee (KAK).  The relationship between students and 
government entered what Sjahrir called the ‗constructive-criticism‘ stage.390  During the period 
of 1967-1970, the students along with their lecturers were part of ‗Task force of University of 
Indonesia (UI)‘ that conducted a study in 1968 to simplify the bureaucracy to reduce 
corruption.
391
  
Another response from Suharto was the establishment of Commission Four (Komisi 4) 
on 31 January 1970.   However, the commission was weak since it did not have the authority to 
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prosecute, but only to review the government‘s policies and provide policy recommendations 
to address corruption.
392
  
The Commission Four was chaired by the former Prime Minister Wilopo.
393
 The 
Commission Four became more credible when widely respected former Vice President 
Muhammad Hatta was appointed as its advisor.
394
 
Mohammad Hatta realized Commission Four‘s limitation; therefore he requested 
Suharto‘s support: 
Should there be an investigation into ‗powerful‘ figures who are suspected of being involved in 
corruption, then if necessary President Suharto must become directly involved in helping the 
commission‘s work.395 
Despite its limited authority, Commission Four performed reasonably well by asking questions 
and gather data from high officials, such as the ministers of finance and the state audit agency 
(BPK). In the end, Commission Four supplied seven reports at various stage, including on the 
Attorney General Office and the high profile corruption prosecution,  followed by a couple of 
reports on the state oil company, PERTAMINA, BULOG and the state forestry enterprise, 
PERHUTANI. A report on the state administrative reform and the new method for corruption 
eradication was also produced.
396
  
Overall, all of the reports provided by Commission Four criticized the governance and 
corruption issue, exposing the financial mismanagement and lack of accountability in state 
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enterprises, mentioned above.
397
Perhaps it was the first high quality report to the President that 
address governance reform and anti-corruption issues comprehensively. However, Suharto was 
reluctant to endorse the report recommendation.  Commission Four‘s report was later leaked by 
the leading Indonesia newspaper, Sinar Harapan, at the end of July 1970 that embarrassed 
Suharto.
398
  This was suspected of being a deliberate attempt by Commission Four to pre-empt 
an intention to water down the content of the report.  
Meanwhile, the relationship between President Suharto and the students‘ Anti-Corruption 
Committee was deteriorating. At the first meeting, the students had a frank discussion with 
Suharto in July 1970, during which they reported the possible corruption by the head of 
PEKUNEG, Suryo.399  
Then, during the second meeting in August 1970, the atmosphere changed 
dramatically.
400
 As described by Budiman: 
Suharto suspected the students of being used by his opponents, who want to place a wedge 
between him and his close associates by bringing up the issue of corruption.
401
 
The government tried to display to the public that it was serious about stepping up its efforts to 
curb corruption. During the cabinet meeting in August 1970, Suharto required the state 
officials to report their wealth and discussed how to reform bureaucracy and strengthen the 
anti-corruption policy.
402
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However, the students were unimpressed because Suharto never announced the list of 
property owned by state officials and the prosecution by the AGO only involved minor 
officials.
403
  As a result, Suharto‘s relations with the student‘s KAK had deteriorated, even on 8 
August 1970; Suharto refused to meet the students. 
404
 
Again, there was revived hope of anti-corruption efforts, when the Indonesian 
parliament (DPR) enacted the anti-corruption law on 12 March 1971. The law stipulated that 
corruption should be legally defined as a crime, whilst previously corruption had only been 
associated with other offences.
405
 However, there were some weaknesses in the law, since it 
could not be applied retroactively, due to intensive lobbying by the government.
406
 Another 
weakness of the anti-corruption law was that it did not subject army personnel to the 
jurisdiction of the civil administration. 
407
 
It was evident that by this time that the early anti-corruption effort through PEKUNEG 
and the TPK was selective and only prioritizing corruption cases in the previous Sukarno‘s 
administration.  This is linked to the second argument of this thesis as outlined in the 
introduction section. Then, as the university students became critical of the alleged corruption 
involving his trusted aides, Suharto tried to accommodate their demands, for instance by 
establishing Commission Four. However, it was clear that Suharto never intended to address 
governance issues comprehensively as Commission Four had only limited authority. Even 
Commission Four‘s comprehensive corruption findings and progressive recommendations that 
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were leaked by the press were never followed-up seriously. This is linked to the first argument 
of this thesis where the governance reform, in this case under Suharto, was never applied 
consistently due to a lack of political support.  Despite credible recommendations from the 
Commission Four, the unwillingness of Suharto to apply it undermined the governance reform 
effort.  
The First Public Exposure of Irregularities involving Suharto’s Family 
A year after the students met Suharto, it was quite clear that the problem of corruption in 
Indonesia not just pertained to his close associates but was linked with Suharto. At first, the 
students established the White Group (Golput) that announced that they would boycott the 
election by refusing to vote due to the overwhelming manipulation by the government to 
ensure Golkar won the 1971 election.
408
 In a systematic fashion, the government hassled 
Golput by disbanding their discussion and interrogating the leaders.
409
  
The relationship between Suharto and the students broke down completely when the 
student activists targeted Suharto‘s wife – Tien Suharto -  over the development of amusement 
park called ‗Taman Mini Indonesia Indah,‘ in January 1972. The allegation of Tien Suharto‘s 
involvement in corruption through her intervention in state projects also reached the diplomatic 
circles, leading to her nickname: ‗Mrs Ten percent.‘410 The students‘ concern about the Taman 
Mini Indonesia project was raised by one of the student leaders, Marie Muhammad, that the 
project would hamper the Indonesia development program.411 
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During a panel discussion on the Taman Mini Project on 3 January 1972, Dorodjatun 
Kuntjoro-Jakti, stated that Rp.10.5 billion to establish the amusement park was too expensive 
and would burden society.
412
  
In response to the students‘ growing criticism of the Taman Mini project and his wife 
role, Suharto reacted angrily by defending the project that it would not affect development 
since it was a private project in his speech on 6 January 1972.  Suharto went further, asserting 
that the real target of the protesters was not the Taman Mini project, but that their short-term 
target was to discredit the government, while their long-term target was to drive out the 
military from the executive.
413
 
This strong statement by Suharto triggered sympathy and support from academicians. 
On 25 January 1972, the group of seven academicians issued a statement sympathizing with 
the students‘ criticism of the Taman Mini projects. These lecturers included Dorodjatun 
Kuntjoro-Jakti, Mardjono Reksodipuro and Juwono Sudarsono.  They also formed a discussion 
group that was critical of the government, called the University of Indonesia Group Discussion 
(GD UI), and organized regular seminars, which was helping to develop policies for student 
protesters in 1973-1974.
414
 This academician in the campus aligned themselves with the 
technocrats and the progressive elements in the army, led by the KOPKAMTIB chief, 
Soemitro.
415
 At the time, their strong competitor was the influential personal assistants 
(ASPRI) of Suharto, led by Ali Moertopo (politics) and Soedjono Humardani (the economy).  
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After Suharto‘s strong reaction to his critics, KOPKAMTIB acted swiftly in January 
1972, by arresting a number of students and activists who was involved in various anti-
corruption protests over the past two years, including Arief Budiman and HJ Princen. 
416
  
The Confrontation and Dismantlement of the Student Movement as well as the 
Opposition Group  
As a tactical political move, the Head of the Student Association at the University of Indonesia, 
Hariman Siregar, tried to forge a relationship with a powerful faction within the army which 
was led by Soemitro, head of KOPKAMTIB.
417
 
The students staged a protest in October 1973, where they announced a resolution to 
protest against corruption, the abuse of power, rising prices, unemployment and illegal 
activities by the ASPRI.
418
 Despite the growing anti-government sentiment, KOPKAMTIB 
chief Soemitro was very accommodating of the students‘ concerns and in December 1973 tour 
around big state universities, tried to contain the rising political temperature.
419
 
The students stepped up their rhetoric on 10 January 1974, by passing a resolution 
calling for the abolition of the President‘s ASPRI, reduced prices and the addressing of 
corruption as well as demand to curb luxurious lifestyles.
420
 
In the end, on 11 January 1974, 35 student council groups met President Suharto to 
discuss their various concerns, but many questions remained unanswered and the Suharto‘s 
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response was quite vague.
421
 When the students asked Suharto about his wife and other family 
members‘ business interests, Suharto merely smiled and said nothing.422 He even challenged 
the students to provide concrete evidence.‘423  
In light of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka‘s state visit, the students decided to 
continue protesting in the streets. But as the unidentified mob started to damage buildings and 
cars, the student demonstration led to the riot on 15 January 1974 became known as the 
'Malari'. The riot cost 11 student lives while 137 others were injured. About 1000 vehicles 
were destroyed and 150 buildings damaged.
424
  
In response to riots, the government announced on 17 January 1974 that preventive and 
repressive action would be taken to restore law and order.
425
 Pertaining to military factional 
rivalry, Suharto wanted to demonstrate his neutrality by taking over the command of 
KOPKAMTIB from Soemitro while at the same time disbanding the ASPRI who had been 
targeted by students.
426
  
The repressive measure that was taken by the Indonesian government led to 820 arrests, 
including that of 14 university students, 83 other students, four MPs and several officers.  
These included human rights defenders (Adnan Buyung Nasution and HJ Princen) and other 
activists like Marsillam Simanjuntak and Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti. This was a set-back for 
the campus activist and the progressive faction within the army.   
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Eventually, only the student leaders were prosecuted by the attorney general‘s office – 
Hariman Siregar and Sjahrir from the University of Indonesia and Aidin Chalid from Gadjah 
Mada University.
427
  The leader of the University of Indonesia‘s student group, Hariman 
Siregar, was sentenced to six years in prison due to subversion, while Sjahrir was also 
sentenced to 6.5 years.
428
  
In 1975-1977, the students intensified their criticism directed at Suharto‘s family 
members.  They wanted Suharto‘s family to answer the accusation that Indonesia‘s first family 
was taking advantage of government projects to accumulate a vast personal fortune. During a 
press conference in October 1976, Suharto‘s brother, Probosutedjo, and eldest son, Sigit, 
denied the corruption accusation by the students.
429
   
In another development, the government launched an anti-corruption campaign, known 
as operasi tertib (OPSTIB), in September 1977.  The OPSTIB operation was led by J.B. 
Sumarlin, Minister for the State Apparatus, and its raid was conducted with the help of 
Sudomo, head of KOPKAMTIB. The mission of OPSTIB was inter alia to push for 
organizational and administrational reform in the government/state agencies as well as to 
eradicate illegal levy in the government services, like levies on tax submission or on the 
customs for goods or services.
430
 There was criticism when the OPSTIB operation applied 
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bottom-up approach
431
, since it was vulnerable when it faced resistance from the powerful 
vested interest.   
Initially, OPSTIB was carried out with a promising start. In the first eight months, every 
day around 15 officials were caught out by the operation. This led to the findings of the total 
number of officials who were found guilty, 1755 were given administrative sanctions, while 
263 were taken to court.
432
 In September, the operation had reached higher level officials, 
whereby four senior police officials were accused of embezzling US$11.5 million between 
1974 and 1977. The highest-ranking police officer involved was Siswaji, former deputy of the 
police chief. During the military trial, they were accused of using unused police funds to 
finance their lavish lifestyle, such as for fancy cars, and luxurious houses.  
433
 
Nevertheless, the bottom-up approach adopted by the OPSTIB operation finally reached 
its limit and was halted when it encountered strong resistance at the mid-level.
434
 Also, the 
corrupt practices continued, as shown by the various illegal levies applied by the government. 
This clearly shows that the Indonesian government‘s attempts to bridle corruption involving 
high level officials were failing.  
The discrimination in terms of corruption prosecution was further amplifying the public 
cynicism.
435
 However, J.B. Sumarlin, claimed that between July 1977 and January 1980, the 
OPSTIB operation managed to save the state assets worth Rp200 billion and also claimed that 
the operation had succeeded in avoiding a state loss of Rp337 billion in 1981. 
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However, Suharto government‘s effort to show that it was serious about in combating 
corruption through OPSTIB was failing. Students from all over Indonesia in October 1977 held 
a gathering in Bandung and pledged to be an opposition to the government.   
The student demonstration reached its peak during a rally at the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB) in January 1978, when around 3,000 students gathered to oppose Suharto‘s 
re-election. They published a ‗White Book,‘ containing a critical assessment of the 
government‘s overall policies, like development planning, agriculture, finance, trade, and 
regional development,
436
 including criticism of Suharto‘s wife using state facilities, that upset 
him.
437
 
In the end, Heri Akhmadi, chair of the Student Council of ITB, was arrested on a 
charge of insulting Suharto. During the trial, Heri used his defense to provide a comprehensive 
criticism of Suharto and his government for turning Indonesia into a nation of beggars and 
embezzlers by allowing a ‗puppet‘ government, Indonesia Chinese businessmen and foreigners 
to drain the national wealth. In Akhmadi‘s defense document, there is an appendix that listed 
the Suharto‘s family wealth and conglomerates.438  
Then, the government also tried to restrict the students‘ political activities on campus 
with the launch of the Normalization of Campus Life (NKK) policy in March 1980. As a result 
of the NKK policy, the student movement became further marginalized, especially on 
corruption by Suharto‘s family.  With the vigorous crackdown by the government, the student 
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movement was forced to change the method of its activism after the NKK policy, becoming 
more underground and less confrontational.
439
 
Dissatisfied with government, the opposition group, consisting of combinations of 
prominent retired generals, like A.H. Nasution (former Minister of Defense), Ali Sadikin 
(former governor of Jakarta) and well-known civilian figures, like Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 
(former governor of BI) and Mohammad Natsir (former prime minister), decided to submit a 
petition with 50 signatories, known as the ‗Petisi 50,‘ to parliament.440 The petition criticized 
how Suharto was using Pancasila as an instrument to threaten his political enemies and his 
efforts to bring the military back into politics.
441
 
 However, the Petisi 50 merely created limited public furor and restricted political 
impact. Subsequently, the signatories were disrupted by restrictions being placed on their 
activities, like closing off their access to bank credit and their rejection from government 
business contracts.
442
  
It had become clear by this period that the relationship between Suharto and critical 
university students as well as academics had broken down when the criticism reached 
Suharto‘s family. Despite Suharto‘s limited efforts to address corruption, from various 
initiatives like TPK, commission four and OPSTIB, were never reached the highest officials.  
Thus, related to the second argument in the thesis as outlined in the introduction section, the 
anti-corruption efforts by Suharto were mostly politically motivated, since they focused mostly 
on cases during the Sukarno era or never reached, especially his close associate in the army. 
Furthermore, as Suharto had just started to consolidate his authority and political patronage, the 
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anti-corruption effort was easily disrupted once it approached his inner circle in the military 
elites. As a result, the efforts failed to convince the students and growing opposition group that 
Suharto was serious about addressing corruption. In contrast, Suharto was using repressive 
measures to deal with the students, as evident in the aftermath of the Malari incident, and with 
the opposition, some of whom used to be Suharto‘s supporters in the early years.  
Conclusion  
When Suharto took over the Presidency from Sukarno, it was evident that the university 
students were the main drivers in pushing for the addressing of corruption and mismanagement 
during the previous regime. The plethora of anti-corruption teams and initiatives were a 
reactive response by Suharto to maintain support among students and the army as the prime 
custodians of his regime. Thus the approaches were ad hoc, and never addressed corruption in 
a comprehensive way, as this threatened to rattle the fragile coalition, particularly within the 
army.  Therefore, applying Dahl‘s political pluralism analytical framework, Suharto, equipped 
with political resources mainly through organizations, physical force and money, was able to 
neutralize the anti-corruption efforts led by the students and later by the opposition group. As 
Suharto became politically stronger, the former student activist and opposition figures, 
although still no match for him, were using their political resources especially knowledge, 
education and international networks, by making their strategy less confrontational through 
NGOs that focused on one development issue, such as environment and human rights.  
 Also, in this period there was further democratic roll-back in referring to analytical 
framework by Linz and Stepan, Diamond, Merkel as well as Croissant and Bunte as mention in 
the introduction section of this thesis. This was evident when Suharto was pursuing 
aggressively the prosecution of critical students and member of oppositions especially for those 
who was critical of his family involvement in business that benefited from government 
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contracts. As a result, it impaired the political and civil freedom, one of the main pillars of 
democracy.  
 In the context of governance reform and anti-corruption effort there was almost none 
policy entrepreneur in this endeavor. Although, the students and opposition group was able to 
identify problem and push Suharto to establish various ad-hoc anti-corruption team, but it was 
evident that it was not sustainable since did not get sufficient political and financial resources 
from government. As result, the students and opposition group had almost none opportunity to 
push for policy that deliver significant impact in dealing with corruption.  
 Lastly in terms of the quality of political leadership using Burns analytical framework 
as mention in the introduction section, Suharto can be categorized as transactional leader in 
these period. Despite an array of anti-corruption effort or initiatives, but it was more of the 
reaction to the public outrage, rather than genuine Suharto-led initiatives to address corruption. 
To maintain his political support, Suharto was using economic patronage to maintain his loyal 
supporter especially from the army or close business associates. As dealing with critical 
students and opposition group, Suharto government was using physical force by intimidation or 
prosecution and treated them such as pariah in order to discourage potential opposition figures. 
Therefore, after the neutralization of students activity through NKK policy and the 
dismantlement of the opposition group, the anti-corruption initiatives was at the verge of 
collapse, while Suharto was growing more confident in consolidating his political authority.  
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
Chapter 5: Suharto, the technocrats and their Fragile Alliance: the 
Authoritarian Consolidation, coalesced with Economic Reform in the New 
Order era 
 
Suharto oversaw the development of Indonesia‘s political governance structure from a slightly 
competitive one into an authoritarian form, with him at its apex. On the other hand Suharto 
also needed vast economic and financial resources to funnel his political, and military or 
intelligence activities. As foreign investment and foreign loans from donors, which were 
usually channeled through the technocrats would invite demands for greater transparency and 
accountability, Suharto had to find an alternative financial source. The technocrat was a group 
an economist from University of Indonesia with post-graduate degree mostly from the US 
universities who was trusted by Suharto to steer the Indonesia economy. This chapter will 
discuss the political dynamics regarding how the technocrats faced tremendous challenges in 
pushing for economic reform during the New Order era, especially from their political rivals 
like financial general, the politico bureaucrat, Chinese conglomerates, Suharto‘s families and 
the engineering group led by Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie. This chapter 
will also outline how Suharto consolidated the authoritarian structure that led him to the 
pinnacle of power in later 1980s – early 1990s by dismantling further the check-and-balance 
system, but at the same time put him in vulnerable political position as evident in his downfall 
in May 1998.  
This chapter is structured into nine sections. The first sections will outline the debate in 
the academic literature on Suharto‘s political legacy. Then the second section will assess the 
role of the technocrats in the New Order era by engaging with the existing academic literature. 
The consolidation of political governance‘s authoritarian structure which made Suharto the 
central authority will be illustrated in the third section. Furthermore, the growth of two 
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influential political groups – the financial generals and technocrats - in the context of economic 
policy making rivalry is outlined in the fourth section.  Then, Suharto‘s effort to find 
alternative financial schemes with the help of the Indonesia Chinese conglomerates is the 
subject of discussion in the fourth section. The fifth section will illustrate the alliance between 
the politico bureaucrats and indigenous business that provided a new competitor for the 
technocrats in the economic policy making under the New Order era. Then, as the technocrats 
were struggling to assert their authority over economic policy-making, the growing influence 
of the emerging political players (e.g., Habibie and Suharto‘s children) will be outlined in the 
fifth section.  Subsequently, the technocrats‘ last efforts under the New Order era using IMF 
assistance during the financial crisis to impose economic reform will be examined in the 
seventh section. Suharto‘s loss of the political support of the Indonesian political elites due to 
the economic crisis, which led to his eventual resignation, will be examined in the eighth 
section. The conclusion of this chapter will be discussed in the ninth section.  
Four arguments will be advanced in this chapter. First, Suharto managed to consolidate 
all of the executive power and dismantle the judicial as well as legislative system to ensure that 
his authority was unchecked. The second argument is that, although the technocrats were 
applauded for their ability to convince Suharto of the importance of implementing sound 
economy policies and won the foreign investors‘ confidence, they were politically vulnerable 
as heavily depended on Suharto‘s support. Third argument, Suharto had neither the desire nor 
commitment to push for further economic reform since it threatened his economic patronage 
which provided by the financial generals and subsequently by the Chinese conglomerates.  
Third, Suharto was blindsided by the fact that his political governance structure was vulnerable 
and ill-equipped to deal with the emerging generation and intricacy of the global economy, 
which evident in his downfall in May 1998 during the Asia financial crisis.  
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The Debate on Suharto’s Political Legacy  
There is still considerable debate about the cause of Suharto‘s downfall in 1998, although there 
are some issues that most agree upon, such as the idea that Suharto had eroded his own 
political legitimacy by the late 1980s or early 1990s as a result of his government preferential 
treatment of his family business.
443
  The existing academic debate centers mostly on the nature 
of the political structure of the New Order.  As Robison and Hadiz argue, the economic reform 
that the technocrats pushed in the late 1980s-early 1990s consolidated the power of the 
politico-bureaucrat families and conglomerates, known as oligarchs, over Indonesia‘s 
economy.  They dismantled the governance structure so that they could enjoy various 
monopolies, business protection, and special privileges.
444
   
Meanwhile, Kian Wee argued that, since the early 1990s, the New Order‘s accumulated 
authority was used for rent-seeking activities that turned into predatory state.
445
 This parallels 
Anne Both‘s argument that Indonesia at the end of the 1990s succumbed to the interest of the 
predatory state.
446
 
Using the premise of the oligarchy‘s role adopted by Winters, who categorized Suharto 
as a Sultanistic Oligarch, the first among equals which emerged since the birth of the New 
Order. According to Winters, Suharto concentrated all the authority around him and also used 
coercive power through the state instruments to tame the other oligarchs.
447
 Also, Winters 
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argues that the major factor that led to Suharto‘s downfall in May 1998 was his abandonment 
by his fellow oligarchs, who was threatened by Suharto‘s family business.448 
 While other academics and analysts have criticized the assumption of the oligarchy 
framework, Peppinsky, suggests that the oligarchy focus failed to identify the political dynamic 
within the coalitions that underlined Suharto‘s political support, which also involved the split 
within the military and the existence of pressure groups. Even, Max Lane argues that the grass-
roots movement, comprised of students, labor associations, and opposition party elements was 
the main factor that led to Suharto‘s eventual toppling.449 
  It would be interesting to explore the impact of corruption and governance issues from 
the perspective of the key political actors in the New Order like Djiwandono and Kartasasmita 
who admitted that the ability for government in dealing with economy crisis was compromised 
due to governance issue and the corruption rooted especially in the judicial system.
450
 
All in all, in light of the debate on the power structure under the New Order, in my 
opinion, it is difficult to subscribe to the view that Suharto had a preconceived, sophisticated 
plan when taking over the presidency from Sukarno to set-up the authoritarian political 
structure systematically. In my opinion, Suharto was applying pure power politics with a zero-
sum-game approach in which it was necessary to accumulate all of the power if the opportunity 
arose to marginalize his adversaries. This created an authoritarian governance structure 
whereby the military and bureaucracy never gained independence, and also the subjugation of 
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the parliament and judiciary under the executive, whereby practically Suharto was the sin qua 
non of the state.   
As a result, the authoritarian streak of the political governance structure was outdated, 
unmatched and thus vulnerable as it had to accommodate the more critical generation.  Once 
the main source of his political legitimacy, which was the sustainable, high economic growth, 
was swapped for the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the fragile Suharto‘s political 
governance structure crumbled. 
Assessing the Role of Technocrats in the New Order  
A number of academics and analysts have applauded the success of the technocrats in reviving 
Indonesia‘s economic growth, from being an almost economic pariah at the end of the Sukarno 
era in the 1960s. As John Bresnan argues, ‗they (the technocrats) provided the confidence of 
the international financial community, and policies and programs that produced demonstrable 
results.‘451  Meanwhile Resosudarmo and Kuncoro also stated that the technocrats ‗helped 
Suharto in designing the economic stabilization policy in 1966.‘452  
However, there was some criticism of the way in which the technocrats were working 
and they were seen as ‗too elitist.‘ McDonald described the technocrats as ‗pursuing policies 
that at times made them extremely unpopular ..‘453 This was admitted by Emil Salim in July 
1974 that the technocrats were too busy in dealing with crisis, therefore they had little time to 
explain policy to group outside government.454 
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There was a consensus that the technocrats had failed to communicate effectively with 
the other political stakeholders in order to mobilize political support for the economic policy.  
Even Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, former minister under Suharto, observed, ‗the technocrats‘ 
lack of political network skill in advancing their policy agenda to their colleague.‘455 
However, in my view we should consider the political context at that time. The 
technocrats had been in no position to monopolize economic policy since the beginning of the 
New Order. They had to share their role with powerful military figures and civilians in 
government; for instance, Suharto‘s personal assistant (ASPRI), Soedjono who also in charge 
of economy.   
Moreover, not all of the major economic power in government fell under the auspices 
of the technocrats. Marie Pangestu admitted that despite the cohesiveness of the technocrats 
being central to the crisis management, ‗however, competing groups within the cabinet have 
had important bearings on the final policy outcomes.‘456   
Thus, the technocrats faced a more complicated task amid the complex political and 
economic environment, whereby they had consistently to push, cajole as well as make 
compromises with Suharto and their political adversaries in order to achieve their policy 
objectives.  As a result, related to the first argument of this thesis in the introduction section, 
governance reform pushed by the technocrats was in the end limited and uneven due to the 
limitation of their authority. No wonder that the outcome of this governance reform in the 
economic and financial sector was relatively limited in addressing corruption.  
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The Consolidation of the Political Authoritarian Governance Structure under the New 
Order Era 
While it is clear that the military-led Suharto played a crucial role in consolidating the political 
authoritarian governance structure in Indonesia, it will be argued here that this was achieved 
through evolution through a number of intense political rivalries. Therefore with initial weak 
political support, it is difficult to envision that Suharto had the ability to dismantle the political 
governance structure as if he had a preconceived plan.  
In the early period of the New Order, Suharto needed a cunning political operator whom 
he could trust to assert his authority.  Ali Moertopo, his trusted lieutenant, since he led the 
Central Java military command in the late 1950s, fits this description since he was personal 
assistant (ASPRI) of the President in politics and entrusted to reorganize the political 
governance structure that emphasized political stability. Moertopo argues for strengthening 
Indonesia revolution the military need to involve in the all aspect of state affairs including 
political, economic, financial and social-cultural affairs.457 
Then, as the national election of 1971, Suharto tasked Moertopo to revitalize Golkar as 
formidable political machine, as it experienced political legitimacy problems due to various 
personnel scandals.
458
 Golkar, that underpinned ‗guided democracy‘ in the late 1950s, was 
established by Sukarno to curb political party influence. Then, in 1964, it was modified into the 
Golkar secretariat, which was eventually dominated by the army to counter the growing 
influence of the PKI.
459
   
Moreover, after the military took power in 1966-1967, through Moertopo‘s special 
intelligence operations (OPSUS, Operasi Khusus), they managed to force state elements and 
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various political groups to support Golkar by taking control the General Election Campaign 
Board (Bappilu) of Golkar that had the authority to elect parliamentary candidate.
460
   
  In an effort to control the bureaucracy, after the election in November 1971, the 
government set up the Indonesia Civil Servants Corps (KORPRI), membership of which was 
mandatory for every Indonesia civil servants.  To ensure control, the governors of the 
provinces – mostly army officers – automatically became the chairs of the KORPRI 
provinces.
461
 Since then, the bureaucracy became the political instrument for Golkar‘s for 
national election as evident by winning the national election in July 1971 with a decisive 
majority of 62.8% of the votes.
462
 
For Suharto to dismantle the check-and-balances system completely, he also sought to 
weaken the judicial system further from the collapse that had been done by Sukarno‘s guided 
democracy. By enacted law in judge authority in 1964, Sukarno could intervened judge ruling 
in the name of revolution and later appointed the Chief of the Supreme Court as the cabinet 
member.
463
  
In the New Order era, the government, through OPSUS, managed to control the process 
of drafting and the deliberation on the new bill on the judiciary and exclude the judiciary 
influence.
464
  As a result, in the new judicial law in 1970, the executive still played a crucial 
role in the administration of the court.
465
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Then, the government further consolidated its authority over the judiciary by a number 
of new laws that were enacted in 1985 and 1986. Through law 14/1985 on the Supreme Court, 
it confirmed the restricted right of the judicial review.
466
 Then, law 2 year of 1986 on the 
General Court explicitly re-affirmed the dual management of the court whereby it would 
handle the technical management,
467
 while the Department of Justice would retain control of 
its role in the administrative, organizational and financial management of the court.
468
 The 
executive used their authority over the personnel and the financial management of the court to 
exert political pressure on the judiciary.
469
 
Meanwhile, Benny Moerdani as Moertopo‘s successor, steadily gained Suharto‘s trust 
to execute military and intelligence operations, which led to his rapid promotion as Indonesia‘s 
Military Chief.
470
   The military, in an unprecedented move in the 1980s, tried to assert its 
independence over Suharto, but failed, triggered by the deterioration of Suharto‘s relationship 
with Moerdani due to the latter‘s criticism of Suharto‘s family involvement in state projects 
and suggestion that Suharto should planning for his successor.
471
 This led to the abrupt 
dismissal of Moerdani from the Military Command in February 1988.  
Suharto was planning to be independent of the military and was trying to empower 
Golkar as alternative political vehicle in the 1980s. Under the leadership of Sudharmono, 
Golkar managed to transform into a formidable political machine with a state-led, mass party 
base. Through his position as State Secretary, Sudharmono also managed to build his own 
patronage through government contracts, including military projects that irked the military 
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establishment. Golkar, managed to recruit a new cadre outside the military or bureaucracy like 
university activists, businessmen or NGO activists.
472
 In 1987, Golkar claimed 28 million 
members and 9 million cadres.
473
 No wonder that, in the national election of 1987, Golkar 
managed to win, with 73.2% of the votes.
474
 
The grooming of Sudharmono and his group marked Suharto‘s attempt to accommodate 
the growing middle class and more progressively-minded politicians, bureaucrats and military 
leaders who were willing to channel critics toward the government. At least on the surface, 
Suharto appeared unwilling to confront this political development head on, that started thriving 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which he called ‗keterbukaan‘ or openness.   
In the end, Golkar was unable to be a relatively independent political party vis-à-vis 
Suharto since, financially, they still depended on Suharto‘s patronage and the Golkar 
politicians who were critical of Suharto were removed.
475
 
 After the military managed to force Suharto to accept Military Chief Try Sutrisno as 
vice president in 1993, Suharto eventually took full-control of the military. In fact, Suharto 
skillfully managed to appoint military officers who were closely associated with him and put 
them into two opposing groups to dispel the notion of any unifying threat.
476
 Before Suharto‘s 
downfall in May 1998, he was appointing Wiranto (Suharto‘s former adjutant) as the Military 
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Chief, representing the nationalist group, while simultaneously promoting his son-in-law, 
Prabowo Subianto as KOSTRAD Chief, who represented the Islamic group.
477
 
 Approaching the early 1990s, Suharto was at the apex of his authority when the military 
were weakened due to the rivalry between the nationalist versus the Islamic camp, the Golkar 
Party was under his control, and the judiciary and bureaucracy were effectively weakened and 
became Suharto‘s de facto political instrument. 
The Expansion of the Financial Generals’ Military Business and the Rise of the 
Technocrats 
Since Indonesia independence involved in business, the military expanded its involvement 
during 1957. That was when the government declared martial law as the military was taking 
over most of the foreign companies which at the time were under the Dutch, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter.  
According to Crouch, from the outset of the New Order era, the army saw that the 
expansion of their commercial activities was vital in supporting their role as the custodian of 
Indonesia‘s political stability, but also an opportunity for the officers to accumulate 
tremendous wealth.
478
 
The prime example of military involvement in business during the New Order era early 
period was their leadership role in the state oil company, PERTAMINA, and BULOG.
479
 The 
establishment of PERTAMINA began in 1957 when the Indonesian army took over an unused 
field in North Sumatra, with capital support from Japanese companies. After 1966, PERMINA 
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was taken over by two other companies and renamed PERTAMINA led by army general Ibnu 
Sutowo.
480
  
 Triggered by the increased oil price, 50 new production-sharing contracts had been 
signed with 35 foreign companies by 1975. As a result, between1969-1975, the government 
revenue from oil increased significantly from Rp. 66.5 billion to Rp. 957.2 billion.
481
   
Then, when PERTAMINA expanded its business due to the oil boom, Ibnu Sutowo‘s 
took on the role of the President‘s political financier, dispensing patronage through ‗non-
budgetary‘ financing to their ally in the military, government officials, businessmen, and state 
projects, like PERTAMINA Hospital or Suharto‘s office‘s Bina Graha.482  
Ibnu Sutowo‘s controversial political ascendancy was also admitted by the US 
Ambassador Galbraight who thought: 
PERTAMINA illustrates some of the best and some of the worst aspects of the Suharto regime. 
It has introduced centers of Efficiency and Economic Accomplishment, entirely run by 
Indonesians...But Ibnu Sutowo Runs the state-owned oil company like it was his own…he has 
built his own Business Empire and become a multi-millionaire himself
483
  
 
Nonetheless, the technocrats resented the difficulty of formulating economic policy because 
PERTAMINA was able to finance independently.  The technocrats consisted of economist at 
the University of Indonesia, led by Widjojo Nitisastro, with Ali Wardhana, and Emil Salim 
among its group, which was also known as the ‗Berkeley Mafia,‘ since some of them educated 
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in the University of California, Berkeley.
484
  The technocrats initially became acquainted with 
Suharto in the army staff and command school in Bandung, SESKOAD from 1962-1964.
485
  
As Suharto came to power in 1967-1968, the technocrats were entrusted with tackling the 
formidable challenge of saving Indonesia‘s economy from the brink as inflation had reached 
1000 percent a year and the government had amassed more than US$2 billion in foreign 
debt.
486
  
Nevertheless, the technocrats, led by Coordinating Minister for Economic affairs 
Widjojo, had little choice but to turn to the international community in 1967-1968. They 
patched up the relationship with multilateral donors agencies, like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and with the industrialized countries, led by the U.S.
487
  
However, the western donor countries, realized that the technocrats were politically 
vulnerable and lacked a sufficient social base. Therefore, the US Embassy tried to help by 
informing the army leaders that Indonesia would not receive any aid unless it was approved by 
the technocrats.
488
 
The technocrats succeeded in stabilizing Indonesia‘s economy within a couple of years 
by reducing inflation quickly and restoring their foreign creditors‘ trust.489  This was 
demonstrated by the vast amount of Indonesian foreign debt that was being rescheduled with 
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generous terms of payment in 1967-1970.
490
  The implementation of the Five Year 
Development Plan was a success as in 1973 economic growth reached over 7%, the investment 
rate increased by more than 15% and exports also increased substantially by 50%.
491
 With the 
technocrats‘ growing stature, they became a formidable foe of Ibnu Sutowo‘s PERTAMINA.  
The technocrats felt that their authority and effectiveness in coordinating Indonesia‘s 
economic policy were hampered by PERTAMINA‘s autonomy capital mobilization, because 
Sutowo had been very close to Suharto as fellow army officers.
492
 
Suharto was conscious of the two-track system in the New Order economy governance 
structure and tried to put him above the fray should a conflict arise. However, the technocrat 
was wary about the potential debt problem caused by PERTAMINA for international donors 
and creditors.
493
 
The concern by the Technocrats was vindicated when PERTAMINA‘s short-term debt 
increased almost tenfold from 1973 to 1975, from US$140 million to US$1,000 million, that 
almost bankrupted the country, with a total debt of around US10.5 billion.
494
  
As a result, the technocrat-led government reacted quickly by guaranteeing all of 
PERTAMINA‘s foreign loans, supervising the firm‘s management and establishing several 
commissions to investigate the scale of PERTAMINA‘ debt problem.495Sutowo was dismissed 
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eventually in March 1976, Suharto having retained him despite the PERTAMINA debt 
problem the preceding year.
496
  
Another form of military involvement in the state enterprises was exemplified by 
BULOG which enjoyed a monopoly over the distribution and price determination of basic 
commodities, like rice, sugar and flour.  Originally, BULOG‘s mission was to provide rice for 
civil servants and military officers, but in 1970 this was expanded to maintaining price stability 
for essential commodities through a policy of purchasing, importing, marketing and pricing.  
However, following the leadership of army general Tirtosudiro from 1967-1973, he left 
an unpleasant legacy, as BULOG was plagued by a number of corruption cases.
497
  The anti-
corruption commission IV, led by former Prime Minister Wilopo, published a critical report, 
outlining, among other things, the potential deficit in BULOG‘s budget that had accumulated 
from 1968-1970 of around Rp. 44 billion.
498
 Nonetheless, despite  systematic corruption, even 
the technocrats were unable to contain BULOG‘s influence.  
When the rice price was again increasing at the end of 1972 due to insufficient stock, 
this led to significantly increased inflation, so Suharto took decisive action by dismissing 
Tirtosudiro as head of BULOG and was ‗transferred‘ to become Indonesia Ambassador to 
West Germany in 1973. 
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In the early years of Suharto‘s rule, they were also influential generals known as 
financial generals who had a strong influence on economic policy. For instance, Soedjono 
Humardani became acquainted with Suharto since he commanded the army in Central Java.
499
 
Soedjono became powerful when he was appointed as Suharto‘s ASPRI in economic 
affairs in mid-1966. Soedjono worked together with his old friend during his Central Java stint, 
Liem Sioe Liong –also very close to Suharto.  Together, they revived Windu Kencana Bank, 
distributing the bank‘s shares to three military foundations.  Soedjono was also director of Tri 
Usaha Bhakti, the holding company of the military business of more than 30 institutions, with 
an estimated value of Rp.9 billion.
500
  
These military officers or foundations were usually provided with very minimum 
financial capital, but could provide concessions, like timber, fishing, and mining, which foreign 
investors were seeking.
501
 There were hundreds of military-related businesses operating during 
the first two decades of the New Order, including foundations owned by various army regional 
headquarters.  
It was clear, from the various business-related schemes run by the Financial Generals 
that their chief responsibility was to ensure a steady flow of funds into the army's coffers 
without causing economic disruption, contrary to Sutowo and Tirtosudiro‘s cases. As long as it 
was not disproportionate, they were permitted to reap part of the proceeds as a reward for their 
own efforts.
502
 Meanwhile, Robison saw the involvement of army generals in business as being 
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to preserve the ‗military bureaucratic state‘ and lucrative economic resources like 
PERTAMINA and BULOG.
503
 
It was evident that Suharto had only empowered the technocrats vis a vis the financial 
generals should a crisis threaten the state economy, as in the case of PERTAMINA and 
BULOG, but never allowed them to take full control of economic policy in order to maintain 
the balance of power.  
The Need for Alternative Financing through Indonesian Chinese Conglomerates and 
their Competition with the Technocrats 
Suharto would need significant financial and economic resources to finance his political and 
military operations, which had formerly been provided by the financial generals by the late 
1980s.
504
 There were several schemes intended to mobilize funding from conglomerates or his 
wealthy relatives.  The conglomerates were asked to support Suharto‘s presidential assistance 
scheme, also known as Bantuan Presiden (Banpres) that was accumulated through the cloves 
monopoly granted to his brother, Probosutedjo, and his close business associate, Liem Sioe 
Liong, whereby 98% of the profits went to Banpres, where Suharto managed to collect Rp. 256 
billion. The interest from this was at his disposal to undertake various social initiatives on his 
behalf.
505
   
Another major avenue for mobilizing this off-budget funding from conglomerates was 
the charitable foundations, also known as yayasan.  There were various methods available for 
accumulating funding for yayasan from conglomerates; for instance, the foundations owned 
shares in companies that were majority-owned by the conglomerates, like textile factories, and 
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flour mills.
506
 The most political of these foundations was Yayasan Dakab, which was 
established in 1985, originally as political funding for the ruling party, Golkar.  At its peak, 
Dakab managed to accumulate assets worth US$43 billion in 1985.
507
 Other foundations 
including managing approximately US$23 billion for Yayasan Damandiri, US$65 billion for 
Yayasan Gotong Royong and Rp.474 billion for Yayasan Dharmais.
508
.  However, these 
aforementioned foundations lacked transparency and accountability since they never published 
any audited financial statements.
509
   
Nonetheless, the technocrats were compelled to compete with Suharto‘s close business 
associates, such as Liem Sioe Liong and Eka Tjipta Widjaja, for influence over economy 
policy-making in the 1980s and 90s, since they were benefited from monopolies and 
government protection.  
The technocrats sought to enact a reform to contain the proliferation of monopolies, 
subsidies and other non-tariff barriers in the 1980s. It began with the bank reform in 1983, tax 
reform in 1983, customs reform in 1985, then partial trade reform in 1986, and in 1987. Also, 
there was easing of the foreign and domestic investment hurdles in 1986 and 1987.  
The economic measures by the technocrats had little effect on the monopolies owned 
by the conglomerates and Suharto‘s family businesses. However, when the technocrats 
announced that 165 monopolies like import quotas or other forms of tariffs were being 
eliminated, they were only worth of US$300-400 million per year or 3-4% of Indonesia‘s total 
non-oil imports in 1985. Meanwhile, the import monopolies which still existed, like steel, 
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plastic, and cotton, had an estimated value of US$1.5 billion.
510
 Nonetheless, once the 
technocrats had convinced Suharto of the importance of economic reform policies, the 
president could thwart any opposition to the policy.
511
  
 Based on presidential decree that was issued in April 1985, most of the customs 
inspection duties were transferred to the Swiss firm, Societé Generale de Surveillance 
(SGS).
512
  The SGS was tasked to inspect the country of origin of all goods bound for 
Indonesia valued at over US$5,000. Another drastic measure was that half of the 13,000 
customs service employees were granted an ‗indefinite leaves of absence‘- some were 
fired.
513
Unfortunately, the reform of the customs service proved unsustainable, as SGS‘s 
contract was not renewed and the customs office was still prone to corruption. 
The political motivation for the liberalization policy induced by the technocrats in some 
cases intended to challenge the monopoly of the Indonesian Chinese conglomerates. However, 
these conglomerates were in the best position to exploit the limitations of the liberalization 
policies.
514
   
As evident in 1988, the top 300 businesses, which were mainly Indonesian Chinese, 
had a combined sales turnover of Rp.70 trillion in 1989-1990.  The largest conglomerate, the 
Salim Group, was owned by one of Suharto‘s associates, Liem Sioe Liong. In 1996, the Salim 
group‘s total sales were estimated to be around Rp.53 trillion, which was more than double that 
of the Astra Group and Sinar Mas. 
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Nevertheless, the inability for the technocrat to push for substantial economic reform 
showed that Suharto would ensure that the economic reform would not disrupt the economy 
governance structure that he created as the main source of patronage that underpinned by his 
business cronies and families, 
The New Rivals of the Technocrats: the Alliance between the Political Bureaucrats and 
Indigenous Businesses  
The resentment toward the growing business influence of the Indonesian Chinese 
conglomerates during the New Order era culminated in the Jakarta riot (Malari) in January 
1974, which was precipitated by a mass student demonstration, which cost dozens of lives.  
Following the National Stabilization Council Meeting called by Suharto on 22 January 
1974, the Indonesian government introduced several protection policies to encourage 
indigenous business, including shortening the time period within which they should take over 
majority ownership of joint venture companies from foreign investors and required foreign 
investment should be in the form of joint ventures with an indigenous business partner.
515
 
Moreover, the new credit systems for small and medium sized enterprises (KIK)/Small 
Investment Credit and Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen (KMKP)/Permanent Working Capital 
Credit) provided loans to small businesses with a net worth of less than Rp.100 million in the 
construction industry, and Rp.40 million in other industries, whereby 75% of the company 
should be owned by an indigenous business.
516
 Unfortunately, the distribution of credit proved 
ineffective. For example, in 1980, only 200,000 people received KIK and KMKP loans of 
Rp.2.8 million and Rp.2.2 million per person, respectively.
517
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There were several measures taken by government to empower indigenous business to 
address this public discontent. One of them was the issuance of government Decree 14/ 1979 
that stipulated the need to advance indigenous businesses through the project, with an 
estimated value of around Rp.50 million.
518
  This protection policy, was expanded a year after 
the issuing of Presidential Decree 10, 1980, which set up a team led by Suharto‘s trusted aides 
from the State Secretary Office (SEKNEG) to oversee the procurement of goods and services.   
The so-called ‗team 10‘ was led by influential State Secretary Sudharmono, with 
members including several Vice Ministers and the Governor of BI.
519
  From the outset, the 
setting up of team 10 coincided with the second oil boom, when Suharto thought about setting 
up an institution under his direct supervision to spend the $1.4 billion oil boom windfall profit 
in the early 1980s.
520
 
In subsequent years, the authority of team 10 expanded into becoming a de facto 
permanent unit stationed in the State Secretary Office (SEKNEG), responsible for approving 
government and state enterprise procurement of more than Rp.500 million, which later 
expanded into military equipment in 1983.
521
 The technocrats had a politically savvy adversary 
inside the government, reflected in team 10. 
During the eight year of its tenure, team 10 channeled around Rp52 trillion ($60billion) 
worth of government procurements to indigenous businesses.
522
 Therefore, the indigenous 
businesses capitalizing on the window of opportunity provided by team 10, including Fadel 
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Muhammad who supplied fire hydrants; Aburizal Bakrie who provided pipes for construction 
work; and Arifin Panigoro who started his business in oil services.
523
 
These indigenous businessmen were usually grouped into a number of business 
associations like HIPMI (The Association of Young Indonesian Businessmen), or KADIN 
(Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry). Usually, they used these business 
associations as pressure groups to advance their collective business interests and affect the 
government policy outcome.
524
  
The Demise of the Technocrats  
The Technocrats had enjoyed almost unparalleled clout in shaping the economy policy terms 
since the early New Order era until the late 1980s. At the apex of their 20 years of influence, 
the technocrats dominated the economic ministerial cabinet portfolio, like trade, industry and 
finance. However, the technocrats‘ influence had been steadily declining since the late 1980s, 
started when Widjojo retired, along with Habibie‘s political ascendancy.  
This was due to the combination factor in which Suharto‘s self confidence increased as 
he practically did not have any credible political rivals, and so would be less dependent on the 
technocrats but, more importantly, Habibie was able to convince Suharto that technology-led 
development was the way forward, and therefore to allocate substantial economic resources as 
well as institutional facilities to help to establish a long-term technological industry.
525
 Habibie 
was the State Minister of Technology and Research and BPPT for 20 years, making him the 
longest-serving minister under Suharto. He also chaired the Agency of Strategic Industries 
(BPIS) which is a holding company of state-owned strategic industries, including 
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transportation, defense equipment and weaponry.  No wonder he was dubbed ‗Super 
Minister.‘526 However, Habibie was well-known for his plan to build the aviation industry as 
CEO of the state-owned aircraft production company, IPTN, when a prototype N-250, that had 
a successful initial flight in August 1995, cemented his national profile.
527
  
The demise of the technocrats‘ influence was accelerated when Habibie became 
involved in politics in the early 1990s through initially joining the ruling party, Golkar, as a 
deputy coordinator of its advisory board and later was promoted to daily coordinator of the 
Golkar advisory board.
528
 Habibie, with Suharto‘s blessing, expanded his political reach by 
appealing to the Islamic urban group by became the chair of the Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectual Association (ICMI) as Suharto tried to counterbalance the political influence of the 
military.
529
 
The combination of political prowess through both Golkar and ICMI, and also 
Suharto‘s support for Habibie‘s technological development vision, proved a major set-back for 
the technocrats.  When Suharto established his cabinet in 1993, it was obvious that the 
technocrat group was losing its clout by losing crucial portfolio such as minister of state 
planning and minister of trade, while Habibie‘s associate increase its representation in the 
cabinet.
530
  
The technocrats tried to push for reform in the banking sector through a deregulation 
policy. There was an unintended consequence that exacerbated the business stronghold of 
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Suharto‘s family and his business associate Indonesia conglomerates over the Indonesian 
economy through the mobilization of low-cost funding from society as well as financial access 
to the state-owned banks and stock market    
Instead of creating a more open business environment, business‘ access to government 
projects was controlled by a complex network of political gatekeepers (Suharto‘s family or 
close business associates) who were entrenched in the bureaucracy.  As consequence, they 
were able to acquire big government projects like petrochemical projects that were protected 
and the construction of toll roads for the Ministry of Public Works.  
Then, the technocrats faced a tremendous task in trying to enforce regulatory reforms in 
the face of the strong opposition from the conglomerates and Suharto‘s families. This vested 
interest managed to acquire loans especially from the state banks through back-channels with 
generous terms and violating the financial regulations by channeling disproportionally to their 
own business group.  Consequently, when these businesses default, several major banks 
became collapsed, as shown by the spectacular fall of Bank Summa in 1992.
531
  
To make matter worse, President Suharto himself was not shy about intervening with 
the technocrats to advance his family‘s business interests. BI governor Soedrajad Djiwandono 
recalls vividly how Suharto intervened personally on Tommy‘s behalf to acquire a US$1.3 
billion loan from BI to finance his national car project with an unrealistic proposal.532  
Through the various government preferential treatment, Suharto and his family 
allegedly amassed a fortune during his three decades in power worth US$15 billion according 
to the Time Magazine, which includes an equity share in 564 companies, a US$4 million 
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hunting ranch in New Zealand and a 75% stake in an 18-hole golf course with 22 luxury 
apartment in Ascot, England.
533
 Transparency International named Suharto the most corrupt 
leader in the world based on their report published in 2004, with estimated alleged embezzled 
state funds of US$15-35 billion, which is more than Ferdinand Marcos from the Philippines‘ 
allegedly embezzled US$5-10 billion and Mobutu Sese Seko from Zaire‘s allegedly embezzled 
US$5 billion respectively.
534
  
The Last Effort by the Technocrats to Impose Reform through the IMF   
The Indonesian economy to be hit hardest of all in the global economic crisis in 1997-1998 
after triggered by the crisis in Thailand due to foreign exchange speculators.
535
 The various 
efforts by the technocrats to revitalize the rupiah currency from continued depreciation in 1997 
through fully floated exchange policy in mid-August 1997 was not working.
536
 Instead, the 
new policy inspired the big corporations to buy more US dollars in anticipation of the crisis 
and rupiah depreciated significantly.   
 After the rupiah currency spiraled out of control, Suharto lost confidence in the 
technocrats and appointed a retired technocrat as his advisor, Widjojo Nitisastro, and Ali 
Wardhana, an effort to improve market confidence.
537
 Widjojo quickly gained influence over 
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economic policy-making by persuading Suharto to request help from the IMF to anticipate 
major economic crises.
538
 
Widjojo and Wardhana, saw that using IMF assistance with its strict conditions 
provided a rare window of opportunity to attack all of the monopoly subsidies of the 
conglomerates and Suharto‘s family‘s businesses plus Habibie‘s strategic industry. The 
monopoly and big projects, in the technocrats‘ view, caused an unnecessary market distortion 
that hindered a prudent macro economy policy. However, the IMF was also encouraged by 
Indonesia and international/national NGOs to use the conditionality in its assistance to address 
the corruption by Suharto.
539
  
Evidently, the IMF‘s support for Widjojo and the NGOs‘ reform agenda by 
accommodating their proposal in the first Letter of Intent (LOI) by the Indonesian government 
in October 1997 that was outlining the government‘s intention for structural reform. In the first 
LOI, the government promised to dissolve the monopoly over the import of wheat, flour, soya 
beans and garlic held by Suharto‘s family or cronies.540  The LOI also contained a plan to 
postpone around 150 big government projects in an effort to reduce the state expenditure so it 
could reduce the state budget deficit to 1%.
541
 
However, the economic reform by the technocrats was challenged by Suharto‘s family 
and cronies.  When due to its unsustainable debt caused by rupiah depreciation in November 
1997 the governor of BI closed 16 insolvent banks, including owned by Suharto‘s relatives 
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who were protesting the decision.
542
 The government‘s efforts to restore market trust after 
closing the 16 banks was failing. It was clear that Suharto never intended to implement the 
reform program endorsed by the IMF.  
After the US President Bill Clinton issued a warning about the need for the government 
to adhere to the IMF program as part of the conditions for the US$33 billion assistance,
543
 
Suharto led the negotiations directly with Stanley Fischer the Deputy Managing Director of the 
IMF on the second LOI reform in January 1998, which outlined a 50 point program that 
included the cartel elimination of cement, paper and plywood and the cancellation of support 
for Habibie‘s aircraft industry.544  To everyone surprise Suharto agreed to all of the conditions 
in the LOI. The market responded negatively to the second LOI because they did not believe 
that Suharto was willing to execute the program 
545
 
After realizing that the tough prescription by the IMF was not working, Suharto‘s was 
persuaded to enact a Currency Board System (CBS) to stabilize the rupiah currency by his 
children, after which the then John Hopkins University Professor, Steven Hanke, was brought 
in to provide academic justification for the plan.
546
  
Finally, the CBS plan was shelved after the IMF postponed its assistance of US$ 3 
billion in March 1998.
547Then the major industrial countries‘ G7‘s leaders led by US President 
Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto clarified their opposition to 
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Suharto‘s plan to apply CBS.548 The failure of the technocrats to address corruption and 
nepotism, especially among Suharto‘s family and close associates, is linked to the second 
argument in this thesis as outlined in the introduction chapter. It stipulates that the anti-
corruption measure at the peak of Suharto‘s political power was arbitrary and even experienced 
a set-back, thus failing to dismantle especially the economic patronage, for instance, in the 
form of off-budget funding created by the financial generals or social foundations that were 
used to mobilize funding from the Chinese conglomerates.  
The Dwindling Political Support that led to Suharto’s resignation  
Meanwhile, his three-decade political reign started to crumble. One of the opposition leaders, 
Amien Rais, head of one of the largest Islamic mass organizations, Muhammadiyah raised the 
issue of leadership succession and criticized Suharto‘s family‘s corruption.549  
In unexpected move, Suharto announced his cabinet a fortnight ahead of schedule. 
From its composition, it was apparent that Suharto was disappointed with the technocrats and 
handed an economic post to the nationalist group or his cronies; for instance, he appointed 
Muhammad ‗Bob‘ Hasan, his golfing buddy, as Minister for Trade and Industry; and his 
daughter, Tutut, as Minister of Social Affairs.
550
 
Meanwhile, the students protesters starting to mobilize in large crowds where both in 
Yogyakarta and Jakarta was demanding Suharto‘s resignation for causing systemic corruption 
in Indonesia. 
551
 However, in Jakarta, the peaceful demonstration held on 12 May 1998, led by 
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students from Trisakti University, turned into a public furor when four students were shot dead 
by a mysterious sniper. The day after the memorial service on Trisakti campus, major riots 
broke out in Jakarta as ordinary people ran amok in the capital, destroying anything that 
symbolized the corruption of the New Order.
552
 With Jakarta on fire, Suharto abruptly 
shortened his participation in the G-15 summit meeting in Cairo.  
During this juncture, the Indonesian elite started to withdraw their support for Suharto 
combine with pressure from around 10,000 students who flooded the DPR building in May 
1998.
553
Furthermore, the split within the Suharto cabinet was amplified.  Ginandjar initiated a 
meeting with 14 ministers on 20 May 1998 that agreed to rejects any offer from Suharto to 
serve in the new cabinet due to political situation.
554
  Later that night Suharto ran out of option 
when the Military chief Wiranto, told Suharto that the military were unable to guarantee the 
security of Jakarta.   
Also, international support was dissipated when the US Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright urging him to resign.
555
 As constitutionally required, Vice President Habibie took 
over the presidency on the morning of 21 May 1998 during a brief ceremony in which he was 
inaugurated by the MA chief. This marked the end of Suharto‘s 30-year reign in Indonesia 
after he took power officially in 1968.  
Ultimately, Suharto became a victim of his own success as the political governance 
structure of the state became overly concentrated on him. As a consequence, any deficiencies 
would reflect directly on him, like the growing influence of his children as they expanded their 
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businesses rapidly through the government protection.  As Indonesia‘s economic prosperity, 
the only source of Suharto‘s political legitimacy in his last decade was wiped out by the 
economic crises in 1997-1998, his supporters started to pull out their political support. As a 
result, Suharto was forced to resign.   
Conclusion   
 When Suharto reached the apex of power in Indonesian politics between the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, by using the political pluralism by Dahl, the political resources were 
disproportionally matched in the form of, among others, physical force, organization and 
wealth. Also, during that period, Suharto was not just overseeing the democratic roll-back or 
regress, as warned by Linz and Stepan, Diamond, Merkel and Croissant and Bunte (see the 
introduction chapter), which started Sukarno‘s guided democracy period in the late 1950s, but 
Suharto took it further by consolidating the political authoritarian structure that made the 
president and his executive power the sole authority of the state to suit his political agenda at 
the expense of suppressing Indonesian society‘s political rights and freedom.  The corruption, 
collusion and cronyism that was rampant especially in the last ten years of the New Order era 
was a manifestation of Suharto‘s authoritarian political governance structure, which in the end 
almost overshadowed his economic and social development success, and thus affected his 
overall presidency‘s legacy, both domestically and internationally.  
 Also, under the New Order, Suharto managed to establish economic patronage 
systematically through his close business associates and later through his relatives, which was 
crucial in providing off-budget funding for his crucial political operation.  Therefore, using the 
political pluralism framework, under the three decades of Suharto‘s reign, the reformers – 
whether the technocrats, students or civil society activists – witnessed the heaviest set-back to 
the conservative elites or oligarchs, like Suharto‘s business associates and family, as they had 
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insufficient political support. Due to the economic crisis of 1998 and also continuous pressure 
especially from the students, however, Suharto‘s political resources were weakened 
substantially since the military and the political elites, in the end, retracted their support, that 
led to his downfall.  
 In addition, by applying the Kingdon analytical framework as explained in the 
introduction section, the Suharto period, as mentioned, was one of authoritarian consolidation, 
and there were only a few effective policy entrepreneurs in the context of the governance 
reform and anti-corruption efforts. The technocrats can be identified as policy entrepreneurs as, 
with their limited authority, they were able to leverage economic reform particularly in the first 
two decades of the Suharto era. The peak of their influence, in my view, was when Widjojo 
and Wardhana held various economic portfolio ministerial positions together.  They managed 
to convince Suharto of the merit of the technocratic approach to economy policy that not only 
restored the economic morass under Sukarno in the late 1960s, but also witnessed remarkable 
economic growth of above 5% consecutively, that brought Indonesia from a poor, low income 
to a low middle income country before the economic crisis of 1998. Since, politically, Suharto 
was almost no match for his competitors, potential policy entrepreneurs in the realm of politics, 
like student leaders or opposition figures, were easily thwarted by Suharto before the economic 
crisis. Nevertheless in 1997-1998, the students were able to identify the problem, offer policy 
proposals, and utilize the window of opportunity produced by the economic crisis in 1998, by 
putting political pressure on Suharto through mass-demonstrations that made an important 
contribution to his downfall, based on Kingdon‘s analytical approach.  
 In assessing the political leadership traits of Suharto, in my view, these should be 
divided into two areas: politics and the economy. In using Burns‘ political leadership analytical 
framework, in my view, Suharto epitomizes transactional leadership that uses a combination of 
coercion especially through the military and co-optation by using wealth or offering positions. 
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Meanwhile, in terms of economic policy, although he was not initiating the idea, Suharto 
provides crucial political support for the technocrats in pushing for economic reform. As 
clearly, in my view, the technocrat was a transformational leader, Suharto should be given 
credit for being a semi-transformational leader in realizing the crucial economic policy reform 
in the New Order era.  
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Chapter 6: The Uneven Progress in Governance Reform and the Up-hill 
Struggle against Corruption: Indonesia’s Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati’s 
Record 1998-2004.  
 
 
After the fall of Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia was politically volatile where subsequent 
post-Suharto presidents had to deal with the demands from civil society for a more democratic 
political governance structure while at the same time oversee the economic recovery from the 
ruins of the major economic crisis. This chapter will start by discussing the academic debates 
on the political dynamic in the post Suharto era (1998-2004). Moreover, it is structured in 
chronological order based on pertinent issues related to the governance reform and anti-
corruption initiatives that started with the interregnum Habibie presidency in 1998-1999, 
followed by the politically turbulent Gus Dur presidency of 1999-2001, and ended with the 
relatively political stable Megawati presidency of 2001-2004.   
 There are fifteen sections in this chapter. The first section focuses on the latest 
academic debate on the Indonesia political landscape during the post-Suharto era. Furthermore, 
the electoral reform introduced by B.J. Habibie is outlined in the second section. The third 
section focuses the discussion on the freedom of the press and freedom of expression that 
enacted during Habibie‘s stint. Moreover, Habibie‘s reluctant to resolve the corruption case 
implicating his predecessor, Suharto, will be examined in the fourth section. The Bali Bank 
Bali corruption scandal that allegedly involved Habibie‘s inner circle and basically ended his 
hopes of reelection will be discussed in the fifth section.  The mixed progress on the military 
reform under Habibie will be examined in the sixth section. Subsequently, the seventh section 
will outline the anti-corruption drive by Gus Dur, followed by his handling of Suharto‘s 
family‘s corruption cases in the eighth section. The significant backlash faced by Gus Dur in 
pushing for military reform will be discussed in the ninth section and his unsuccessful 
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addressing of judicial reform in the tenth section. The crucial process of constitutional 
amendments to establish a more democratic political governance structure during Megawati‘s 
period will be outlined in the eleventh section.   Moreover, the set-back to the military reform 
due to the rise of conservative military leaders in the Megawati period will be examined in the 
twelfth section. Meanwhile, Megawati‘s lack of enthusiasm to push for further anti-corruption 
initiatives will be discussed in the thirteenth section. The deliberation and later enactment of 
the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK)‘s bill will be outlined in the fourteenth section, and 
the conclusion is presented in the fifteenth section.  
 This chapter will outline three arguments in interpreting the political dynamics of the 
competing political actors in the context of governance reform and anti-corruption initiatives 
during the post-Suharto era. The first argument is that Habibie should be credited with several 
important political governance reforms, like the electoral reform that brought about the 
relatively free-and-fair national legislative (DPR) in 1999 and in ensuring the freedom of 
expression and freedom of organization that facilitated the significant growth of both the 
independent mass-media and civil society. However, Habibie was unable to resolve the 
rampant corruption that linked with his reelection presidential campaign and the alleged 
corruption implicating Suharto. The second argument stipulated that there was a valuable 
opportunity to push for further governance reforms and a bolder anti-corruption drive, after 
credible top leadership emerged from the free-and-fair election in 1999 embodied in the 
appointment of Gus Dur and Megawati Sukarnoputri as president and vice president. However, 
the political bickering and blatant competition over grabbing the state resources for the election 
campaign in 2004 that had bedeviled the Gus Dur presidency constitute a set-back in several 
governance reform areas – like military and judicial reform.  
The third argument is that, during the Megawati era (2001-2004), important political 
governance reform was enacted through constitutional amendments driven by the reformist 
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elements in the MPR that later sanctioned by Megawati for her reelection campaign.  Also, 
because of the push from civil society, reformist senior bureaucrats and international donors 
(the IMF), the anti-corruption commission (KPK) bill was finally enacted in 2004. This was 
crucial as KPK in the next administration emerged as the most effective anti-corruption agency 
in Indonesia‘s modern history. Nevertheless, Megawati was neither able nor willing to show 
her tenacity in pushing for further fundamental governance reform. On the contrary, 
Megawati‘s government over the course of three years in power continued to be embroiled in 
corruption allegations that exhaust her political capital, which cost her reelection in 2004.  
The Debates’ Political Landscape in the Post-Suharto Era  
Several streams of literature interpret the new political governance structure after the fall of 
Suharto in May 1998. One of stream of thought during the post-Suharto era is the dominant 
political role played by the oligarchy.  Hadiz and Robison, define an Oligarchy as a ‗system of 
government which virtually all political power is held by a very small number of wealthy 
people…while displaying little or no concern for the broader interests of the rest of 
citizenry.‘556 These oligarchs comprise conglomerates (mostly Indonesian Chinese), political 
businessmen (indigenous businessmen) and state officials.
557
   
Other academics employ Robison and Hadiz‘s approach, like Chua‘s analysis of 
Indonesia‘s Chinese conglomerates 558 or the role of the Politico-Business group by Rosser.559 
Within the same stream of Oligarchy thought, Winters emphasizes that oligarchs‘ political 
prowess where, ‗the transition to democracy does not constitute a significant disruption or even 
                                            
556
Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of 
Markets (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), pp. 16-17.  
557
 Vedi R. Hadiz and Richard Robison, ‗The Political Economy of Oligarchy and the Reorganization of Power‘ in 
Beyond Oligarchy: Wealth Power, and Contemporary Indonesian Politics (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia 
Program Publications, 2014), p. 38. 
558
 Christian Chua, ‗The Conglomerates in Crisis: Indonesia, 1997 – 1998‘, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 
Vol. 13, No. 1, 2007. 
559
 Andrew Rosser, ‗towards a Political Economy of Human Rights Violations in Post-New Order Indonesia‘, 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 43, no.2. 
188 
 
diminution of their power.‘560  While Hadiz, Robison and Winters acknowledge the emergence 
of progressive forces like civil society or the technocrats, they also argue that these were easily 
marginalized by the oligarchs.
561
   
The other analytical framework focuses on the form of political dealings behind the 
scenes that facilitated the distribution of patronage by the formation of political cartels.  This 
stream of thought was applied in Indonesian‘s politics in the post-Suharto era (2001-2004) by 
Slater and later Ambardi.
562
 This cartel arrangement was reflected in the cabinet formed by 
Gus Dur in 1999 and Megawati‘s ‗rainbow‘ cabinet that accommodated almost every political 
party in parliament in 2001.
563
 As a result, cartel theorists concluded that the political party 
elites managed to extract state resources through a power sharing arrangement without 
electoral accountability.  
Then, in the third stream of thought (political pluralism) there was what Mietzner called 
the ‗pluralist camp‘, Fukuoka‘s called the ‗liberalist‘ camp and Pepinsky called ‗pluralism.‘564 
The proponents of political pluralism argue that, in the post-Suharto era, the political 
governance structure facilitated ceaseless competition between the reformist and predatory 
elements.  According to Aspinall, even the lower-class group (e.g., labor, farmers) were able to 
take an advantage of the political space in the post-Suharto era by advancing its interests and 
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forcing the Oligarchy to compromise.
565
 Meanwhile, Lane emphasized the role of students in 
toppling Suharto and the growing mass-protests that expanded all over Indonesia.
566
  
In my view, the Oligarchs were certainly one of the important actors in the political 
contestation. However, the number of reforms, such as constitutional amendments, showed that 
non oligarchy political leaders like the PDIP party‘s Jacob Tobing could play an instrumental 
role. This highlighted that the political actors unpredictably change alliances in their political 
battles, so neither the Oligarchs nor cartel theorists, in my view, sufficiently capture this 
phenomenon.  However, nor does this mean that, in Indonesia post-Suharto, the democratic 
governance structure was fully consolidated. As Aspinall explained, ‗The legacies of a political 
transition that kept the old Suharto  regime‘s ruling elite and patrimonial governing style 
largely intact continue to bedevil democratic governance.‘567  
The Electoral Reform under the Habibie Presidency 
Suharto was forced to resign due to the strong public protest and the Indonesian political elites 
rescinded their support in May 1998. Afterwards, there was a consensus among Indonesia‘s 
political elite that Habibie as Vice President would take over the presidency, albeit as an 
interim measure. This arrangement was also part of the deal between the military and political 
leaders to accommodate the demand for Suharto‘s resignation.568 
  Given the unpopularity, Habibie and Military Chief Wiranto decided that they needed 
to work together. There appeared to be a pro quod pro, whereby Habibie let the military decide 
the scope and pace of their reform. This arrangement was possible as Wiranto had consolidated 
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his authority within the military by January 1999 by marginalizing Prabowo Subianto‘s 
supporter.
569
  
With his low political capital, to the great surprise of both his adversaries and even his 
supporters, Habibie managed to push for electoral reform.  Habbie gave directions to ministers 
about the electoral reform in May 1998 by overhauling laws and regulations on political 
party.
570
 
Habibie then set-up team seven, consist of government officials and academics led by 
the Ministry of Home Affairs‘ high officials, Ryaas Rasyid, who was tasked with preparing 
important draft laws on political reform, political parties, the national elections and the 
governance arrangement between parliament (DPR), the people‘s consultative assembly 
(MPR) and the Regional Parliament (DPRD) or Susduk.
571
 
Knowing that Habibie depended on its credibility, team seven managed to push for the 
preparation of a legislative framework for a more democratic electoral system. Habibie 
managed to severe the link between the civil service and Golkar which had existed for three 
decades.
572
 Also, the National Election Commission (KPU), with representatives from the 
government, political parties and community, was tasked with organizing the national election 
of 1999.
573
  
The government also relaxed its requirement to build a political party with the new 
political party law that only required 50 adults to establish a political party with other lenient 
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requirements.
574
 Besides the three parties from the New Order era (Golkar, PPP and PDI), the 
number of political parties mushroomed, with an additional 145 parties, ranging from those 
with strong Islamic constituents like PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), with majority Islamic 
mass organization Nahdlatul Ulama followers, PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) with Islamic 
mass organization Muhammadiyah followers and certainly PDIP with a strong nationalist 
constituent.
575
 
Then, through the law on Susduk, the number of military seats in parliament (DPR) was 
cut by half, to 38 seats.
576
  This was to accommodate a strong anti-military sentiment among 
the public.
577
 Under the same law, parliament received more power, as it was given inter alia 
the authority to propose draft law, conduct supervision and request direct clarification from the 
president.
578
  
However, team seven also faced some set-backs.  The strong vested interest in the 
political parties managed to scrap team seven‘s proposal for district voting to keep a 
proportional-representation system. Then, the KPU in April 1999 managed to give authority 
for the political leaders to decide candidates who got a seat in parliament.
579
 Furthermore, the 
number of non-elected seats of the regional and functional group representatives without a 
clear selection mechanism still allocated to 238 of the 700 seats in MPR. 
Then, the government appointed credible figures within the team of eleven to make the 
political party selection for the national election in 1999. This team was led by the highly-
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respected Islamic scholar, Nurcholis Madjid. Through the second stage election process, out of 
150, only 48 political parties were qualified.  
There were at least four institutions involved in monitoring the election, including: the 
University Network for Free Elections (UNFREL), the Independent Committee for Election 
Monitoring (KIPP), and the Rector Forum (Forum Rektor). UNFREL managed to mobilize 
around 159,000 volunteers to monitor 225,000 election booths nationwide with the assistance 
of volunteers from the KIPP, the Rector Forum and YAPPIKA. 
580
 
The Habibie government also decided to involve international NGOs and international 
organizations in monitoring the election to ensure its credibility.  For instance, the Carter 
Center and National Democratic Institute (NDI) fielded around a 100-member delegation led 
by former US President Jimmy Carter, which observed 26 of the 27 provinces in Indonesia.
581
 
With an extensive international scrutiny, the national election in 1999 was seen as relatively 
free and fair.
582
 
  Despite Habibie‘s successful management of the relatively competitive national 
election, Golkar was defeated by Megawati‘s PDIP, which secured 33.74 percent of the votes 
and 153 seats in parliament, while Golkar only managed to get 23.75 percent of the votes and 
120 seats. Surprisingly, the PKB won 13.34 percent of the votes, with 51 seats in parliament.
583
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Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Press: Other Habibie Accomplishments  
Habibie should also be noted for his achievement in ensuring freedom of expression and 
opening up the free media. Initially, the press and NGOs were skeptical about the Habibie 
government‘s intention, especially the appointment of Yunus as the Minister of Information, 
who was an army general.
584
  
 In May 1998 there was a demonstration by the Alliance of Independent Journalists 
(AJI) where they demanded the revocation of the regulation that required the press association 
to be solely the Indonesia Journalist Association (PWI) and the rescinding of the Ministry‘s 
right to revoke press licenses. During the meeting, Yosfiah promised to fulfill the demands 
except for the new press law as the government needed approval from parliament.  Yunus 
streamlined new media license approval process, thus providing an opportunity for a number of 
credible media to reemerge that had been disbanded during the New Order era, like Tempo 
Magazine and Detik tabloid.
585
  
 In drafting the freedom of the press bill, Yunus was again working closely with the 
important press figures, such as Atmakusumah Astraatmadja, former managing editor of the 
disbanded Indonesia Raya Newspaper. There was tension during the drafting process, as the 
government still wanted to impose some control, while the activists and the press wanted to 
have more freedom. Then, Yosfiah quietly asked UNESCO for assistance, and eventually an 
inter-governmental organization called Article 19 was involved in drafting the bill. 
586
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Finally, after a month-long deliberation process, the press bill was passed by parliament 
in September 1999 which guaranteed, among other things, the freedom of the press, freedom 
from censorship and freedom from being banned.
587
   
The Elephant in the Room: Suharto’s Corruption Case  
Due to political and public pressure, the MPR intended to create a distance from Suharto, who 
was closely associated with corruption, collusion and nepotism (known in Indonesia as KKN).  
Thus, during the MPR special session in November 1998, the MPR decree on Good 
Government that is Free of corruption was issued that stipulates: 
The effort to eradicate corruption has to be vigorous and without discrimination, including high 
state officials, former high state officials, their family and cronies, including private 
sector/conglomerates and former President Suharto...
588
  
  
Habibie realized that the chance of being re-elected would depend on how he dealt with the 
corruption case related to Suharto, especially as public pressure increased after Suharto stated 
on national television denied the allegation.
589
 
 In an effort to show his seriousness, Habibie issued a presidential instruction to AGO 
to investigate Suharto‘s alleged corruption.590 Attorney General Andi Ghalib reported that 
seven foundations managed by Suharto had been identified, worth around Rp. 4.1 trillion, and 
also identified 72 bank accounts in Suharto‘s name with total deposits of around US$3 
million.
591
 In December 1999, the team established by AGO, led by Deputy Attorney General 
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Antonius Sujata, interrogated Suharto about the national car project (Mobnas), his assets 
abroad and his ownership of a plantation and farm in Tapos village.
592
 
Suharto then made a surprising political move by voluntarily returning assets with an 
estimated worth of US$690 million of seven charitable foundations (Yayasan) in February 
1999.  However, these seven foundations‘ assets were suspected to be worth more than the 
amount that Suharto returned to the state. For instance, three Yayasan owned 87 percent of the 
shares in Indonesia‘s private Bank Duta, with an estimated value in 1990 of around US$1 
billion.
593
 Then, Ghalib announced that, based on the investigation of 15 Indonesian 
Embassies, AGO could not find any proof that assets existed abroad in Suharto‘s name.594 It 
appeared that AGO was irrationally focusing on tracing assets under his name.  
Furthermore, an embarrassing telephone conversation between Habibie and Ghalib was 
leaked by the Indonesian press in February 1999, which showed that neither was seriously 
investigating Suharto‘s case.595 It was believed that the reluctance was due to that many of 
Habibie cabinet ministers had served Suharto‘s government.596 
Then, Time Magazine, in May 1999, ran a cover story on how Suharto‘s family had 
benefited from rent-seeking activities to accumulate substantial wealth during Suharto‘s three 
decade presidency.  The Time calculated that around US$78 billion had been channeled toward 
Suharto‘s family members, including in the form of mining, timber, commodities and 
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petroleum industries.  Despite the major economy crisis in 1998, the net worth of Suharto and 
his six children was estimated at around $15 billion.
597
  
The Habibie government had little choice but to act swiftly following Time‘s report, 
especially regarding a suspicious transfer of US$9 billion from Switzerland to Austria that 
caught the attention of the US treasury and was associated with Suharto‘s family. The Habibie 
government dispatched both Ghalib and Minister of Justice Muladi to Switzerland to track the 
funding in May 1999, but never submitted a request for mutual legal assistance. No wonder, 
Muladi announced in June 1999 that the government had been unable to find such money 
transfer abroad.
598
  
To make matter worse, Ghalib himself became embroiled in a corruption case when 
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) reported him to the military police (PUSPOM TNI) for 
inappropriately receiving 11 money transfers around US$ 180,000, including from 
conglomerates in June 1999.
599
 In the end, Habibie suspended Ghalib as Attorney General. 
 Disappointingly, Acting Attorney General Ismuldjoko announced that AGO had issued 
a letter announcing that the investigation into Suharto‘s alleged corruption would cease (SP3) 
on 11 October 1999 due to insufficient evidence.  
The Bank Bali Scandal: The Scandal that affect Habibie’s Reelection Bid 
Habibie initially announced that he would not stand for reelection, but revised his position in 
June 1999.
600
 In response, his close political associates and family formed an informal group to 
support his reelection bid called Tim sukses that consisted of, Supreme Advisory Council 
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(DPA) Chair A.A. Baramuli, Minister of State Enterprise Tanri Abeng and Habibie‘s brother, 
Timmy.   The Tim Sukses was established because Habibie did not trust Golkar under Akbar 
Tandjung‘s leadership.  After Golkar was defeated at the parliamentary election in1999, it was 
suspected that Tim Sukses intended to bribe the MPR to appoint Habibie as president.
601
   
Then, the Bank Bali case was revealed by banking analyst Pradjoto in July 1999, 
showing a gap of Rp.576 billion on Bank Bali‘s balance sheet that had been used to pay a fee 
to Eka Giat Prima (EGP) Company that was owned by Setya Novatno, one of Habibie‘s tim 
sukses members.  This fee was paid to collect a Rp. 905 billion government-guaranteed 
interbank loan from the Indonesia Central Bank (BI).  It was suspected that the US$70 million 
fee was used by Tim Sukses for Habibie‘s reelection campaign.  
This scandal created not only a public furor but also a strong reaction from the IMF that 
threatened to suspend US$ 1 billion financial aid.
602
 Then, after pressure from civil society and 
international donors, the Habibie government invited the international auditors firm Price 
Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) to investigate the Bank Bali scandal. In the report, PWC 
concluded that they found ‗preferential treatment, concealment, bribery, corruption and fraud‘ 
connected to the US$70 million.
603
  
Despite the PWC report and parliament‘s censure of high officials‘ related to the Bank 
Bali scandal, the Habibie government never conducted a serious investigation,
604
 although the 
testimony of IBRA (Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency) Chair Glenn Jusuf in September 
1999 revealed that DPA Chair A.A. Baramuli asked him to cover up the Bank Bali case.
605
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Consequently, the Bank Bali case became of the major incidents that made Habibie‘s 
reelection presidency bid almost impossible.  
The Military Reform under Habibie: on the Military Pace 
The military led by Wiranto realized that Habibie‘s interim government heavily depended on 
military support. Despite pressure to replace the Military Chief during cabinet formation in 
May 1998, Habibie kept Wiranto in this crucial post.
606
  
The relationship between Habibie and the military was one of mutual dependence. 
While Habibie needed the military for political stability, on the other hand the military needed 
Habibie‘s good will in exercising his right to appoint the right personnel, resource allocation 
and in setting the military reform agenda.
607
 
The military led its own reform in which Wiranto tasked the small group of 
‗intellectual‘ army generals - Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Agus Widjojo and Agus 
Wirahadikusumah - with designing a new concept for the military‘s future role. This group was 
to undercut the military‘s critics, bolster its credibility and preserve its influence.608 In 
September 1998, the military launched its reform concept called ‗New Paradigm‘, which 
proposed that they should not always be involved in the forefront of Indonesian politics but 
play an influential role, avoiding intervention in politics, and offering power-sharing with 
civilians.
609
  
As the media and civil society disliked the new concept as too abstract, the intellectual 
generals pushed for concrete measures. SBY downgraded his position as Chief of Social and 
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Political Affairs (Kassospol) to Chief of Territorial Affairs (Kaster), with only a limited role in 
overseeing the military territorial network.  The military also issued a regulation requiring 
active officers in civilian political position to retire from the service by 1 April 1999
610
that was 
targeted to 4000 military officers who served as mayor, governor, or ministers.
611
   
Due to public pressure, the military reduced its seats in the MPR from 75 to 38. Also, 
the military retracted its automatic support for Golkar which had occurred during Suharto era 
by being politically neutral. Then, the military span-off the police service out of their command 
to the Ministry of Defense and Security on 1 April 1999. 
 During the first half of the Habibie presidency, the military reformers attracted strong 
support from Wiranto. The military reformers had strong leverage because their proposals were 
seen as the only way to restore public trust from the troubled past of their human rights abuses 
during the New Order era.
612
  
Even Wiranto‘s initial support of the army intellectuals was seen as part of his political 
agenda to separate him from the conservative element. Supporting the reform gave Wiranto a 
reformist image which was crucial in consolidating his authority. However, Wiranto and SBY 
eventually drifted apart, due to the scope of the military‘s political role in the post-Suharto era. 
Wiranto wanted the military to continue to play a leading political role at the post-1999 
election. This divergence led to Wiranto ‗kicking‘ SBY upstairs to Minister of Mining in Gus 
Dur‘s government.613  
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Despite the progress, the territorial command structure was still in place to ensure the 
military political role and to access off-budget funding. This was perhaps an area of common 
ground between Wiranto and the intellectual generals who preferred the gradualist approach, 
where the military reform should not harmed their long-term interest and avoiding the 
disaffection of the majority officers. 
614
 
In my view, during his term Habibie surprised even his harshest critics by bringing 
about the crucial electoral reform, relaxing the restriction on the mass-media and ensuring the 
exponential growth of civil society. The outcome from Habibie‘s government was the first 
relatively competitive DPR election for four decades and the independent mass-media.   
Nonetheless, Habibie faced a significant challenge in resolving the controversial 
corruption cases, especially those implicating his former mentor, Suharto. More importantly, 
his reelection campaign was marred by a corruption allegation, as the Bank Bali scandal 
emerged. As a result, Habibie was forced to rescind his reelection bid in 1999.  
One Step Forward, two steps back: Gus Dur and the Anti-Corruption Drive 
Following the 1999 general election, Habibie‘s accountability speech was rejected by the MPR 
by 355 votes to 322 on 19 October 1999. As a result, he announced that he would withdraw 
from the presidential race in October 1999.
615
   
With Habibie bowing out, Megawati Sukarnoputri became the next presidential 
frontrunner since PDIP won the national election legislative with more than 33 percent of the 
votes. However, her overconfidence and the Islamic Parties‘ wariness about having a female 
president made Megawati‘s presidential campaign ineffective.  Meanwhile, two leading 
Islamic leaders, Gus Dur from PKB and Amien Rais from PAN, cleverly exploited Megawati‘s 
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presidential campaign implosion by forging an Islamic coalition called the middle axis or poros 
tengah, proposing Gus Dur as presidential candidate.
616
   
Megawati was defeated in the MPR by 313 votes to 373 with crucial support from 
Golkar that catapulted Gus Dur to become the fourth president.
617
 Gus Dur finally decided to 
back Megawati as Vice President, after there was a huge protest from Megawati supporter on 
the street that caused riot in Jakarta. In the end, Megawati became Vice President by beating 
Hamzah Haz from the PPP in the MPR by 396 votes to 284.
618
 
Nevertheless since PKB only had 8 percent seats in the MPR, Gus Dur had to 
accommodate the political parties who had supported his presidential bid and the military in 
the cabinet. Therefore, Gus Dur established a ‗rainbow cabinet‘ which was underwritten by 
leading political figures including Amien Rais, Wiranto, Megawati and Akbar Tandjung.
619
 
Despite the compromising nature of Gus Dur‘s cabinet, there were several breakthroughs, like 
the appointment of the first civilian as Minister of Defense after 50 years, Juwono Sudarsono; 
the first Indonesian Chinese to the senior post of Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Kwik Kian Gie; and a credible Attorney General Marzuki Darusman. 
620
  
However, Gus Dur‘s heath complications, combined with his erratic leadership style, 
led to his failure to manage his cabinet. After only a month in office, in December 1999, 
Laksamana Sukardi raised an allegation of corruption related to Indonesia‘s biggest Textile 
Company, Texmaco, which was owned by politically-connected Marimutu Sinivasan. 
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Laksamana revealed an array of documents that exposed  Texmaco‘s misuse of ‗pre-shipment 
export facilities‘ and also a loan to Texmaco from the state owned bank BNI, that violated the 
legal lending limit. Afterwards, the AGO, in December 1999, announced that Marimutu was 
the subject of alleged corruption related to the misuse of loans from a number of state-owned 
banks worth Rp.9.8 trillion. Later, AGO‘s Marzuki launched an investigation by interrogating 
not only Marimutu, but also BI Governor Syahril Sabirin.
621
  
However, Laksamana and Marzuki‘s efforts to expose Texmaco‘s corruption allegation 
did not attain Gus Dur‘s support.  Eventually, the AGO halted the investigation on May 2000 
because an audit by the Financial and Development Audit Agency (BPKP) revealed that 
Texmaco had not incurred the state loss.
622
  
Laksamana‘s efforts to address corruption finally hit the heart of political patronage in 
Gus Dur‘s government. Inside the Ministry of State-owned Enterprise, Laksamana was 
constantly undermined by his deputy Rozy Munir, who was Gus Dur‘s proxy.  Based on 
Barton‘s account, PKB and NU members‘ acted of self-serving and greedy inflicting Gus 
Dur‘s presidency.623 
What made matters worse for Laksamana was the fact that Munir was working together 
with Megawati‘s husband, Taufik Kiemas.  The owner of Texmaco, Marimutu Sinivasan, was 
also very close to Taufik, which was believed to contribute to Laksamana‘s removal from the 
cabinet.
624
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Eventually, Minister of State Owned Enterprise Laksamana Sukardi and Minister of 
Trade and Industry Jusuf Kalla (JK) were dismissed from the cabinet in April 2000.  Gus Dur 
accused JK of collusion involving his company, Bukaka, which won the project of the state-
owned electricity company PLN and also JK‘s brother‘s involvement in rice imports to 
BULOG. Both of these allegations were strongly denied by JK.
625
 Meanwhile, Laksamana was 
accused of appointing a corrupt official to the telecommunications company, Indosat. It was 
clear Gus Dur committed a fatal mistake in sacking Laksamana and JK, thereby exhausting his 
political support from the parliament.
626
  
When Gus Dur sacked two ministers based on an unfounded accusation of corruption, 
his commitment to address corruption was being questioned. Also, the mass-media and civil 
society became more hostile since Gus Dur was seen to be using corruption as a pretext for 
building his own financial patronage.    
Then, the concern of the mass media and civil society appeared to be vindicated when 
the two corruption allegations emerged, known as BULOG Gate and Brunei Gate in May-June 
2000.  The Vice Head of Sapuan embezzled US$4 million from the National Logistic Agency‘s 
(BULOG) Foundation and used it to bribe Gus Dur‘s masseur for promotion.627 Eventually, 
Secretary of State Bondan Gunawan resigned due to this scandal.
628
 
Then another financial scandal emerged, in June 2000, when Gus Dur admitted 
receiving a donation of around US$2 million from the Sultan of Brunei. According to Gus Dur, 
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he needed the donation for humanitarian purposes in Aceh province in a personal capacity,
629
 
without considering the conflict-of-interest. Later, it was also revealed that Gus Dur‘s brother, 
Hasyim Wahid, had been an advisor to IBRA – a crucial bank restructuring program with asset 
worth of billions of US$ – where he helped to negotiate the debt of Indonesian controversial 
businessmen.
630
 This nepotism appointment infuriated the business community and 
international donors, thereby forcing Hasyim‘s resignation from IBRA.631 
Negotiation or Prosecution? Gus Dur’s dealing with the Suharto Family’s Corruption 
Cases 
Gus Dur realized that his presidency would be judged on how he dealt with Suharto‘s 
corruption cases. He announced that Suharto would be pardoned once convicted, on condition 
that he would return a significant part of his wealth.
632
 Gus Dur‘s premature presumption that 
Suharto would be easily convicted hampered the investigation. 
 After his appointment as Attorney General, Marzuki Darusman declared that the 
prosecution of Suharto‘s alleged corruption was his highest priority.633  Initially, the Attorney 
General worked swiftly by overturning the SP3 letter and launching an investigation.
634
 
In parallel, Gus Dur also sent Minister of Mining SBY to negotiate with Suharto‘s 
family about the possibility of returning big part of their wealth.  However, Suharto‘s family 
                                            
629
 ‗Dari Sultan untuk Presiden [From Sultan to President]‘, Tempo, 12 June 2000, retrieved on 25 March 2015 
from http://majalah.tempo.co/konten/2000/06/12/NAS/114086/Dari-Sultan-untuk-Presiden/15/29  
630
 ‗Hasyim ―Gus Im‖ Wahid: Gus Dur tidak Meminta Saya Duduk di BPPN‘, Tempo, 15 May 2000, retrieved  on 
25 March 2015 from http://majalah.tempo.co/konten/2000/05/15/WAW/113401/Hasyim-Gus-Im-Wahid-Gus-
Dur-Tidak-Meminta-Saya-Duduk-di-BPPN/11/29  
631
 ‗Ring of Scandals‘, Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 24.  
632
 ‗Gus Dur: Suharto Diampuni Bila Kembalikan Harta‘, Kompas, 11 December 1999, retrieved on 25 March 
2015 from http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1999/12/10/0033.html  
633
 ‗Wawancara Jaksa Agung Marzuki Darusman: Hukum Bukan untuk Balas Dendam [Attorney General: 
Marzuki Darusman: Rule of Law is not for Revenge], Media Indonesia, 19 March 2000, retrieved on 25 March 
2015 from http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/2000/03/18/0066.html  
634
 ‗Suharto jadi Tersangka [Suharto became a Suspect]‘, kompas, 11 February 2000, retrieved on 25 March 2015 
from http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/2000/01/0870.html  
205 
 
insisted that their wealth had been obtained legally.
635
 In the end, government called-off the 
negotiation because of the public controversy surrounding the process.
636
 
Furthermore, Suharto was interrogated at his home by the AGO for two hours in May 
2000 regarding his potential misuse of funds in his foundation Supersemar and was later 
formally charged of corruption for misusing his position as Chair of seven foundations, leading 
to US$416 million in state losses.  The secondary charge against Suharto was for abusing his 
power while in office,
637
 but the South Jakarta court dropped this suit after Suharto failed to 
attend court due to health complication in August-September 2000.
638
 
  Meanwhile, Suharto‘s favorite son, Hutomo ‗Tommy‘ Mandala Putra, was finally 
convicted of corruption related to a land fraud that benefited his company, PT. Goro, and 
incurred a state loss of Rp.96.6 billion.  Eventually,  the MA judge ruled in September 2000 
that Tommy was to be sentenced to only 18 months in prison and had to pay a fine of a mere 
Rp.10 million.
639
  
Another of Suharto‘s trusted businessmen, Mohammad ‗Bob‘ Hasan, was also 
convicted of corruption by the court for stealing US$75 million of government forestry funds 
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in February 2001. The MA ruled that he was sentenced to six years in prison, forced to return 
around US$24 million of state losses.
640
 
Gus Dur’s mishandling of the Military Reform: A Significant Backlash  
With Gus Dur‘s strong political legitimacy after being elected by the MPR in 1999, he was 
able to force Chief of Military Wiranto to accept the post of Coordinating Minister for Security 
Affairs and relieved Chief Military post. He also appointed the first civilian Minister of 
Defense in 50 years, an academic Juwono Sudarsono.   
After realizing that Gus Dur was trying to curb his influence, Wiranto consolidated his 
authority in the military by signing-off the reshuffle in November 1999 without Gus Dur and 
Juwono being consulted.
641
 Wiranto‘s trusted aides, such as Fachrul Razi, were promoted as 
Deputy Chief of the Military and Djaja Suparman was promoted to head of the KOSTRAD.
642
   
Then, Gus Dur tried to marginalize further Wiranto‘s influence.  Due to pressure from 
the international community, the government established the commission for human right 
abuses inquiry in the aftermath of the East Timor referendum (KPP HAM Timtim)‘s human 
rights violence in August 1999. 
Finally, KPP HAM Timtim announced the findings arising from its investigation in 
January 2000, which implicated Wiranto and five generals as being responsible for the East 
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Timor violence. Eventually, through intense negotiations, involving Vice President Megawati, 
Gus Dur managed to force Wiranto resignation.
643
  
After Wiranto‘s replacement, Gus Dur further consolidated his authority within the 
military by promoting military officers who supported him. The highest profile officer 
promoted was Agus Wirahadikusumah, who advocated inter alia the dismantling of the 
territorial command and extraction of the military from politics.  
  Wirahadikusumah‘s outspokenness fitted Gus Dur‘s agenda of finding a trusted ally in 
the military to contain Wiranto‘s influence by promoting him to head the influential 
KOSTRAD post in February 2000.
644
 This promotion irked the high-ranking army officers, 
who regarded this as intervention in their personnel affairs.  Chief of Army Tyasno Sudarto 
initially supported the reform proposal by Wirahadikusumah by supporting Saurip Kadi‘s 
proposal to run a pilot project to dismantle the two lowest levels of the command system in a 
number of urban areas.
645
  Furthermore, in March 2000 Gus Dur dissolved the 
BAKORSTANAS – the New Order era‘s intelligence army structure.646  
Furthermore, Wiranto‘s military ally was lobbying Megawati to marginalize State 
Secretary Bondan since he was suspected of playing an important role in Wirahadikusumah‘s 
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rapid promotion.
647
The initial move to marginalize Wirahadikusumah and his allies was 
through the military reshuffle in June 2000.
648
  
Realizing that his political allies were being dismantled, Wirahadikusumah attempted to 
retaliate by exposing corruption in KOSTRAD. Alleged corruption involving around US$20 
million that implicated Wirahadikusumah‘s predecessor, Djadja Suparman, emerged in August 
2000. This was revealed by the external auditor that was invited by Wirahadikusumah to 
investigate KOSTRAD‘s foundation Darma Putera.649 
The publication of financial impropriety by KOSTRAD‘s foundation enraged not only 
Wiranto‘s supporters but also moderate factions in the military. They viewed 
Wirahadikusumah as being motivated by personal ambition by leaking inside information 
about KOSTRAD to the press.  The alliance between Wiranto‘s supporters and moderate 
reformers in the military took Gus Dur‘s allies to the brink.650 This was evident when Gus Dur 
was forced to accept Wirahadikusumah‘s dismissal from the KOSTRAD post in July 2000.  651  
At the national level, Gus Dur also disagreed with Minister of Defense Juwono 
Sudarsono regarding the scope and pace of military reform. Although in principle supporting 
Gus Dur‘s agenda, Juwono realized that the changes had to be gradual and that a three or four 
year transition period was needed to achieve substantial civilian supremacy. Juwono was also 
skeptical about the civilians‘ readiness since the politicians remained entangled in the intrusive 
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competition for political funding.
652
 Consequently, after Juwono suffered a mild stroke, Gus 
Dur seized the opportunity to replace him with a legal scholar and trusted aide, Mahfud M.D., 
in August 2000.
653
 
Gus Dur survived the August 2000 MPR session since he agreed with the coalition 
leaders to give daily authority over the government to Vice President Megawati. However, Gus 
Dur only half-heartedly delegated his authority since all crucial decision, for instance the 
appointment of echelon one officials still required his approval.
654
 To make matters worse, Gus 
Dur appointed troubling figures in the cabinet like Minister of Finance Prijadi Praptosuhardjo, 
who failed the fit-and-proper test of the BI.
655
   
The division between Gus Dur and Megawati was exploited by the military, knowing 
that the main political parties were shifting their support to Megawati.  In the end, the 
promotion of Endiartono Sutarto to Chief of Army consolidated further the conservative 
group‘s hold over the military. At this stage, the radical reformer group was effectively 
demolished.   
After the promotion by Gus Dur to the post of Coordinating Minister for Security 
Affairs in August 2000, SBY tried to mediate with the military and the opposition in 
parliament. Instead, SBY was given a mandate to restore security and order in May 2001. Gus 
Dur, disappointed at SBY‘s reluctance to execute his orders, replaced him with Agum 
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Gumelar.
656
 As a result, the last effort by the military‘s moderate camp to prevent Gus Dur 
from entering into direct conflict with the military failed.    
Subsequently, Gus Dur made continuous political blunders through his perceived 
involvement in the BULOG and Brunei scandals that provided ammunition for the MPR to 
pass its first memorandum for violating the 1945 constitution and MPR decree on clean 
government that is free from KKN in February 2001. However, Gus Dur further antagonized 
the MPR that led for a second memorandum for a special session of the MPR.   
Against the united army under Endiartono, Gus Dur demanded that the military should 
dissolve the MPR for violating the constitution, and then wanted to appoint MOD Secretary 
General Johnny Lumintang as Deputy Chief of the Military. However, Coordinating Minister 
of Security Agum Gumelar, accompanied by the Military chief Widodo A.S. in July 2001, 
declared that the military rejected his plan.
657
 Irked by the military‘s rejection, Gus Dur issued 
a decree to freeze the MPR and Golkar.   Both Cabinet Secretary Marzuki Darusman and 
Coordinating Minister for Security Agum Gumelar rejected this decree and resigned.
658
  
The MPR accelerated the special sessions, revoked Gus Dur‘s mandate as president and 
on the same day (23 July 2001) inaugurated Megawati Sukarnoputri as the fifth president. 
Megawati struck a deal with a middle axis to appoint Islamic Party (PPP) Chair Hamzah Haz 
as her Vice President through voting in the MPR.
659
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After the initial military reform initiated by Gus Dur started with Wiranto‘s dismissal in 
February 2000, no progress was made because, as Honna observes, the ‗President relied too 
much on his political skills in manipulating appointments and promotions.‘660 Meanwhile, 
Kingsbury attributed this failure to Wirahadikusumah and his allies in the military playing 
politics.
661
 In contrast, Mietzner observed that Gus Dur should be credited with some progress, 
including two MPR decrees in 2000, stipulating that the military should focus solely on 
defense, and required that the military had to depart from parliament in 2004 and from the 
MPR in 2009.
662
  
However, in my view, despite his vision of civilian supremacy, Gus Dur made a 
fundamental tactical mistake in its execution; for instance, by forging an alliance with high 
profile Wirahadikusumah and thereby blatantly intervening in military personnel affairs. Gus 
Dur, alienated also the moderate reformer, whose support was crucial for military reform. 
More importantly he also alienated his political supporter in DPR, especially Megawati.  
The Backfiring of Gus Dur’s Intervention in the Law Enforcement Institutions 
At the outset, Gus Dur‘s addressing the law enforcement institutions issues appeared 
promising, when he issued a decree to separate the police from  military in July 2000 and place 
them under the president.
663
  
 Meanwhile, aware of the corruption of the Supreme Court (MA), Gus Dur was 
intending to replace most of the Supreme judges by displaying his preference for Benjamin 
Mangkoedilaga, an MA judge, who was famous for his decision about lifting the ban from 
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Tempo Magazine in 1995.
664
 Due to Gus Dur‘s rift with the political party leaders by the end 
of 2000, both the parliament and the MA united to oppose Mangkoedilaga‘s appointment. 
 In the fit-and-proper test in the DPR, Mangkoedilaga failed to be nominated as Chief of 
MA.  Instead, the DPR managed to nominate two candidates as MA Chief – former Minister of 
Justice Muladi and former Director General of Minister of Justice Bagir Manan.
665
 Furthermore, under Gus Dur, there was also an effort to clean up the judiciary with the 
establishment of the Joint Team for Corruption Eradication (TGPTPK) in April 2000 
comprising law enforcement officers and elements of civil society.
666
 The TGPTPK was led by 
former career MA judge Adi Andojo
667
 that had vast authority since they could tap 
conversations and request the freezing of suspicious bank accounts.
668
 
 The TGPTPK was depending on public reports for their investigation and was focusing 
on cleaning-up the judicial system.
669
  The litmus test came when a lawyer named Endin 
Wahyudin reported three MA judges to the TGPTPK for receiving bribes of Rp.96-100 
million. 
 However, the two MA judges in turn reported Endin for defamation to the police.  The 
two MA judges requested a pre-trial in troubled West Jakarta court, which approved the 
request on the ground that the TPTPK was established by Law 31/1999 on corruption and 
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therefore they did not have the authority to investigate corruption cases for the period before 
the law was enacted.
670
  
Not only that, the lawyer of Harahap – one of the MA judges –  submitted a Judicial 
Review on Government Regulation number 19/ 2000, the legal basis for the TGPTPK. As 
predicted, a panel of MA judges annulled the regulations in March 2001, thereby dissolving the 
TGPTPK as done in August 2001.
671
  
Then, Gus Dur compounded the problem through his interference in the law 
enforcement process. After his request for Tommy Suharto‘s arrest was ignored, in September 
2000, he replaced Rusdihardjo with Bimantoro as Chief of the Police.
672
 However, in the end, 
Gus Dur conflicted with Bimantoro, demanding him to resign as Chief of Police in June 2001. 
Gus Dur then went further by appointing Chaeruddin as Vice Chief of police and taking 
over the daily command.
673
 However, Chaeruddin was unable to assert his authority due to the 
significant internal resistance within the police. 
Another case of Gus Dur personalizing the law enforcement process was when he 
aimed to replace BI Governor Syahril Sabirin. Subsequently, the AGO announced in June 2000 
that Sabirin was a suspect in the Bank Bali case.  Sabirini‘s detention sparked protests from 
Speaker of the Parliament Akbar Tandjung and other BI Deputy Governors.
674
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 Amidst the turmoil, there was scant hope of addressing corruption in June 2001 cabinet 
reshuffle, Gus Dur managed to appoint the respected Marsillam Simanjuntak as Minister of 
Justice and Baharuddin Lopa as Attorney General. Following his appointment, Lopa vowed to 
re-open the case on Indonesia Central Bank‘s Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) that implicated 
major conglomerates and also re-opened the investigation into a case that implicated textile 
conglomerate Marimutu Sinivasan since Texmaco, had allegedly caused state losses of Rp.19.8 
trillion
675
and the investigation that implicated Speaker of Parliament Akbar Tandjung and 
Nurdin Halid MP - both Golkar leaders – related to BULOG‘s misuse of non-budgetary 
funds.
676
  Unfortunately, in July 2001, Lopa suddenly passed away due to a heart attack in 
Riyadh.
677
  
Although Gus Dur targeted corrupt state officials in the New Order era, the timing of 
this was in response to the MPR proceedings on Gus Dur‘s impeachment.678  Thus, the 
prosecution process was seen as a political vendetta and Gus Dur‘s interference in the legal 
process led to the loss of his government‘s credibility with regard to judiciary reform.679   
However, Arief Budiman noted, Gus Dur had inherited a quite appalling socio-political 
and economic legacy that would have presented challenges.
680
 Greg Barton also argues that the 
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post-Suharto period was not conducive for Gus Dur to due, inter alia, a self-serving, corrupt 
state apparatus, the absence of a functioning legal system and an antagonistic military.
681
  
Nevertheless, in my opinion, when Gus Dur was elected President by the MPR with 
strong political capital, he had an opportunity to bring about considerable reform and 
accelerate the anti-corruption drive. Unfortunately, his blatant political adventurism, in an 
effort to build his own political financial patronage for his 2004 reelection campaign, 
combined with his counterproductive governance style, not only cost him the presidency but 
also the rare opportunity to execute important governance reform initiatives. 
The Constitutional Amendment during the Megawati Era: Crafting a More Democratic 
Political Governance Structure in Indonesia  
There was strong public pressure for a more democratic political governance structure after the 
fall of Suharto. During the General Session in October 1999, the MPR agreed to the first 
amendment of the 1945 constitution through such measures as imposing a limit on the 
presidential term to only two five year terms and requiring any laws to be agreed by both the 
government and the DPR.
682
  
 When no political party won a majority in the DPR, a quod pro quo was agreed 
between the political parties and the military that the amendments would only be applied to 
non-core elements of the 1945 constitution. Therefore, the MPR working committee 
established an Ad Hoc Committee I (PAH 1) in October 1999. PAH 1 Chair Jacob Tobing was 
a senior MP from PDIP with the Golkar‘s Slamet Effendy Yusuf as Deputy Chair that played 
an important role in navigating the political challenges either in the MPR or their own political 
party. 
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  During 1999-2000, PAH I conducted a public hearing, organizing consultative and 
hearings nationwide.  Eventually, they managed to resolve politically contentious issues in the 
MPR, like addressing the dual function of the military, by stipulating that the military would 
focus on upholding the territorial integrity, while the police would focus on law 
enforcement.
683
 The second amendment also explicitly outlined the autonomy for regional 
government, and decentralization of the central government authority.
684
  
 The constitutional amendment process was postponed in 2001 due to a showdown 
between Gus Dur and parliament. The negotiation on the third amendment of the constitution 
continued in November 2001. There was an attempt by the two major political parties – PDIP 
and Golkar – to strike a deal.  Golkar wanted greater authority for the newly-established 
Regional Representative Council (DPD), and PDIP wanted the President and Vice President to 
be appointed by the MPR in the second round election.  However, a consensus could not be 
reached as the Middle Axis parties wanted a second round presidential direct election and also 
the functional group opposed the existence of DPD. To prevent negotiations breaking down, 
Tobing and other PAH I leaders in the MPR quickly decided to enact the amendments that had 
been agreed and postponed discussion of the rest by outmaneuvering the conservative that tried 
to stop the amendment.
685
 
 The outcome of the third amendment to the 1945 constitution marked a fundamental 
change. Andrew Ellis noted ‗.. it changes Indonesia from a state with a single all-powerful 
highest institution of state to become a state with constitutional checks and balances.‘686 The 
important feature was that it diminished the authority of the MPR, in which the President and 
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Vice President were directly elected in the first round.
687
 Another important issue was that the 
President could not be impeached solely on policy differences, but only if it were proven that 
he/she had violated the law because of corruption, bribery, other criminal acts, and/or 
disgraceful behavior, or no longer met the requirements to serve that should be determined by 
the MK ruling. The third amendment also provided for a more independent judiciary, a new 
constitutional court (MK) and the DPD, with limited authority.    
The third amendment was also an effort to empower accountability institutions, like the 
Supreme Audit Council (BPK) and Judiciary Commission (KY).  The inclusion in the 
constitution empowered BPK as a constitutional agency to strengthen the checks-and-balances 
system. Moreover, KY was established to supervise the notorious MA.  For instance, KY had 
the authority to supervise the conduct of MA judges.
688
   
 Then, in the fourth amendment of the constitution in July 2002, the conservative elite 
realized that it was progressing further than they had envisioned. The ruling PDIP grew 
concerned about the viability of holding a second round direct presidential election
689
 that was 
linked to concern about Megawati‘s chance of reelection in 2004.690 In the end, Megawati was 
persuaded by the reform element in the PDIP that her reelection prospects were greater through 
direct election in the second round presidential contest.   
Another major development in the fourth amendment of the constitutions was that 
appointed members of the functional group (Utusan Golongan) in the MPR was finally 
dissolved. Furthermore, realizing the political shift, the military finally accepted that their 38 
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appointed seats in the MPR would be abolished by 2004.
691
  Nonetheless, the military launched 
their last maneuver by tabling a proposal to establish a constitutional commission (KK) refined 
the new constitution by disregarding prior amendment.
692
  However, the majority of the MPR 
members rejected this, demonstrating that the military‘s lack of political clout. 
The four amendment processes in 1999-2002 proved a slow, cumbersome process due 
to fragmentation within the MPR, but it was crucial in building mutual support among the 
political leaders.
693
 Credit should be given to Tobing along with his PAH I associates for 
steering the amendment process amicably, and the NGO and media also played a crucial role in 
scrutinizing the process from being politicized.
694
  
 Furthermore, the fragmentation within the MPR created an environment that suited the 
Indonesian style decision making process through deliberation (Musyawarah) and consensus 
(Mufakat) to reach compromise.
695
 Consequently, according to Indrayana, despite some 
shortcomings, the four amendment process created ‗a far more democratic constitution.‘696  
Despite many disappointments with the legislative performance of the DPR and the 
MPR in the post-Suharto era, in my opinion, this was a rare accomplishment, and should be 
attributed to the effective leadership by Tobing and his associates in the PAH1 of MPR with 
support from civil society. In my view, in addition to a more democratic political structure, the 
existence and empowerment of accountability institutions like KY and BPK facilitate a number 
of future anti-corruption and governance reform initiatives.  
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The Rise of the Conservative Generals and the Set-Back to the Military Reform  
One of the main factors behind Megawati‘s ascendancy to the presidency was her alliance with 
the army in preventing Gus Dur‘s efforts to dissolve the DPR and the MPR in July 2001.  
Megawati did not trust the other political leaders in light of Gus Dur‘s experience, and needed 
the military to counterbalance the political party‘s influence.   
 Subsequently, Megawati promoted Endiartono Sutarto as the military chief, a relatively 
professional soldier but defender of the military‘s political role. Megawati also promoted her 
favorite military figure, ultra-Conservative Ryamizard Ryacudu to the post of Chief of 
Army.
697
 Eventually, the conservative element dominated the military leadership by 2002.  
 As Mietzner and Crouch observed, the consolidation of the conservative element during 
Megawati presidency effectively ended the military reform.
698
 This was further evident when 
Megawati weakened the Ministry of Defense (MOD) by appointing former PKB Chair Matori 
Abdul Jalil, who possessed neither political clout nor military expertise.
699
 To make matter 
worse, when Matori was incapacitated due to a stroke in August 2003, Megawati simply left 
the Minister of Defense post vacant until the end of her term, showing her disengagement in 
the military reform.
700
   
 Adding further complication, a scandal involving the purchase of military equipment 
broke out in 2003. Following Megawati‘s state visit to Russia in April 2003, she decided to 
purchase four Sukhoi Jet fighters and two military helicopters through a deal to exchange 30 
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commodities worth US$193 million for these six aircrafts. BULOG was in charge of collecting 
the commodities and was instructed by Minister of Trade and Industry Rini Soewandi to 
arrange a down-payment of US$26 million through Bukopin Bank to Rosoboronexport, the 
Russian handling agent.
701
  
 The deal appeared plausible until it was revealed that Minister of Finance Boediono 
refused to pay the US$26 million down-payment, since it was not budgeted for 2003, thus 
became a national scandal. Subsequently, the DPR set up a special committee to investigate the 
Sukhoi scandal in June 2013,
702
but no serious investigation was undertaken of the ‗Sukhoigate‘ 
case until Megawati finished her term.  
 Approaching the end of Megawati‘s term in office in 2004, the new military (TNI) bill 
was finally drafted by the military headquarters (Mabes TNI) without much MOD 
involvement. A number of articles in the bill invited criticism, including explicitly insisting on 
the territorial function of the military and allowing active military officers to accept political 
positions like governor/ mayor.
703
  
 Ultimately, the TNI bill underwent a major overhaul during the deliberation process in 
the Indonesian parliament in June 2004 as an attempt to burnish Megawati‘s reform credentials 
for her presidential reelection campaign.
704
  Several key reform amendments in the bill 
eventually became law on the TNI; for example, in regards to defense policy and strategy as 
well as securing administrative support, the TNI was coordinated by the MOD
705
 and it 
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explicitly prohibited soldiers from joining a political party, as well as taking other forms of 
political or business position.
706
 However, there was an exemption regarding to the 
Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs, MOD, National Intelligence Agency 
and Supreme Court.
707
 The law also required that by 2009 the government was to take over the 
military business.
708
  
 From July 2001 until October 2004, the military reasserted much of its authority that 
had been diminished during the Habibie and Gus Dur periods. Thus, Megawati lack of interest 
in military issues coalesced with her sympathy for the military‘s nationalistic agenda at the cost 
of military reform. Under Megawati, the main elements of the military reform agenda were 
largely unaddressed.  Based on Sukma and Prasetyono‘s observation is that ‗the ongoing 
military reform is largely ad hoc in nature and not based on a comprehensive review.‘ 709 Also, 
Megawati‗s military appointment, which Malley argued ‗reflected her conservatism 
tendency.‘710 
The Politicization of Addressing Corruption Cases during Megawati’s Era  
During Megawati‘s term, little progress was made in addressing big corruption cases through 
law enforcement process, especially when Megawati appointed M.A. Rachman, an AGO career 
official, as the new Attorney General. 
711
   
 As mentioned above, Suharto‘s youngest son ‗Tommy‘ went missing in 2000 to avoid 
police arrest. MA Judge Syaifudin Kartasasmita, who sentenced Tommy for corruption, was 
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shot dead while driving to work at MA in July 2001.
712
 After one year hiatus, the police finally 
managed to capture Tommy in November 2001, who was sentenced to 15 years‘ imprisonment 
in 2002 for masterminding Kartasasmita‘s killing. 
However, Tommy‘s arrest in 2002 did not signal the improvement in the law 
enforcement process, because the judiciary felt obliged to respond to the killing of one of its 
own members.‘713 The real litmus test was how Megawati dealt with the alleged corruption 
implicating DPR Speaker Akbar Tandjung who was also chair of the second largest party, 
Golkar.  
 Since being appointed DPR Speaker in 1999, Akbar Tadjung was bogged down by the 
corruption investigation of Rp.40 billion of misusing BULOG non-budgetary fund as State 
Secretary. Megawati‘s PDIP sparked public disappointment when he spurned efforts by the 
DPR to establish an ethics committee to investigate Akbar‘s case in June 2001 to ensure 
Golkar continued support
714
and also to take Golkar hostage through prolonging the corruption 
trial.
715
 This plan to politicize Akbar‘s case corroded PDIP‘s reformist credentials.   
 The panel of judges at Central Jakarta Court in September 2002 found Akbar guilty of 
misusing the Rp.40 billion non-budgetary fund from BULOG and sentenced him to three 
years‘ imprisonment. Instead, Akbar was not arrested immediately pending a ruling by the 
highest court of appeal and eventually was acquitted by the MA in February 2004.
716
 This 
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verdict by the MA was controversial since two of Akbar‘s codefendants had their lower court 
sentences upheld by the MA.
717
  
In August 2001, Megawati claimed that she asked her family not to allow any 
opportunity for corruption, collusion and nepotism.‘718 However, in the end, Megawati‘s 
government became embroiled in a number of corruption allegations involving her inner-circle 
and family – especially her husband, Taufik Kiemas (T.K.) who helped her enter politics in the 
1990s.
719
  
There was also concern about T.K.‘s business dealings, acting as his wife‘s gatekeeper 
cum political operator. Although T.K. was only a member of the DPR from PDIP, de facto, he 
almost controlled the party.  T.K. raised eyebrows when he admitted having requested 4.7 
percent of the U.S. mining giant Freeport‘s shares that were previously owned by Suharto‘s 
crony, Bob Hasan.
720
 Also, T.K. was interfering in a number of government policies and major 
appointments to key positions, like Syaefudin Temanggung as Chief of the IBRA.
721
  
T.K.‘s influence on Megawati‘s economic policy was apparent, when he led the 
government delegation as special envoy on visits, such as to China and Japan. Nonetheless, 
what created a conflict of interest impression were his ties with conglomerates who attended 
the negotiations with the government regarding their billions of dollars of debt. The double-
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role played created discomfort among the officials leading this negotiation,
722
 due to T.K.‘s 
friendship with Jacob Nursalim, nephew of Indonesian Tycoon Sjamsul Nursalim, who owed 
to government US$2.7 billion.
723
   
However, the cases that undermined Megawati‘s government‘s credibility in their anti-
corruption drive was her position regarding the work of the State Official Wealth Audit 
Commission (KPKPN) and when KPKN exposed the corruption allegation implicating 
Attorney General M.A. Rachman. 
 The main task of the KPKPN was to investigate the state official‘s wealth report.724  
Gus Dur selected 35 members and the KPKPN that was led by Yusuf Syakir of the Islamic 
party PPP from January 2001. However, the KPKPN had insufficient staff or authority to 
sanction public officials who hid their wealth.
725
 
Initially, the request by the KPKPN for public officials‘ wealth report form was largely 
ignored. Of the 11,000 forms that were distributed to the executive, around 5049 were returned 
(45.08 percent), whereas of the 12,000 forms that were distributed to legislators including 
national and local MPS, only 2,000 were returned (15.48 percent).
726
 
However, intensive lobbying by the KPKPKN leadership, combined with their ability 
to use the media, they managed to persuade Megawati, and other high state officials to submit 
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a wealth report.
727
 Eventually, wealth report publication and verification became politically 
complex for the KPKPN, when NGOs and the critical media started to criticize public officials 
with questionable wealth.  
The most controversial case exposed by the KPKPN was Attorney General M.A. 
Rachman‘s wealth report manipulation, as his US$543,000 mansion went unreported. 
Rachman also admitted to the KPKPN that part of his Rp.545.6 million deposit came from 
donations by his East Java business associates.
728
 
Rahman‘s alleged corruption was the most damaging to the government, since it 
implicated the AGO.  However, Megawati chose to ignore the public demand and instead 
accept Rahman‘s weak defense in October 2002729 based on the puny argument that the case 
was politically motivated.
730
  
Ultimately, the KPKPN created discomfort for the political elite as it was acting too 
aggressively in exposing suspicious source of wealth. Consequently, it was suspected that the 
government and the DPR had conspired to merge the KPKPN into the newly-established 
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK] under the new bill on KPK in 2002.
731
 The 
KPKPN made a final effort to file a judicial review in 2003 regarding the law on the KPK to 
the MK, but the court rejected.
732
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Another of Megawati‘s controversial policies was her decision on the Indonesia Bank 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA) that was established during the financial crisis in 1998. With a 
defunct banking system, the IBRA almost took over the banking industry and oversaw the 
restructuring and liquidation of weak banks.  The IBRA ended up with an estimated Rp.533 
trillion worth of assets, with stakes in 200 companies, with the authority to seize assets without 
a court order. 
733
 
Therefore, with such powerful authority combined with a significant asset value, the 
IBRA became the battleground for the nation‘s economic resources, where politicians saw the 
IBRA as a potential source of political patronage. The IBRA officials had to deal with these 
devious competing interests to maximize their asset returns.  
Unfortunately, the political calculation triumphed over the economic rationale in the 
IBRA‘s efforts to dispose of its assets.  The IBRA was rarely allowed the authority to foreclose 
the assets of the former owners, instead brought the matter to court. With troubled judicial 
system, IBRA had handed over 18 cases to the Attorney General and police and lost all three 
court cases.
734
  Ultimately, the IBRA was targeted by the IMF to dispose of its assets to cover 
the budget deficit by selling the assets cheaply by providing an incentive for debtors through 
the issuance of ‗release and discharge (R&D)‘ decree for big debtors. This decree stipulated 
that the big debtors would be exonerated from any criminal prosecution if they paid their debt 
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in full, created a public backlash
 
.
735
 Megawati defended her controversial policy as the move 
was a necessary to resolve the banking sector‘s huge debt problem.736 
Unrepentant about the R&D policy, the AGO acquitted Sjamsul Nursalim from legal 
prosecution because he had returned Bank Liquidity Assistance Funds (BLBI) worth US$1.2 
billion. Seven conglomerates received a letter of certification for settling their debt from the 
IBRA, including Bob Hasan‘ of Bank Umum Nasional and Hasyim Djodjohadikusumo of Bank 
Pelita.
737
   
Ultimately, the IBRA‘s operation came to an end in February 2004, since mandated 
with recovering the government‘s huge bank bailout costing around Rp.650 trillion. In its six-
year operation, IBRA only managed to raise Rp.168.2 trillion (a recovery rate of 28 percent). 
The remaining 72 percent was declared the ‗cost of the crises‘ by the IBRA.738 According to 
Bresnan, ‗IBRA had a reputation as a corrupt instrumentality that failed to meet any objectives 
for which it had been created.‘739  
The Birth of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) 
 Article 43 of law 31/1999 stipulated that a KPK should be established within two years. The 
process of drafting the bill for law number 30/2002 was led by the Director General for Laws 
and Regulations of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (MenkumHam) Romli 
Atmasasmita, Amien Sunaryadi and Chandra Hamzah, who represented the NGO. The 
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committee also received advice from the former Commissioner of Hong Kong‘s Anti-
corruption Body‘s (ICAC) Bertrand de Speville. 
The bill on KPK submitted to the DPR followed a three-pronged strategy: investigation, 
prevention and education. However, it did not completely follow the ICAC‘s Hong Kong 
model since the ICAC only handled the investigation of corruption cases, while KPK both 
handled investigation and the prosecution.
740
 Moreover, the KPK had the right to conduct 
searches, record conversations and conduct seizures which is more powerful than the ICAC.
741
 
In addition the international organization, especially the IMF, also played a role in 
pushing the Indonesian government for the enactment of the KPK bill. Furthermore, 
Megawati‘s economic ministers planned to establish KPK as part of a broader agenda to 
address corruption. This was outlined in its Letter of Intent (LOI) to the IMF in August 2001 
and further elaborated upon in the LOI on 13 December 2001 that outlined the plan to establish 
the KPK in the second quarter of 2002.
742
 
During the bill on KPK‘s deliberation in parliament, the government faced some 
resistance from the ruling political parties and the Military/Police factions.
743
 What was 
surprising was the ruling party PDI-P opposition of the bill as they warned that ‗the 
commission would become the new authoritarian institution in the judiciary and create 
uncertainty in law enforcement process.‘744  
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However, the MenkumHam provided a robust and reasonable defense of the bill‘s 
critical component with support from the reformist faction in parliament, led by the PPP‘s MP, 
Zain Badjeber.
745
   Therefore, the DPR accepted the proposal to keep the crucial articles, like 
the establishment of a special anti-corruption court.
746
 
There were a number of delays in enacting the KPK law and the deadlines set in the 
LOI‘s of 11 June 2002747 and 20 November 2000 was missed.748 The IMF thus played an 
important role in pressuring the government to enact the KPK bill.  As the KPK‘s Vice Chair 
Amien Sunaryadi explained, ‗The IMF stated that, unless the government made the KPK 
operational, the tranches of the loan would be stopped.‘749 Ultimately, at the plenary meeting of 
the DPR in November 2002, all of the factions in the DPR supported the KPK bill.
750
  
There was a mixed result of Megawati‘s term in office in the context of the governance 
reform and anti-corruption measures.  There was a fundamental constitutional amendment that 
recalibrates Indonesia‘s political governance structure from an authoritarian to a more 
democratic.  However, in my opinion, the drive for that constitutional reform came from the 
progressive elements within in the MPR, led by PAH I Chair Jacob Tobing.  
With Megawati‘s support for the conservative group, the military reform agenda was 
stalled. The military was given a free hand over defense affairs, which contributed to the 
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declining pressure for military reform, as Honna observed.
751
 This was aggravated by a lack of 
oversight by civilians of the defense policy by the fact that the Minister of Defense position 
was left vacant for over a year due to health reasons.  
However, in my view, one of the main contributory factors to Megawati‘s failed 
presidential reelection in 2004 was her reluctance to address the corruption.  Based on a 
national poll in July 2002, 85 percent of the respondents were dissatisfied with the efforts to 
eradicate corruption.
752
 Meanwhile, Megawati‘s administration was plagued by streams of 
controversial decisions, from keeping Akbar as DPR speaker at the expense of a fair judicial 
process, giving her husband, T.K., a free hand to meddle in policies, and her insistence on 
keeping the troubled Attorney General M.A. Rachman.   
Overall, it was clear that during the post-Suharto presidencies there was some 
commendable progress in governance reform.  As described in the previous section, it was 
shown that this was the first free-and-fair election for 40 year, with freedom of speech under 
Habibie and subsequently a more democratic political structure through various constitutional 
amendment processes under Gus Dur and Megawati. However, in light of first argument of this 
thesis, the governance reform was not as extensive and comprehensive as shown by the lack of 
progress or even set-back in the area of judiciary and military reform.  
Although, in the end, the DPR and the government managed to enact the law on KPK, 
but under Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati, the prosecution of high profile corruption cases 
tended to be politicized, as evident in, for instance, the case of former president Suharto, the 
Bank of Bali scandal, and the Speaker of DPR Akbar Tandjung. Related to the second 
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argument of this thesis as outlined in the introduction section, the lack of drive in pushing for 
prosecution in the big corruption cases was suspiciously, in my view, due to maintaining 
economic patronage for their political agenda during the national legislative and presidential 
election in 2004.  
Conclusion  
During the post-Suharto presidencies in 1998-2004, by applying Dahl‘s political pluralism 
analytical framework, some progress was achieved by the reformers in the context of 
governance reform. What was distinctive in this period is that it was the reformists, not 
necessarily the president or ministers who drove the reform. In some cases, like the 
constitutional amendment or the enactment of the KPK bill, there was a reform element either 
in the executive or legislative by working together with civil society, that formed a temporary 
alliance in pushing this crucial reform agenda effectively. Therefore, this reformist coalition 
was quite complex and diverse. In bringing about this reform, this reformist element, in my 
view, was employing their political resources in the form of knowledge, organization, political 
networks and communication by allying with the national mass media.   
 In terms of democratic consolidation, in my view, during the period 1999-2004, there 
was commendable progress and an important political milestone was passed, especially in 
bringing about procedural democracy especially in the Habibie and Megawati period after the 
authoritarian consolidation during the New Order era. This was evidently an effort to achieve 
political equality among Indonesia society in fulfilling the key requirements of Diamond and 
Morlino as outlined in the introduction section, at least in these areas: recurring competitive 
elections, more than one serious political party and an alternative source of information. 
However, as the democratic political system had re-emerged in the late 1950s, the democratic 
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consolidation as envisioned by Linz and Stepan, Diamond, Merkel as well as Croissant, as 
mention in the introduction chapter, was not achieved.  
 As for identifying the political leaders who brought about reform in the period 1998-
2004 in the context of governance and anti-corruption, using Kingdon‘s analytical framework 
as explained in the introduction section, in my view, President Habibie, the PAH1 committee 
in the MPR led by Jacob Tobing and the coalition of reformists in government as well as in 
parliament, with support from civil society, that crafted the KPK bill, can be described as 
policy entrepreneurs. These political actors were able to identify problems such as the need for 
a more democratic political structure and the addressing of corruption as an effort to distance 
them especially from the last decade of Suharto‘s troubled authoritarian tenure.  Then, these 
political leaders was able to develop policy reform proposals and capitalize on the political 
momentum where there was high pressure from people at large to enact this reform that made 
them able to institutionalize this important political governance reform.  Thus these political 
leaders were able to maneuver effectively in three streams of situations, as outlined by 
Kingdon (problem, policy and political), in enacting considerable political governance reform 
and anti-corruption efforts.  
 In identifying the type of political leadership traits in the context of the governance 
reform and anti-corruption efforts by using modified Burns‘ analytical framework during the 
period 1999-2004, in my view, President Habibie, the PAH1 Committee in the MPR led by 
Jacob Tobing and the reformist coalition that was able to enact the KPK bill possessed 
transformational leaders‘ traits. This was because they initiated the reform proposal and in the 
end were able to forge a consensus among the Indonesian political elite to institutionalize their 
political reform like free and fair elections as well as constitutional amendment towards a more 
democratic political governance structure.  Meanwhile, although Megawati was not initiating 
the reform for constitutional amendment and the law on an anti-corruption commission, her 
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late support as the leader of the ruling party PDIP was crucial in formalizing this important 
reform. Therefore, in my view, Megawati was in the category of a semi-transformational leader 
for her role in supporting the reform at the late stage. While there was an initial high hope for 
Gus Dur‘s presidency, with his strong track record as one of the opposition leaders during 
Suharto‘s era, in the end he was not able to enact a crucial governance reform and there was 
also a lack of progress in addressing corruption. As a result, in my view, Gus Dur was in the 
category of transactional leaders.  
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Chapter 7: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back or Vice Versa? President 
Yudhoyono’s Struggle to Advance Governance Reform and Anti-Corruption 
Initiatives during his First Term  
 
 
When Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) became the first directly-elected President in 2004, 
there were high hopes among voters that he would fulfill his promise to eradicate corruption 
and promote good governance. However, to contain the influence of his powerful Vice 
President, Jusuf Kalla (JK), who took over the biggest political party in parliament (the 
Golkar), and his ally, tycoon Aburizal Bakrie, SBY appointed technocrats to the important 
economy portfolio, such as Coordinating Minister of Economy Boediono, Minister of Finance 
Sri Mulyani Indrawati and Minister of Trade Marie Pangestu.  Therefore, within the difficult 
political environment, it was highly viable that the technocrats/professionals chose to start with 
their own governance reform, like civil service reform in the MOF and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
 It is worth noting that the most aggressive anti-corruption campaign in Indonesia 
commenced under SBY‘s presidency, initiated by the establishment of the Interagency 
Coordination Team for Corruption Eradication (Timtas Tipikor) in 2005, but the most 
important was the functioning of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), perhaps the 
most effective anti-corruption agency ever established in Indonesia. The KPK managed to 
prosecute an unprecedented number of high-ranking officials, like former ministers, governors 
and the Chairman of the Election Commission (KPU). As outlined in the previous chapters, no 
anti-corruption agencies or ad-hoc team in the previous administration was underpinned by a 
strong legal standing or sufficiently resourced and, more importantly, did not get support from 
the top political leaders. As a result, compared to the KPK, this corruption eradication state 
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agency or ad-hoc team was not sustainable since they were quickly dissolved once they 
investigated the powerful figures that were close to the president.  
The account of SBY‘s first term‘s governance and anti-corruption initiative in this 
chapter is structured into eight sections. First, the academic debate on the mixed progress of 
SBY‘s first presidential term will be outlined.  The second section will highlight the emergence 
of SBY onto the national political scene, as an author of the military reform in 1998-1999 to 
becoming the first directly-elected president in 2004. The third section will describe the nature 
of the political relationship between SBY and JK. The fourth section will examine how SBY 
tried to consolidate his authority over economic policy by appointing the technocrats. The fifth 
section will analyze the political battle over economic policy between the technocrats and the 
oligarchs. The various challenges in implementing military reform faced by SBY will be 
discussed in the sixth section. Moreover, the institutional building process in the KPK and their 
initial high profile corruption case prosecution will be outlined in the sixth and the seventh 
sections respectively.  Section eight will discuss the growing resistance by the vested interest 
as the KPK accelerated its prosecution work. The last section will present the conclusion of the 
chapter.  
Three arguments are presented in this chapter. The first is that, despite the pocket of 
governance reforms pushed by SBY through technocrat/professional ministers, its impact 
remained limited, since they had to compete with powerful oligarchs. The second argument is 
that the success of the KPK‘s institutional building was crucial in establishing the KPK‘s 
capacity to prosecute high profile corruption cases. The third argument is that the KPK 
impressive start with its 100 percent conviction rate for high-profile corruption cases, in some 
ways, helped to establish SBY‘s anti-corruption credentials. 
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The Literature Debate and Assessment of SBY’s First Term Performance regarding 
Governance Reform and Anti-Corruption Initiatives 
 
Several scholars still have reservations about the viability of the democratic governance 
structure in Indonesia after the end of SBY‘s first term. Although Indonesia was equipped with 
a relatively legitimate democracy, Diamond warns that the conservative elite still existed, 
who was able to reverse democracy.
753
  The concern that the New Order elite might 
undermine the democratic reform was also espoused by Webber and Weiss.
754
 Davidson 
adopts a similar position, but emphasizes the lack of rule of law as the main cause.
755
 
Meanwhile, Hadiz believed that the New Order‘s oligarchy still prevailed and influential up 
until SBY‘s era.756 
In contrast, SBY received enthusiastic accolades from leading foreign leaders. Kevin 
Rudd praised Indonesia‘s transformation to democracy within the constitutional framework to 
become the third largest democracy,
757
 while Barack Obama appreciated how Indonesian 
‗democracy is sustained and fortified by its checks and balances.‘758 
Other observers focused on SBY‘s political flaws. According to Kingsbury, SBY 
preferred ‗cautious reform,‘ so corruption, remained problematic.759 Meanwhile, Fatah 
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highlights that SBY enthusiastically embraced the political accommodation that it imperiled 
substantive reform.
760
 
In SBY‘s first presidential term, there were some pockets of progress in governance 
reform, that were pushed by professional ministers in the economic as well as security sectors 
and other agencies, according to Ramage and Juwono.
761
 In my view, the number of 
governance reforms initiated by reform-minded ministers is laudable, although their impact 
was relatively limited, since the vested interest entrenched.   
 Many observers praised the KPK‘s emergence as a leading institution in combating 
corruption. The KPK with its effective prosecution by dissolving the high public officials 
‗sense of impunity‘, as Schutte observed.762 As it only handled less than 5 percent of cases, 
Butt warns that the KPK‘s impact on reducing corruption remained limited.763  In my view, the 
KPK‘s effectiveness in prosecuting high profile corruption cases involving high-ranking 
officials set a new standard regarding anti-corruption measures, which previously had been 
easily dismantled.  
 SBY‘s role vis a vis the KPK was also debated in the context of pushing anti-corruption 
initiatives.  Lanti applauds SBY‘s decision to establish Timtas Tipikor to complement the KPK 
in accelerating the prosecution of high-profile corruption cases. Meanwhile, Crouch praised 
SBY for freely permitting the KPK and Timtas Tipikor to investigate high-ranking officials‘ 
role in corruption cases.
764
  
                                            
760
 Eep Saefulah Fatah, ‗Kekuatan Presiden adalah Kelemahannya (The Strength of President is also his 
Weakness)‘, Kompas, 9 October 2007, p. 6.  
761
 Douglas Ramage, ‗Indonesia: Democracy First, Good Governance Later‘, Southeast Asian Affairs 2007 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), pp. 139 – 141; Vishnu Juwono, ‗Reformasi Birokrasi di Indonesia Setelah Era 
Presiden Suharto : Kemajuan, Kemunduran atau Stagnan? (Bureaucratic Reform in Post-Suharto  Era: Progress, 
Set-back or Stagnant?)‘  In Wijayanto and Ridwan Zachrie (eds.), Korupsi, Mengorupsi (Corruption, to corrupt) 
(Jakarta: Gramedia, 2006), pp. 210-213. 
762
 Sofie Arjon Schutte, ‗Against the Odds: Anti-Corruption Reform in Indonesia,‘ Public Administration and 
Development, Vo. 32, August 2012, p. 47.  
763
 Simon Butt, Corruption and Law in Indonesia: the Unraveling of Indonesia's anti-corruption framework 
through law and legal process (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 47.  
764
 Harold Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), p. 145.  
238 
 
Nevertheless, Aspinall and Mietzner warned that SBY did not wholeheartedly support 
the KPK‘s prosecution work by raising concern that the KPK was growing too strong.765 
Meanwhile, Djani argues that the initiative was ineffective and counterproductive because it 
failed to address the entrenched politico-business network,
766
  whereas Hardjapamekas and 
Subagjo are concerned that the KPK had become a victim of its own success, since vested 
interest started to resist the KPK.
767
 Despite some negative rhetoric, in my view, the overall 
trajectory of anti-corruption under SBY‘s watch remained on the right track, especially in 
facilitating the KPK‘s institutional building efforts. Thus, SBY‘s support was also a crucial in 
the KPK‘s effective prosecutions, and its survival of the counterattack by the vested interest.768 
 The existing literature is silent on the political competition between the 
technocrats/professionals that were advancing the governance reform, while facing resistance 
from oligarchs. Aspinall and Mietzner employed political pluralism in their analysis of SBY‘s 
first term, but did not mention the technocrats‘ role,769 while McLeod and Hill focused solely 
on Sri Mulyani‘s struggle against Bakrie.770 Also, the current literature ignores the interaction 
between SBY vis a vis the KPK, that helped to burnish both as corruption fighters. Schutte et 
al.‘s analysis is centered on the KPK‘s anti-corruption work, rather than their interaction with 
SBY.  Therefore, this chapter attempts to fill this literature gap on those two issues to analyze 
the political interaction, especially among, SBY, KPK, the technocrats and the oligarchs. 
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SBY’s Road to the Presidency  
SBY particularly came to the fore on the public stage during 1998-1999, when he was part of 
the ‗intellectual general‘ group that conceptualized the military‘s internal reform. SBY‘s 
military career ended when he was forced to accept a cabinet position under Gus Dur in 1999. 
Subsequently, he experienced several political trajectories. First, he was promoted by Gus Dur 
to Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs (MenkoPolsoskam) in 
2000.
771
 SBY‘s role in leading tumultuous political negotiation between Gus Dur and the 
opposition eventually led to his replacement due to his unwillingness to execute Gus Dur‘s 
decree to restore security order.
772
 SBY then was reappointed as MenkoPolsoskam in 
Megawati‘s 2001 cabinet, when he skillfully cultivated a public image as a competent, 
corruption-free high official. Meanwhile, SBY‘s wife helped him to establish the Democrat 
Party as his political vehicle.  
Megawati and her husband tried to stop SBY‘s political rise, but SBY used the 
mishandling of his resignation in March 2004 to portray himself as a victim of political 
isolation in the cabinet through the media.
773
 As de facto presidential candidate, SBY‘s 
popularity skyrocketed after his resignation to over 40 percent in June 2004.
774
 Trading on 
SBY‘s popularity, his Democratic Party attracted 7.5 percent of the votes, placing them in a 
respectable fifth place during the national legislative election in 2004. Eventually, in the 
second round 2004 presidential election, SBY, who managed to appoint Coordinating Minister 
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of Social Welfare JK as his vice president candidate, trounced Megawati-Muzadi by 60.7 
percent to 30.4 percent.
775
   
Duet or Duel? The Partnership between SBY and JK  
The partnership between SBY and JK in 2004-2009 appeared a perfect fit. SBY was known as 
an ‗intellectual‘ military leader with a strong nationalist background. Meanwhile, JK was 
known to be an accomplished businessman with strong Islamic credentials.
776
 
However, the tension between SBY and JK emerged after the cabinet formation in 
October 2015.
777
  The SBY-led political party coalition was forced to accommodate more 
coalition members and JK‘s trusted aid within the cabinet. JK successfully lobbied to appoint 
influential businessman Aburizal Bakrie to the important post of Coordinating Minister for 
Economic Affairs.
778
 Eventually, SBY accommodated 20 political parties, affiliating 35 cabinet 
personnel, which disappointed the mass media and civil society. 
Furthermore, the opposition coalition declared their intention to grab the majority of the 
leadership commission positions in the DPR to forestall any government-driven policy in 
November 2004.
779
 Therefore, the DPR and government were on the verge of deadlock.  
Then, SBY and JK decided that they had to take over the Golkar, the 2004 election 
winner.  During the Golkar chairmanship contest at the leadership meeting in November 2004, 
JK ran for chair, with the support of DPR speaker Agung Laksono, managing to beat the 
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Akbar-Wiranto pair by 323 votes to 156.
780
 JK-Agung was accused of making large cash 
payment (around US$6 million) to win the Golkar leadership contest.
781
  As JK winning the 
Golkar chairmanship, SBY-JK was able to form a new coalition with 80 percent of the seats in 
the DPR, leaving the PDIP as the opposition leader.  
 Notwithstanding their tension, SBY and JK worked very well in achieving the 
instrumental Aceh peace agreement in 2005. JK had personally invested in cultivating ties with 
Aceh rebel leaders (GAM) for a long time and, as Golkar Chair, JK was able to secure the 
GAM‘s leader‘s trust.782  
The devastating Tsunami in Aceh in December 2004, which killed more than 200,000 
people, changed the social and political dynamic in Aceh, which placed great pressure on both 
the Indonesian military and GAM militia, especially from the international community, to 
resume peace talks in January 2005. After five rounds of talks, the Indonesian government and 
GAM signed a landmark MOU peace agreement in August 2005 in Helsinki. However, SBY 
also played a crucial role in personally preventing the conservative military from sabotaging 
the Aceh peace agreement.  
Consolidating SBY’s Authority and Embarking on Economic and Governance Reform 
through the Appointment of Technocrats and Professionals  
 
SBY felt uneasy about JK‘s new political leverage as Golkar Chair, since within the DPR 
Golkar was holding more than double the number of seats of SBY‘s Democrat Party. There 
was also disagreement over economic policy, especially regarding the scale and speed of the 
fuel subsidy allocation to more productive sectors, i.e., health, education and the 
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infrastructure.
783
  Consequently, the economic team was deeply divided between SBY‘s 
cautious approach due to concern for its social as well as political implications and JK-Bakrie‘s 
drastic approach to cutting the fuel subsidy.
784
  Eventually, SBY approved the proposal to cut 
the significant subsidy to Rp.89.2 trillion and reduce the budget deficit to 0.9 percent, thus 
drastically increasing the fuel price by 87.5-185.71 percent in October 2005.
785
 
SBY also seemed wary of JK and Bakrie‘s perceived conflict-of-interest regarding their 
business dealings with a number of government-related projects, like toll roads being built by 
Bosawa and Bakrie Corporations. JK argued that his and Bakrie family had been in the 
infrastructure business for a long time.
786
  
Due to a lack of trust and the economic team‘s unimpressive performance, SBY wanted 
to strengthen his grip on economic policy, by appointing technocrats to crucial posts in 
December 2005. He managed to persuade highly-respected technocrat Boediono to become 
Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and promote Sri Mulyani Indrawati to Minister of 
Finance.
787
  These two moves left the technocrats in a strong position to formulate economic 
policy and embark on governance reform.  
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Sri Mulyani made her mark by dismissing two perceivably corrupt officials in the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) – the Directorate General (DG) of Tax and Customs –in April 
2006.
788
  The MOF, led by Sri Mulyani, began rolling out the civil service reform initiative in 
July 2007, including: business process; human resource management; performance indicator; 
and monitoring and evaluation.  It encompassed the improvement of 6,475 public service 
procedures under the MOF, with 35 top reform services priority within the MOF.  
The most drastic move by Sri Mulyani was taken at Tanjung Priok Port‘s custom office 
when she transferred all 1720 staff members and reassigned only 820 new ones that helped to 
increase its revenue in 2007.
789
 Sri Mulyani also invited the KPK to conduct a raid in May 
2008 which uncovered US$54,000 worth of bribes in which 69 officials were implicated.
790
  
SBY trusted another technocrat, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, to oversee the important 
reconstruction of Aceh province after the devastating Tsunami in December 2004, which cost 
around 200,900 lives. The BRR of Aceh Nias was established in April 2005, and its 
governance set-up was based on input from former Singaporean PM Lee Kuan Yew, with 
consulting firm McKinsey provided a pro-bono support for devising the reconstruction plan 
and Multi-Donor trust fund support of around US$655 million managed by the World Bank.
791
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  Kuntoro was responsible for US$7.2 billion in international assistance and US$2.1 
billion of the state budget (APBN).
792
 One of Kuntoro‘s innovative ideas was to build the 
BRR‘s capacity and preserve their integrity by hiring talented staff from both within and 
outside the bureaucracy through offering attractive compensation. As result, about 86 percent 
of the BRR's around 1000 core staff came from the private sector.
793
  
Another innovative idea was the establishment of the BRR‘s anti-corruption unit 
(SAK). The SAK managed to set up a complaints handling mechanism, which successfully 
processed all 1,350 irregularities complaints about BRR projects. The SAK also worked with 
the KPK when, in December 2007, they reported 153 potential corruption cases, 43 of which 
the KPK followed up.
794
 
Following its four-year operation, the BRR ended on a high note. It allocated US$6.7 
billion of the US$7.2 billion that was pledged by around 900 international donors by building, 
inter alia, 140,000 houses, 3,700 kilometers of roads, 1,700 schools and 1,100 medical 
facilities. The BRR‘s success was even applauded by former US president Bill Clinton, who 
used it as a model for the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission after the major earthquake in 
early 2010.
795
 
Another governance reform was led by Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu) Hassan 
Wirajuda. Wirajuda initially instituted a governance reform in 2002, which was expanded 
under SBY and comprised: the restructuring of the ministry; the restructuring of the overseas 
diplomatic mission; and improvements to the diplomatic profession.  This program aimed to 
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instill a strong corporate culture, aligned with increased transparency and accountability in the 
Kemlu.
796
  
Moreover, by applying open and competitive recruitment process, Kemlu was one of 
ministries that successfully recruited highly-skilled staff.  Furthermore, with a more 
competitive and fairer promotion system, it gave young, talented, driven diplomats the 
opportunity for fast-track promotion.
797
 Thus, rising star diplomats emerged, such as 
Presidential Spokesperson Dino Djalal and Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa.
798
  
Kemlu in the 2005 second phase of the reform managed to restructure its 4000 staff‘s 
ratio from 2:1 (Administrative: Diplomatic} to 1:2 (Diplomatic: Administrative] within almost 
five years by freezing administrative staff recruitment and recruiting the diplomatic staff.
799
 
Overall, Kemlu‘s governance reform constituted an overall effort to eradicate bureaucratic 
inefficiencies
800
and to change foreign policy by reflecting democracy and good governance 
values.
801
 
The inescapable conflict between SBY with the Technocrats vis a vis JK with Bakrie and 
Golkar  
 
The growing influence of the technocrats eventually led to a constant struggle with JK over 
economic policy. The first case was when Lapindo, the gas exploration company owned by 
Bakrie, caused a well blowout that led to a massive mudflow in Sidoarjo that affected the 
displacement of 65,000 residents.   
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 Bakrie planned to undertake some damage-control by selling off its Lapindo‘s share to 
Lyte Limited for US$2 per share in September 2006. However, the sale fell through because 
the MOF, led by Sri Mulyani, halted negotiations due to concern about Bakrie‘s responsibility 
for clearing the mud in Sidoarjo. In December 2006, SBY decided that Lapindo must 
immediately pay US$144.4 million to cover the mud problem plus US$277.8 million in 
compensation to the victims.
802
 
JK then entered into direct conflict with SBY, triggered by the establishment of the 
presidential delivery unit called UKP3R (Unit Kerja Presiden Pengelola Program Reformasi), 
with reform priority areas including: bureaucratic reform, reforming state 
enterprises, and improving law enforcement.
803
  
From the outset, the UKP3R was undermined by JK and the State Secretary. On its 
launch in October 2006, JK and his supporters in the Golkar party conducted a public attack on 
the UKP3R, arguing that this was an effort to weaken JK‘s influence on economic policy.804 
 SBY appointed Marsillam Simanjuntak, a former Attorney General, as head of 
UKP3R. However, Marsillam‘s background also fuelled resentment, because his involvement 
in initiating Gus Dur‘s decree to disband the Golkar in 2001.805 In November 2006, JK was 
demanding SBY to freeze UKP3R. Ultimately, the unit was unable to function effectively 
because of under-resourced and under-staffed.  
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 As Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, Boediono moved quickly by pushing 
for the new economic policy package in February 2006 that outlined 85 government plans to 
improve the investment climate including through tax and customs reforms.
806
 Nonetheless, 
Boediono and Sri Mulyani were criticized for being too conservative regarding fiscal policy 
and thus hindering government spending on the infrastructure.  
Therefore, a clash with Kalla was unavoidable. Boediono stated that the government 
would not provide a guarantee for investors from China regarding 10,000 MW power generator 
constructions that JK opposed. On Jakarta‘s monorail system, JK was furious when Boediono 
refused to request a government guarantee in return for Dubai Islamic Bank‘s US$500 million 
investment.
807
 
Nevertheless, the technocrats did not always win the policy battle. For instance, 
following JK‘s insistence, presidential regulation 103/2006 was issued to guarantee Jakarta‘s 
monorail project and afterward Sri Mulyani, issued the finance minister‘s regulation 
required.
808
  
Following the rejection of two external candidates, SBY proposed Boediono for 
Indonesia Central Bank (BI) governor, which was approved by the DPR in April 2008. 
Therefore, Sri Mulyani replaced Boediono as Acting Coordinating Minister for Economic 
Affairs, in June 2008. 
 With Boediono‘s appointment as BI Governor, Sri Mulyani lost an important ally since 
she was not given insufficient political authority over other economic ministers representing 
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the political parties.
809
 Eventually, a clash between Sri Mulyani and Aburizal Bakrie emerged 
in 2008, centered on the public trading of the Bakrie-owned Bumi Resource on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange (IDX).  After the MOF suspended trading in Bumi‘s shares, since the price 
plummeted, Bakrie‘s request to extend the suspension for finalizing the deal with the potential 
buyer was rejected by Sri Mulyani.
810
  
Due to pressure from JK and Bakrie, SBY asked Sri Mulyani to maintain Bumi‘s share 
suspension when IDX was about to resume trade in November 2008 out of concern that Bakrie 
would be unable to compensate the Sidoarjo mudflow victims. Displeased at SBY‘s 
intervention, Sri Mulyani tendered her resignation, which SBY rejected. 
811
 
During his first term, SBY used the technocrats as his proxy for containing the 
influence of the politically-connected oligarchs and gave international credibility to economic 
policy. Despite governance reform by the technocrats, like in the MOF, BRR and Kemlu, its 
impact remained limited.  In my view, the technocrats/professionals in SBY‘s era were 
politically vulnerable since they had to face fragmented political authority among the 
executives, legislative and judiciary.   
With only 10 percent of the seats held by the Democrat party in the DPR, SBY‘s 
authority to influence the ministers representing the political party was limited.  Therefore, 
SBY preferred consensus building and avoided intervening until the conflict spill-over into the 
public sphere, at the expense of the integrity of economic policy-making.  
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The consolidation of SBY’s Political Authority over the Indonesia Military  
On the military reform, SBY managed to tame the conservative military element from 
sabotaging the Aceh peace agreement in 2005, also consolidating his authority by appointing 
Air Force Admiral as Military chief in January 2006 to neutralize the army dominance. 
Subsequently, SBY managed to install his trusted aides in the army, especially Djoko Santoso, 
who later promoted to Military chief in December 2007.
812
 The marginalization of the 
military‘s political role was possible due to his high political capital as directly-elected 
president and his military experience.  
 In promoting the policy aspect of the military reform, SBY, inter alia, reappointed 
Juwono Sudarsono as Minister of Defense. Juwono was a former academic from the University 
of Indonesia, who had known SBY since he was a mid-ranking army officer.
813
  
However, Juwono‘s authority remained limited, especially with regard to the 
appointment of officials to strategic positions within his own ministry. The majority of 
appointments were still based on military assignments.  
 Despite these challenges, Juwono attempted to leverage his influence with the President 
by embarking on a military reform by integrating the military budgeting process and 
procurement of military equipment to avoid military expenditure spiraling out of control, since 
in the past the mark-up could reach up to 150 percent. Juwono claimed that he managed to 
reduce the number of vendors from 210 to 60.
814
 However, he was outmaneuvered by well-
connected military equipment agents, because they were able to pre-finance purchases. In 
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response, Juwono coordinated with Minister of Finance and BI Governor to discipline their 
subordinates and agreed upon a standardized market-based fee applied in North America and 
Europe.
815
 
 Another important task assigned by SBY to Juwono was the taking over of the military 
business as mandated by law that had to be completed by 2009.
816
 Juwono established an inter-
departmental verification team that identifies 23 foundations, 1,000 cooperatives and 
ownership of 55 companies with assets worth Rp3.2 trillion.
817
 
 There ensued reluctance from the military during the verification process as they had 
started selling their assets. In September 2005, one of the army‘s foundations, YKEP, sold its 
11 percent share in the private bank, Artha Graha, for Rp. 121 billion.
818
 Then, another army 
foundation sold its stake in Mandala Airline Company.
819
 
 As the process of transferring the military‘s business dragged on, the government 
established a new advisory group led by Former KPK Vice-Chair Erry Ryana Hardjapamekas 
in 2008 and utilized 70 auditors from the leading accounting school, STAN. With only 
authority to give recommendations, Erry‘s team was able to speed-up the formulation of three 
recommendations within six months that were submitted to SBY in October 2008.
820
   
SBY eventually issued Presidential Decision Decree 43/ 2009 on taking over military 
business that limited on businesses directly owned by the military, while restructuring the 
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foundation, cooperatives, and ownership of state assets.
821
 This categorization was criticized by 
Human Rights Watch because the government, according to the regulations, only had a limited 
role in restructuring the foundations or cooperatives.
822
  
Another Oversight Team was established, again with limited authority (to make an 
inventory of issues, provide recommendations and plan of action related to military 
business).
823
 The main weakness of the team was that there existed no clear timeframe for 
completing the assignment, and no managerial control over military businesses.
824
 
Moreover, Juwono tried to reorganizing the whole defense and security governance 
structure by introducing the national security bill, with some progressive proposals, like the 
clear delineation between the formula policy agency (the ministries) and the implementing 
agency (the military and police).
825
 
However, when the MOD started to reveal the draft bill to the public in 2007, it 
attracted strong opposition from civil society due to the possibility of restoring the domination 
of the military over security affairs, which was understandably opposed by the police.
826
 After 
arousing strong controversy, the national security bill was given to the national resilience 
institute (Lemhanas) for revision.
827
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The effort to for military reform clearly faced a significant internal hurdle, especially 
from the army, as Juwono admitted.
828
 One of the main reasons for the military‘s resistance 
stemmed from the underfunded budget that justified military officers seeking outside income 
and senior officers‘ opportunity for wealth accumulation.829 
The KPK’s emergence and institutional Building Process 
 The reformist Indonesian officials, civil society and DPR learned from the previous failure of 
the anti-corruption bodies due to their lack of independence, resources and political support. 
Therefore, law number 30/2002 established the KPK as an independent anti-corruption body 
with a stronger mandate, including coordinating and supervising the other anti-corruption 
related agencies, and monitoring the state apparatus.
830
 
The KPK‘s main focus was the prosecution of major corruption cases, including those 
involving law enforcement personnel or state officials. The KPK also handled cases that raised 
public concern and that caused state loss of at least Rp.1 billion.
831
 The KPK also had the 
authority to take over corruption cases from the police and AGO.
832
  
Moreover, all investigations undertaken by the KPK had to lead to prosecutions to 
avoid potential abuses where the discretion to halt prosecutions bred opportunities for 
blackmail, as in the past.
833
 
Compared to the standard criminal procedures, the deadline for preparing an 
investigation and prosecution was stricter. In conducting its investigations, the KPK could tap 
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communication lines and record conversations, issue travel bans, and suspend suspects‘ 
financial or other transactions.
834
 
The most progressive feature in the Law on the KPK was the anti-corruption (Tipikor) 
court that was established due to the notoriously corrupt court system and had a panel of five 
judges. The three ad-hoc court judge was usually independent legal experts, like academics, 
practitioners or retired judges, who contributed to the quality of the verdicts in the court.
835
  
Another difference between Indonesia‘s general court and the anti-corruption court was 
the fact that Law 30/2002 on the KPK created a strict deadline for the court to make decisions 
at a maximum of 240 days from the Tipikor Court until the Supreme Court (MA) appeal.
836
 
Initially, Civil Society and the mass media were skeptical of the KPK commissioners, 
who were dominated by law enforcement personnel.  Two of the five commissioners came 
from civil society: Amien Sunaryadi and Erry Ryana Hardjapamekas, while the others included 
retired two-star police officer Taufiequrachman Ruqi and senior AGO prosecutor Tumpak. The 
DPR‘s Commission II selected Ruqi as KPK Chair.837  
After almost one year‘s delay, the first KPK commissioners were finally inaugurated, in 
December 2003.
838
 The first program of the KPK was ‗to establish and later improve the 
institutional capacity of the KPK‘, according to Ruqi.839 After one year of institutional 
building, KPK was able to announce its first corruption case prosecution as their investigation 
capacity was developed.  
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Despite the lack of government support during the initial phase, they had an 
opportunity to adopt international best practice, developing their own human resources (HR) 
and IT system and employing a culture of integrity. The development of its own HR system 
was important, to avoid a hierarchical and non-transparent civil service system. After extensive 
lobbying, the exemption from civil service rule was obtained in December 2005.
840
  
Thus, the KPK adopted a simplified salary system based on performance measurement 
indicators,
841
 and was able to recruit professionals from private sector. For example, the KPK 
managed to recruit 7 of 10 new directors and deputies from multinational companies.
842
 
The KPK utilized IT to monitor its staff in investigating and prosecuting the cases and 
avoid lenient sentences in the corruptors‘ indictment and catch corruption suspects when 
receiving bribes.
843
 Crucially, the KPK managed to get sufficient budget from the SBY 
government of more than Rp.19 billion in 2004. By the end of 2009, the KPK increased their 
budget by more than 10 times, to around Rp.315 billion.
844
  
The first term KPK commissioners managed to build the KPK‘s organizational capacity 
by utilizing foreign donors‘ support and also to obtain budgetary support from SBY‘s 
government as well as personnel support from the police and AGO. More importantly, in my 
view, they managed to convince SBY that KPK would be a reliable partner in his anti-
corruption agenda. 
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Catching ‘Big Fish’: SBY, KPK and their Earlier Prosecution Work   
As KPK was not fully functioning yet, SBY established Timtas Tipikor in 2005 that had 48 
members, comprising AGO prosecutors, police investigators and BPKP auditors. Timtas 
Tipikor was led by Deputy Attorney General Hendarman Supandji, who was given a two-year 
to accelerate the investigation and prosecution of large-scale corruption cases in State 
institutions and State-owned enterprises.
845
  
 Timtas Tipikor performed admirably by prosecuting high-profile cases, like that of 
former Minister for Religious Affairs Said Agil Munawar, who in Februar y 2006 
was found guilty of diverting US$71 million from the Hajj fund and was fined 
US$250,000, with five years‘ imprisonment. 846 Another case involved US$ 31 
billion state loss in the State-owned Insurance Company Jamsostek due to 
violations of a medium-term notes purchasing fund. Jamsostek‘s CEO Achmad 
Junaedi was found guilty in June 2006 and was imprisoned for 8 years  and told to 
return US$6.5 million to the state.
847
  
 Following his good performance in leading Timtas Tipikor, Supandji was promoted to 
Attorney General in May 2007. Consequently, Timtas Tipikor was officially dissolved in 2007. 
During its two years of operation, it had managed to process 72 cases, with 7 convictions, and 
claimed to have recovered a state loss of around Rp. 3.95 trillion.
848
 
 When SBY appointed Sutanto as Chief of Indonesia Police (Kapolri) in July 2005, 
there was a high hope. Sutanto, as Chief of Regional Police (Kapolda) in North Sumatra and 
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East Java in early 2000, was known for his tough stance on gambling through a number of big 
raids. He also led the police confiscation of around 34 luxury cars worth Rp.billions as 
Kapolda of East Java.
849
 
 As Kapolri, Sutanto moved quickly to deal with corruption in the internal police by 
appointing his trusted aides to key positions, such as Jusuf Manggrabani to Head of the Internal 
Division.
850
 The police‘s internal investigation was into the conviction of several generals who 
were implicated while handling a case of fictious letters of credit issued by BNI, which caused 
a Rp. 1.7 trillion state loss. Thus, the three star general and former the police head of detectives 
Suyitno Landung was sentenced in October 2006 to 18 months in jail for accepting a car worth 
Rp.247 million.
851
 This was the first case in the post-Suharto era in which an active three star 
ranking police general was convicted of corruption.  
Then, Head of PPATK Yunus Hussein reported to Sutanto alleged ‗fat bank 
accounts‘ owned by 15 high ranking police officers containing a suspicious money 
transaction. One police officer had a  suspicious money transaction of Rp.800 
billion.
852
 The internal resistance was too high and Sutanto did not have sufficient 
allies to push this case through. Consequently, up until Sutanto retired in 2008, 
there was no progress in resolving the ‗fat bank account‘ case.  
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Therefore, Sutanto‘s three-year stint in addressing big corruption cases was 
not optimal, despite his better record compared to his predecessor in the post -
Suharto era.
853
  
Meanwhile, as the institutional building about to be completed, the KPK 
was pressured to produce fast results in high-profile corruption cases. The KPK‘s 
first corruption case was that of Aceh governor Abdullah Puteh on the procurement of a type 
M-2 PLC Rostov helicopter from Russia.  The case was reported by Aceh anti-corruption NGO 
Samak to the AGO in April 2003, that was accusing him of adding around a $1.2 million mark-
up to the helicopter purchase, and the KPK‘s investigation uncovered a potential state loss of 
around Rp.4 billion.
854
  
The KPK faced tremendous challenges related to processing the Puteh case, firstly 
when Coordinating Minister for Security Hari Sabarno wrote to KPK in June 2004 to stop 
Puteh investigation as he needed to focus on his job of restoring Aceh security that was since 
under Martial Law.
855
  
The next challenge was that the KPK was unable to prosecute Puteh after completing 
its investigation because Megawati was only able to inaugurate the anti-corruption judges in 
October 2004. Another problem was that the anti-corruption judges did not have the facilities 
to hear corruption cases, but the KPK continued to prosecute Puteh using the Central Jakarta 
court.
856
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The KPK‘s prosecutor successfully showed that Puteh had violated a number of laws 
and regulations. Puteh was finally found guilty of corruption for using US$2.17 million from 
the special assistance allocation fund (DAK) to buy helicopters, in violation of the MOF 
decree, and also for violating the procurement regulation by awarding contracts without any 
competitive bidding in June 2002.
857
 When Puteh appealed, the MA raised the amount that 
Puteh had to repay to cover state losses of around $650,000, while reaffirming the 10 year 
prison sentence with a fine of US$50,000
858
that set a new precedent in which the active 
governor could be convicted of corruption.
859
  
The second case, that was used to build public support, was that of KPU commissioner 
Mulyana W. Kusumah, who was caught trying to bribe Khariansyah, a BPK auditor, in April 
2005 to dismiss its audit findings regarding the misprocurement of ballot boxes during the 
2004 national election.  Mulyana was caught red-handed giving Khariansyah US$15,000 via a 
camera on one of Khariansyah‘s shirt buttons. The Central Jakarta District Court found 
Mulyana guilty of corruption and sentenced him to 3 years in prison and a fine of US$5,000.
860
  
Mulyana‘s case created a ripple effect that led to prosecution of other KPU 
commissioners, including KPU Chair Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin. During the investigation of 
Mulyana, the KPK received a statement from KPU Head of Finance Hamdani Amin that the 
Nazaruddin was involved in the mobilization of around US$2.3 million from the KPU‘s vendor 
for off-budget funds.
861
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When the KPK investigated Nazaruddin, he admitted that he had received a total of 
around US$125,000 for off-budget funds, and was then found guilty of corruption. On 
appealing to the MA, he was sentenced to 6 years in prison, fined US$30,000, and ordered to 
repay US$106,800 to the state.
862
  
The successful prosecution of corruption cases in Aceh and the KPU strengthened the 
public support for the KPK. By the end of its first term in 2007, the KPK had brought other 
cases against former Minister of Seas and Fisheries Rokhmin Dahuri, former Head of the 
Investment Coordinating Agency Theo F. Toemion, and a number of regional leaders.
863
 
The KPK’s Accelerated Prosecutions and the Initial Backlash from the AGO and Police  
As the first term commissioners of the KPK‘s stint ended in 2007, there was concern among 
civil society regarding their potential replacement.  Firstly, DPR Commission III voted out 
incumbent KPK‘s Vice Chairman Amien Sunaryadi, who had been instrumental in setting up a 
sophisticated IT system to support the KPK‘s effective investigation work. Eventually, the only 
new commissioner who represented civil society was Chandra Hamzah. Three others were 
senior prosecutors from the AGO Antasari Azhar, senior police officer Bibit Samad Rianto, 
senior BPKP auditor Haryono Umar and KPK director Mochammad Jasin.  
The DPR, based on Golkar and PDI-P‘s preference, chose the most controversial 
candidate Antasari as KPK Chair.
864
  Antasari was accused by an anti-corruption NGO of 
stalling the prosecution of Suharto and his youngest son, Tommy, for the murder of an MA 
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judge.
865
 Therefore, there was a low expectation from the public against the KPK. However, it 
appeared that Antasari wanted to prove the skeptics wrong by stepping up the KPK‘s 
prosecution including law enforcement officials.    
 Several cases catapulted Antasari onto the national scene as an anti-corruption fighter 
from January 2008 when the KPK declared former Chief of Police Rusdihardjo a suspect.  
Rusdihardjo allegedly received a total of up to Rp.2.2 billion during his stint as Ambassador to 
Malaysia related to immigration fee.
866
 
Furthermore, the KPK declared that BI Governor Burhanuddin Abdullah as a suspect in 
February 2008 of allegedly misappropriating Rp.100 billion from BI‘s Indonesian Banking 
Development Foundation (YPPI) Funds.
867
 Then, one month later, the KPK managed to detain 
AGO senior prosecutor Urip Gunawan for receiving US$660,000 related to the case of BI‘s 
liquidity support funds (BLBI).
868
  
Antasari further burnished his anti-corruption fighter credentials as the KPK named BI 
Deputy Governor Aulia Pohan - SBY‘s in- law – and other BI officials as suspects in October 
2008 in the YPPI case.
869
  The prosecution of Burhanuddin, Pohan, Urip and others signaled 
that the KPK under Antasari was more independent of the government and more willing in 
confronting the corruption at the highest level.  
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 In early 2009, the KPK led by Antasari was performed impressively regarding its 
prosecution and managed to recover $36.5 million in State assets from corruption , 
which were ten times greater than in the previous year. Then, the KPK‘s 
investigation work increased significantly to 43 cases that they prosecuted in 
2008.
870
  
However, Antasari‘s misconduct as KPK Chairman haunted him when he was declared 
a suspect by the police in May 2009 of masterminding the murder of businessmen 
Nasaruddin Zulkarnaen that led to Antasari suspension.
871
 Further investigation of 
revealed that many codes of ethics had been violated by Antasari.
872
 
This was evident when Antasari later testified to the police that he had met fugitive and 
criminal suspect Anggoro Widjaja to clarify an alleged Rp.6 billion bribe to KPK staff. 
Subsequently, the KPK reported Antasari to the police for KPK code of conduct violation in 
meeting and fabricating a travel ban cancellation letter for Anggoro.
873
  
Furthermore, two KPK commissioners, Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Riyanto, 
were named as suspected of abusing the power to issue a travel ban on two fugitive corruption 
suspects – M. Anggoro Widjojo and Joko S. Tjandra.874 This ultimately crippled the KPK since 
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they were the only two remaining commissioners.
875
 In an attempt to reverse the KPK‘s 
deteriorating fortunes, SBY issued a government regulation in 2009 to appoint KPK 
commissioners directly.
876
 This triggered a strong protest by civil society, as it was seen as 
SBY‘s interference in the KPK.877 
In response, SBY established a ‗Team 5,‘ comprised of, inter alia, Coordinating 
Minister for Security Widodo A.S. and Member of the Presidential Advisory Board Adnan 
Buyung Nasution. In short time, the team of five managed to select three KPK interim 
commissioners with its temporary Chair, former KPK Vice-Chair Tumpak Hatorangan - 
inaugurated by SBY in October 2009.
878
  
The police‘s prosecution of Bibit and Chandra, that almost paralyzed the KPK, marked 
the start of the ongoing struggle between the two institutions that reached its culmination 
around the beginning of SBY‘s second term.  
In sum, under the first term of SBY‘s presidency, there was some progress in terms of 
governance reform that was pushed by the technocrats/ professional ministers like the Minister 
of Finance Sri Mulyani and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirajuda, but its impact was 
relatively limited. Therefore, as a link to the first argument of this thesis, under SBY‘s 
presidency, there was not quite a comprehensive governance reform that would improve 
significantly the quality of democracy.   
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Nonetheless, as it links to the third argument of this thesis, the emergence of KPK in 
the first term of SBY‘s presidency, in my view, should be acknowledged as an important 
milestone in the anti-corruption effort.  As outlined in the previous section of this chapter, the 
KPK prosecution of high state officials constituted an unprecedented legacy, since it reduced 
their sense of impunity that would later introduce an important momentum in the more 
aggressive punitive approach by the KPK in SBY‘s second term.  
Conclusion  
During his reelection campaign, SBY‘s popularity reached its height based on the Indonesia 
Survey Institute‘s (LSI) public poll in July 2009, with 85 percent satisfied with his 
performance.
879
 Moreover, the level of public support was 84 percent for the government‘s 
corruption eradication effort, albeit this dropped to 70% when the KPK/police conflict 
emerged. Even regarding the rule of law, where reform is difficult to capitalize, the public 
support remained relatively positive, reaching almost 60 percent in July 2009.
880
 Therefore, 
public support for SBY‘s first term performance, especially regarding anti-corruption, was 
relatively positive.  
Despite the persistence of the New Order era‘s oligarchs during the SBY pres idency, 
in my opinion, by employing Dahl‘s political pluralism framework, the competition with the 
Indonesian reformers remained relatively equal in the context of governance reform. The 
technocrats/professional ministers, with civil society support, in some cases, were able to 
contain the Oligarchs‘ influence. These technocrats/ professionals employed their political 
resources like knowledge, prestige, information and education, while the Oligarchs possessed 
political resources mostly in the form of money, wealth and political organization. But, as the 
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only reliable political support that the technocrats/professionals attained came from SBY, 
their political influence was vulnerable.   
In terms of democratic consolidation, SBY managed to preserve the democratic 
political structure that was achieved during the constitutional amendment under the post-
Suharto presidency. Despite some progress of governance reform in respective ministry led 
by the technocrats, in my view, overall, SBY had not achieved democratic consolidation as 
Diamond, Linz and Stepan, Croissant and Bunte as well as Merkel envision, as mentioned in 
the introduction chapter due to the persistent influence of the oligarchs who continued to 
forestall democratic progress.  
 In applying Kingdon‘s analytical framework in the milieu of governance reform and 
anti-corruption measures, the KPKwas a policy entrepreneur as its emergence was an 
important milestone in Indonesia‘s anti-corruption campaign history by changing the sense of 
impunity from prosecution among high-level state officials. It would be difficult to 
comprehend how the KPK would have emerged on their own, considering the failure of 
similar anti-corruption bodies due to the lack of political support. Therefore, SBY also 
played a crucial role as a policy entrepreneur as his support for institutional building was a 
key factor in developing the KPK‘s investigation and prosecution capacity.  Consequently, 
the SBY/KPK alliance produced an unexpected outcome as the start of the most progressive 
and sustained anti-corruption effort in Indonesia since independence by maneuvering three 
important streams of problems, policy and political momentum. In this case, SBY and KPK 
were able to capitalize on the political momentum at a time when people‘s demand for the 
addressing of corruption among its political leaders reached its zenith.  
In identifying the political leadership traits during 2004- 2009 utilizing Burns‘ 
political leadership framework in the context of governance reform and anti-corruption 
measures, in my view, the KPK can be categorized as providing transformational leadership 
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by starting to change the sense of impunity among the Indonesian political elite, as 
mentioned above. Meanwhile, SBY‘s role in helping the crucial institutional building of the 
KPK and the technocrats/professional ministers in embarking on their own governance 
reform, in my view, should be credited as semi-transformational leadership. While they were 
unable to bring about transformational change, it should be admitted that there was progress 
in terms of governance reform under their leadership. 
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Chapter 8: High Expectations, but under Delivery? Assessing One Decade of 
Yudhoyono’s Presidency with regard to Governance Reform and the Anti-
Corruption Initiative  
 
 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was reelected as president by an overwhelming majority, 
trouncing his rivals, former President Megawati Sukarnoputri and his Vice President Jusuf 
Kalla (JK) in 2009.  His Democratic Party was winning the national legislative election in 
2009, with more than 20 percent of the vote, and also secured the largest parliamentary seats. 
Therefore, there were high hopes that SBY could push for more ambitious governance reform 
and anti-corruption measures in his second term. Instead SBY was occupied with numerous 
corruption cases, especially the constant conflict between the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) and the police. Another rivalry that SBY had to manage was between 
technocrats like Boediono and Sri Mulyani, in one camp, and the politically powerful 
Oligarchs led by the Aburizal Bakrie, Chair of the second largest party in parliament – Golkar.  
Thus, SBY was unable to meet the high expectations during the 2009 presidential campaign to 
bring about more substantive governance reform. Meanwhile, the KPK was taking over the 
anti-corruption agenda, especially in prosecuting ministers and the leaders of the ruling 
Democratic Party. Nonetheless, overall, SBY left a crucial legacy in the context of governance 
reform and anti-corruption, albeit its impact was limited.  
The narrative of this chapter is divided into seven sections. The first will discuss the 
debates on the overall legacy of SBY in the context of governance reform and the anti-
corruption initiative. The second section will depict how SBY managed to win his reelection 
presidential campaign and the legislative campaign. The third section will discuss the initial 
conflict between the KPK and the police during SBY‘s second term and how, ultimately, SBY 
managed to intervene. The fourth section will describe the rivalry between the 
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technocrats/professional ministers who tried to push for governance reform but faced resistance 
from powerful vested interests. The fifth section will describe how, ultimately, the KPK was 
taking over the anti-corruption agenda from SBY, while the sixth section will outline how the 
MA‘s Chambers of Crime‘s Chair Artidjo Alkotsar helped to create a deterrent against high 
profile corruption and SBY‘s failure to restore public trust in his government due to being 
embroiled in a number of corruption cases involving his ministers. The last section provides 
the conclusion to this chapter. 
Four arguments will be outlined in this chapter.  First, the survival of the democratic 
governance structure for SBY‘s one decade should not be underappreciated, since Indonesia‘s 
political history was marked by almost four decades of authoritarian rule. Second, while the 
appointment of technocrats/professional ministers was crucial in pushing for governance 
reform, their influence become more limited in the second term, as the oligarchs were become 
more powerful. The third argument was that SBY gave some political space to the KPK to 
undertake effective high profile corruption prosecutions. SBY established the important 
precedent that even the President‘s inner circle did not enjoy immunity. Fourth, there was an 
alliance between SBY and the KPK for around one decade as the most sustained and 
aggressive anti-corruption drive in Indonesia to date compared with the past failure similar 
initiatives. Nonetheless, the initiatives were unable fundamentally to change the political, 
economic and social structures that form the patronage.  
SBY’s Overall Legacy: the Contentious Debate 
During his decade in power (2004-2014), SBY managed to raise Indonesia‘s profile on the 
international stage as US President Barack Obama credited SBY with successfully 
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transforming Indonesia into a full-blown democracy.
881
 Furthermore, the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) praised Indonesia‘s ‗golden years‘ period under SBY‘s leadership and 
acknowledged his success in maintaining democracy.
882
 Then, the Singaporean government 
awarded SBY the First Order of Temasek (First Class) that recognized a number of his 
achievements: inter alia, consolidating democracy and reforming Indonesia‘s economy.883
 Despite appreciation by the international community, Indonesian political observers, 
international academics and the mass media tended to be highly critical of SBY‘s decade in 
power. Most observers felt that the political stability achieved by SBY also delivered 
stagnation. According to Kimura, the corruption controversies and scandals surrounding the 
SBY administration eroded his credibility as a reformer.
884
 Moreover, McRae outlines how, 
under SBY, the governance reform was stagnant because of the least reformist legislative 
products since 2005 and the many attempts by the legislative to weaken the KPK.
885
 
Furthermore, Sidel views SBY as a military democratic transitional figure who – compared to 
his peers, PM Prem Tinsulanonda in Thailand and President Fidel Ramos in the Philippines – 
was successful in defending the status quo and less enthusiastic about enacting structural 
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reform.
886
 Meanwhile, Sherlock observes that SBY‘s legacy was a series of absences; thus, 
there were no obvious disasters but also no tremendous achievements either.
887
 
 The cause of the perceived stagnation under SBY‘s leadership style is also subject to 
academic debate. Fealy argues that his flawed personality contributed to his ineffective 
presidency.
888
 Meanwhile, Fatah observes that SBY applied adaptive leadership that 
emphasized a populist policy at the expense of progressive reform.
889
 According to Harris, 
SBY made blunders in forging a coalition with the Golkar‘s Bakrie that undermined his 
government‘s effectiveness.890 
 However, the other leading observers argue that the problem with the stagnation was 
due to Indonesia‘s political structure. Representing the Oligarchy theorists, Winters argues that 
SBY, as a ‗hidden‘ oligarch, was part of the key arbiters in Indonesia‘s political life, especially 
due to their extensive grip on the political party that limits any attempt at comprehensive 
governance reform.
891
 Meanwhile, other oligarchy theorist proponents Hadiz and Robison see 
that the oligarchy managed to consolidate its power by building a new political alliance under 
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the new democratic governance structure in the post-Suharto era, where it limits the reformist 
in pushing reform.
892
  
There was no significant breakthrough in the political governance reform by SBY. 
However, in my opinion, SBY‘s legacy in empowering and not obstructing the reformist 
institutions, like the KPK and MK, should not be underestimated, considering the failure of 
similar institutions in the past.  Also, by appointing reformist technocrats to crucial positions 
like Ministry of Finance or establishing a special unit like the UKP4, some commendable 
governance reform took place in SBY‘s era.  
SBY’s Reelection 
Approaching the 2009 national election, the relationship between SBY and JK clearly became 
more uneasy. SBY‘s Democrat Party supporters were discontent since JK became the Golkar 
Chair, and often forced SBY to compromise on certain policy. Meanwhile, the Golkar felt that 
SBY was insufficiently accommodating Golkar as the largest party in the cabinet.  Thus, the 
separation became imminent.
893
  
 SBY was also growing more confident as, approaching the DPR election, the polls 
showed that the Democrat Party was taking the lead from the opposition party at the end of 
2008, where the Democrats led by 18 percent to the Golkar‘s 17 percent.894 
 One of the main causes of this major turnaround in the Democrat Party‘s popularity 
was the government policy of introducing a massive social assistance program, including direct 
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cash transfers (BLT) targeted at the poor that was reallocated from the fuel subsidy. According 
to the World Bank, between 2005 and 2006, the government spent around US$2.3 billion on 
BLT for 12 million households, and in 2008-2009, around US$1.7 billion on BLT to 9 million 
households.
895
   
As the BLT program took effect, it translated into public satisfaction with the 
government‘s economic policy. By June 2009, 52 percent of the public felt that the economy 
was better.
896
  SBY‘s job approval then skyrocketed to its peak of 79 percent in June 2009.897  
It is also important to note SBY‘s public approval rating for tackling corruption. SBY 
was seen as supportive of the KPK‘s anti-corruption work by prosecuting high officials. The 
watershed came when the KPK named as a suspect and detained SBY‘s in-law Aulia Pohan 
who was involved in corruption case as the Deputy Governor of BI in November 2008.  
Therefore, SBY‘s stance of not protecting his in-law Aulia Pohan helped to burnish his 
anti-corruption credentials. As the polls show, the public approval rating of the government for 
handling the anti-corruption effort was significantly increasing to its peak of 80 percent in June 
2009.
898
 SBY‘s anti-corruption credential was still crucial especially in the presidential 
campaign, since integrity at 40 percent was the most important characteristic for the 
presidential candidate in 2009.
899
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Despite Mietzner and Honna‘s argument that SBY‘s successful reelection bid in 2009, 
mainly due to the BLT program,
900
 in my opinion, since the Democrat Party also depended on 
SBY‘s personal appeal, his anti-corruption credential also played an important role.  
Accordingly, the Democrat Party successfully won the parliamentary election in 2009 
with the majority of the votes (20.9 percent) and managed to beat the more established parties, 
the Golkar (14.5 percent) and the PDIP (14 percent). Then, the Democrat Party also managed 
to secure the parliamentary majority by acquiring 148 seats and followed by the Golkar with 
108 seats.
901
 
After the election, SBY signaled his intention to forge a political coalition on his own 
terms. In April 2009, Golkar felt embarrassed as SBY requested more than one candidate for 
Vice President – a clear rebuke of JK.902 Consequently, JK was pushed to run as the 
presidential candidate from the Golkar.
903
 
Ultimately, SBY choose Boediono, a respected technocrat who was Governor of BI, as 
his vice president. SBY‘s decision was based on an internal survey, which showed that 
Boediono had the credibility, acceptance and integrity.
904
 Then, Jusuf Kalla‘s Golkar managed 
to choose former Chief of Military Wiranto as the vice presidential candidate. For the PDI-P 
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party‘s presidential candidate, Megawati managed to pick former Chief of the KOSTRAD 
Prabowo Subianto as her running mate. 
Ultimately, SBY cruised to win his second term with a convincing win over Megawati 
and Kalla in the Presidential election of July 2014 by 60.8 percent compared to 26.79 percent 
and 12.41 percent.
905
 Therefore, SBY became the first president to be directly reelected.  
However, as SBY unveiled his cabinet in October 2009, there was much criticism that 
it reflected political accommodation more than the professional qualifications. Despite the 
criticism, there were still technocrats in important positions; Sri Mulyani was kept as Minister 
of Finance and Marie Pangestu as Minister of Trade, but the technocrats‘ influence was less 
dominant than in the first term. 
906
  
The New Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Hatta Radjasa became the most 
influential person in the new cabinet. The surprising choice of Hatta as Coordinating Minister 
of Economic Affairs also signaled that the economic policy was shifting since he had more 
political clout in the DPR and had close relations with SBY.
907
  
SBY on the Defensive during his Early Second Term  
The conflict between the KPK and the Police had begun to spiral out of control as SBY started 
his second term. The detainment of two KPK non-active commissioners, Chandra Hamzah and 
Bibit Samad Rianto, in October 2009, by the police as a suspect, created a strong public outcry. 
It was suspected that their detainment was triggered when a recorded conversation between a 
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businessman, Anggoro, a fugitive who was suspected of corruption, and his brother, Anggodo 
and a high-ranking AGO and police officers in July 2009 to frame KPK commissioners – 
Chandra and Bibit – for receiving bribes was leaked to the press.908  
 The detainment of Chandra and Bibit sparked a huge protest and the efforts of civil 
society as well as the mass media and managed to mobilize public support through 
demonstrations.
909
 In response to the public protest in November 2009, SBY established an ad-
hoc team of eight academics and legal experts, to investigate the alleged framing of Chandra 
and Bibit, led by Presidential Advisory Board (Wantimpres) member Adnan Buyung Nasution, 
and its Secretary was Presidential Special Staff Denny Indriyana.
910
 Team 8 was given only 
two weeks to conduct their investigation and produce a recommendation. 
 When the MK played the recording of Anggodo‘s cell phone conversation during the 
Chandra-Bibit trial at the judicial review of the KPK law on 3 November 2009, it was 
consistent with the transcript that had been leaked earlier.
911
  
 With the recorded conversation between Anggodo, AGO and Police high official was 
revealed, public pressure was increasing to release Chandra and Bibit. Then, the team 8 was 
upset since the head of Police failed to fulfill his promise to dismiss Susno.
912
 Later, Chief 
Detective of Police Susno filed for temporary suspension as Deputy Attorney General Abdul 
Ritonga tendered his resignation.
913
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 In November 2015, Team 8 recommended to SBY, inter alia, to halt the investigation 
by the police and AGO into Chandra-Bibit; punish the officials in the police, the AGO and 
Witness Protection Agency (LPSK) responsible for the flawed legal process; and eradicate case 
brokers in the judiciary.
914
 
 However, SBY did not fully follow Team 8‘s recommendations.915 To add to the 
confusion, Deputy Attorney General for Special Crime Marwan Effendi announced that he 
would issue a letter of order to stop the prosecution (SKPP) of the Chandra- Bibit case for 
‗sociological and legal reasons.‘  The reasoning outlined by the AGO was unknown in the 
criminal law (KUHAP).
916
 Nevertheless, SBY used the SKPP as a basis for reinstating 
Chandra-Bibit as KPK commissioners in December 2009.
917
 
After a legal battle that lasted over a year, the Attorney General Basrief Arief finally 
signed all of the documents needed to invoke the legal principle of deponeering, which allowed 
the government officially to drop the case against Bibit and Chandra.
918
 
The Technocrats vs. the Golkar and the Political Parties: The Second Round  
Following SBY‘s reelection in July 2009, the incumbent Chair of Golkar Jusuf Kalla‘s political 
capital dwindled. With only 12 percent votes at the presidential election, JK was forced to step 
down as Golkar chair.  
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 During the Golkar leadership conference in early October 2009, the Coordinating 
Minister of Social Welfare Aburizal Bakrie was able to win the chairmanship by beating fellow 
businessmen Surya Paloh, who was supported by JK, by 297 votes to 239.
919
 Bakrie‘s winning 
of the Golkar chair gave SBY a political advantage, as Golkar strengthened support from the 
parliament. Instead of becoming minister, Bakrie chose to work full-time as Golkar chair. 
 With his new role, Bakrie enjoyed a relative degree of independence from SBY, 
sometime choosing to oppose the government. Bakrie and the Golkar used this new leverage to 
expose the bailout of a small private bank, Century, by BI amidst the global financial crisis of 
November 2008, to marginalize his archrivals –BI Governor Boediono and Minister of Finance 
Sri Mulyani Indrawati. 
 The Century Bank saga began when the Financial Sector Stability Committee (KSSK), 
chaired by Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani Indrawati, with members including Governor of BI 
Boediono, decided that the defunct Century Bank needed to be bailed out through the Deposit 
Insurance Agency (LPS) as it posed a systematic risk to the financial system in November 
2008. The problem later emerged when the short-term fund injection for Century Bank 
increased significantly, from Rp.132 billion to Rp.6.7 trillion.
920
  
 In response to the DPR‘s request, the BPK in November 2009 completed the audit 
report on Century Bank, concluding that BI officials had intentionally provided inaccurate data 
to KKSK and BI so the bailout decision was unjustified and also questioned the legality of the 
decision.
921
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 The showdown between the technocrats and the Golkar dragged on, with various 
probes by parliament which targeted Sri Mulyani and Boediono‘s role in the decision to bailout 
Century Bank. SBY, during a public speech in early March 2009, defended Sri Mulyani and 
Boediono.
922
   
 However, the Indonesian parliament, led by the Golkar and opposition PDIP party cast 
votes of no confidence in the government policy of bailing out Century, with 325 votes to 212 
votes. Parliament also recommended to the law enforcement agencies to take legal action 
against the officials responsible for the Century case – including Sri Mulyani and Boediono.923 
Although there was no legal ramification of the DPR votes, the continuing scrutiny by 
the DPR and the media of Sri Mulyani and Boediono relating to the Century Bank case 
undermined their public image and effectiveness in performing their task. 
  Eventually, Sri Mulyani was ‗sacrificed,‘ as she accepted an offer from the World 
Bank to become Managing Director in May 2010.
924
  Before leaving for Washington, D.C., Sri 
Mulyani chidingly implied that there had been a ‗political marriage‘ between Bakrie and SBY 
that cost her Finance Minister position.
925
 Meanwhile, Boediono was subjected to various 
parliamentary and the law enforcement agencies‘ inquiries and negative publicity about his 
role in the Century Bank case.  
 In his second term, SBY got off to a rocky start. As evident in the Century Bank cases, 
Bakrie and the Golkar had managed to neutralize the reform efforts of the technocrats by 
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making deals with SBY.
926
 The Chandra-Bibit and Century cases had dented SBY and 
Boediono‘s popularity, where SBY‘s public satisfaction reached a record low of 65 percent in 
March 2010 while Boediono‘s fell to 45 percent in March 2010.927 
 Boediono had another ally in the cabinet to push for governance reform – Head of the 
UKP4 Kuntoro Mangkusubroto.
928
 Kuntoro‘s ability to choose his cabinet post stemmed 
especially from his internationally praised reconstruction work in Aceh through the BRR in 
2005-2008.    
The UKP4 was tasked with helping the President to monitor and supervise the 
development program.
929
  The priority program to be executed by the UKP4 including: 
increasing the effectiveness as well as accelerating the bureaucratic reform and public services 
improvement; and enhancing the performance of the state-owned enterprises.
930
  
 Another crucial task that SBY gave to the UKP4 was to evaluate the performance of 
ministers. This created tension between the UKP4 and the political parties that supported their 
underperforming ministers. For instance in July 2010, Kuntoro gave a quarter of the 45 
ministers a ‗red mark‘ for failing to implement a priority program in the first half year.931  
                                            
926
 From US Ambassador to Indonesia Cameron Hume to the Secretary of State, the Department of Treasury, 
National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and the US Representative 
in ASEAN, ‗Internal Power Struggles Slows Progress on Reform, Indonesia – U.S. Partnership‘, cable 
(confidential), 25 February 2010, Wikileaks, retrieved on 2 June 2015 from 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10JAKARTA256_a.html  
927
 Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), Akuntabilitas Politik: Evaluasi Publik atas Pemerintahan SBY – Boediono 
(Political Accountability: Public Evaluation on SBY – Boediono government), 2 September 2010, Press Release 
material, Slides 37. 
928
 ‗Akhir Cerita Tim Jambu (The end of Story for Guava Team)‘, Tempo, Ibid. 
929
 Article 3 (1), President Regulation number 54/ 2009 on Presidential Working Unit for Supervision and 
Management of Development (UKP4).  
930
 Article 3 (2), Ibid.  
931
 ‗Ministers get red marks for missing targets‘, Jakarta Post, 9 July 2010, retrieved on 3 June 2015 from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/07/09/ministers-get-red-marks-missing-targets.html  
279 
 
Nonetheless, SBY still kept the underperforming ministers despite the UKP4‘s critical 
evaluation report and so the unit started to lose its clout.
932
 Furthermore, Kuntoro was given an 
additional task by SBY of eradicating the case broker in the corrupt judicial system by heading 
a task force for the Judicial Mafia, with Denny Indrayana as its secretary.
933
 
 This task force had no enforcement authority, but was limited to advising, monitoring 
and evaluating the reform by all of the law enforcement institutions. Initially, the task force, 
working with the national mass media, conducted a number of crackdowns by exposing the 
luxurious cell of businesswoman Artalyta Suryani in the Women‘s Detention Center in East 
Jakarta.
934
 The task force managed to formulate recommendations for reform, such as that 
high-ranking official should be recruited via a fit-and-proper test and the revision of several 
laws, including the criminal law (KUHAP).
935
 
 Furthermore, the task force managed to bring fugitive junior tax official Gayus 
Tambunan to face trial in Jakarta.  Gayus was suspected of a number of high profile tax 
evasion cases that allegedly implicated law enforcement officials and a number of private 
companies linked to powerful politicians. The Gayus case became political when he testified 
that he had amassed an Rp.28 billion fortune from three Bakrie-linked companies in return for 
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undervaluing their tax bills. Bakrie denied Gayus‘ testimony.936 Gayus was eventually only 
charged with bribery linked to a smaller firm‘s tax problems.937 
   Eventually, SBY did not extend the task force‘s two year term that ended in 
December 2011, preferring to empower the UKP4 by appointing Achmad Santosa, a member 
of the task force, as Kuntoro‘s Deputy in charge of Law reform.938 Meanwhile, Denny 
Indrayana was promoted to Vice Minister for Law and Human Rights in October 2011.  
From the outset, SBY was on the defensive as some of his cabinet members were 
tainted by corruption allegations and on-going the KPK-police conflict. Therefore, he was 
unable to push for significant governance reform in other areas, like the security sector. 
Nonetheless, in his second term, SBY continued the positive tradition of military Chief rotation 
appointments among the three military services – the Army, Navy and Air Force – by 
appointing Navy Chief Admiral Agus Suhartono.
939
 This symbolic action signaled SBY‘s 
effort to exert equal influence on other military services, after the army‘s domination during 
Suharto era. Despite some criticism, SBY was also credited with maintaining the military and 
police‘s neutrality during the fierce 2014 national election.940 
There was continuing criticism overall of SBY‘s military reform record. Baker argues 
that SBY had deliberately squandered an opportunity for greater civilian oversight over the 
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security institutions.
941
 Another criticism by Honna outlines that the military was still able to 
dictate the pace and scope of the reform by playing the politics of insecurity.
942
  Meanwhile, 
Mietzner highlights that, while SBY was able to control the military and maintain its neutrality 
during the national election, he was unable to institutionalize this reform.
943
 In my opinion, to 
expect full civilian control over the military as a benchmark was a very difficult task for the 
post-Suharto presidency. There was a continuing structural problem in the Indonesian military 
due to the lack of military funding, the sense of impunity over civilians, and the sense of 
entitlement as a national guardian. It was also propagated by politicians, who were seen as 
corrupt, which provided a justified opposition to full civilian control. 
The KPK’s Taking Over of the Anti-Corruption Agenda  
After the on-going conflict between the KPK and the police culminated with Bibit-Chandra 
case, the KPK tried to reinvigorate its prosecution work, naming former Minister of Social 
Affairs Bachtiar Chamsyah as a suspect in a corruption case in his ministry in February 
2010.
944
  
 Furthermore, the KPK charged 26 former MPs for receiving bribes related to the 
selection of the BI Deputy Senior Governor, Miranda Gultom, in September 2010. This was 
the first time that the KPK named more than 20 former MPs as suspects in a single case.
945
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The KPK continued to accelerate its prosecution by naming former Minister of Home 
Affairs Hari Sabarno as suspected of corruption in procuring fire trucks for several provinces, 
with an estimated state loss of around Rp.86 billion. This was the first time that the KPK 
managed to prosecute retired four star-ranked Army General.
946
 
Furthermore, the KPK was strengthened by the advent of a new KPK chief, Busyro 
Muqqodas, who was selected in November 2010.
947
 Under Busyro‘s leadership, the KPK 
exposed corruption cases in the athletes‘ accommodation construction for the Southeast Asia 
Games (SEA Games) in Palembang that implicated the ruling Democrat Party leaders by 
naming its treasurer Muhammad Nazaruddin as a suspect in July 2011. Nazaruddin demanded 
13 percent of the project‘s Rp.191 billion cost for fixing a tender for his company to develop 
the athletes‘ accommodation.948  
Moreover, Nazaruddin named his MP colleagues including Democratic Party Chair 
Anas Urbaningrum and Youth and Sport Minister Andi Mallarangeng was also mentioned as 
allegedly receiving a bribe. Nazaruddin also faced questions about his role in 31 corruption 
cases related to government projects valued at Rp.6 trillion.
949
  
 As the second term KPK commissioners‘ term reached its end in 2011, only Chandra 
ran for re-election as KPK commissioner but failed. To avoid the DPR choosing the weak 
candidates, the selection committee of the KPK commissioners decided that they would reveal 
the ranking of the best candidates.  The best three candidates were the former head of the Legal 
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Aid Institute (YLBHI) Bambang Widjayanto, followed by former Head of PPATK Yunus 
Husein, and Advisor of KPK Abdullah Hehamahua.
950
 
 The DPR chose the top-ranking candidate Bambang Widjojanto, but the rest of the 
KPK commissioners were dominated by the bottom four rankings. Repeating the previous 
practice, the DPR selected Abraham Samad as KPK Chair, an anti-corruption activist from 
South Sulawesi.
951
  
 There were numerous internal conflicts at the start of Abraham Samad‘s leadership. 
During KPK‘s restructuring in January 2012, Busyro was not given any authority to conduct 
prosecution work, despite his previous experience.
952
 Internal tension emerged when the four 
KPK investigators returned to their home institutions, the police and the AGO in March 2012 
because of their protest against the KPK commissioner.
953
 
 Nonetheless, the KPK under Samad increased its prosecution of high profile cases to an 
unprecedented level. In following up Nunun‘s case, the KPK named former Deputy Senior BI 
Governor Miranda Goeltom as suspect of bribery in late January 2012 for masterminding the 
distribution of travel checks worth Rp.24 billion to around 33 former and current DPR 
members.
954
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 Furthermore, the KPK‘s prosecution work also started to affect the ruling Democratic 
Party, naming one of its leaders, DPR member Angelina Sondakh, as a suspect in early 
February 2012 related to the corruption in the construction of athletes‘ accommodation for the 
SEA Games.  Angelina was implicated after key witness Mindo Manulang, testified in court 
that she had received a Rp.2 billion ‗fee‘ for the project.955   
Moreover, key fundraiser for the Democratic Party Hartarti Murdaya was also named as 
a suspect by the KPK in August 2012. Hartarti allegedly paid an Rp.3 billion bribe to head of 
Regent Buol in connection with business permit for Hartati‘s two companies.956 
 Another conflict between the KPK and the Police emerged, when the KPK raided the 
Police traffic Corps Headquarters at the end of July 2012 for investigating the corruption in the 
procurement of vehicle simulator equipment worth Rp.190 billion. After the raid, the KPK 
named former Head of Traffic Police Djoko Susilo as a suspect.
957
  
 The peak of the conflict occurred when 150 police officers raided the KPK 
headquarters in October 2012, targeting Commissioner Novel Baswedan, KPK‘s top 
investigator, after he interrogated Djoko Susilo for the corruption case related to the 
procurement of vehicle simulators.
958
 
The police squad brought a warrant to arrest Novel for a shooting incident involving 
bird-nest thieves that cost a life in 2008 when he served in Bengkulu. However, hundreds of 
anti-corruption activists and public figures ‗shielded‘ the place from police attack and the next 
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day triggered a public reaction through intense mass media as well as social media coverage, 
and mass protests in Jakarta‘s streets.959 
Ultimately, SBY intervened in the conflict between the KPK and the police. In a 
nationally-televised speech on the night of 8 October 2012, SBY decided that the simulator 
corruption case involving Djoko Susilo was to be handled by the KPK and felt that the 
investigation against Novel Baswedan was inappropriate.
960
 In December 2012, Djoko Susilo, 
was finally detained by the KPK.
961
  
 KPK also exposed corruption cases implicating Chair of the Islamic Justice and 
Welfare Party (PKS) Luthfi Hasan Ishaak by catching Ahmad Fattanah, Luthfi‘s aide, as he 
accepted a bribe from a beef import company. The bribe worth Rp.1 billion was suspected of 
securing a slot in the government-run beef importation program under the Ministry of 
Agriculture led by PKS member Suswono. Luthfi was detained by the KPK after being 
interrogated in 2013.
962
  
 The KPK also expanded its investigations into the construction of a sports complex in 
Hambalang in Bogor City worth Rp.1. 2 trillion that implicated Minister of Youth and Sport 
Andi Mallarangeng and Chair of the Democratic political party Anas Urbaningrum. After 
being mentioned numerous times by Nazaruddin during their corruption trial, eventually the 
KPK named Minister of Youth and Sport Andi Mallarangeng as a suspect in December 2012 in 
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the Hambalang case and he immediately resigned.
963
 The case showed that, for the first time, 
the KPK named an active minister as a corruption suspect.
964
 Andi‘s fall from grace was 
disheartening as he had been one of the architects of the free election and regional autonomy 
concept.
965
   
 Then the draft letter related to the investigation (Sprindik) of Democratic Party Chair 
Anas and other internal documents of the KPK leaked to the press in February 2013.  The 
ethics committee, chaired by Paramadina University‘s Rector Anies Baswedan, was 
established and a conducted investigation, followed by an open trial in April 2013 of two KPK 
leaders – Chair Abraham Samad and Vice-Chair Adnan Pandu Praja.  Baswedan announced 
that Samad had committed a minor ethical violation and thus received a written warning for 
failing to supervise his secretary who leaked an internal KPK document.
966
 The ruling by the 
KPK‘s ad-hoc ethics committee also signaled the deepening rift among the KPK 
commissioners, as one of the committee members was KPK Vice-Chair Bambang.
967
 
 The string of scandals that implicated the Democratic Party leaders affected the ruling 
party‘s popularity. According to a survey, the Democratic Party was seen as the most corrupt 
political party (at 44.8 percent) and followed by the Golkar (6.5 percent) in June 2012.
968
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Another survey in December 2012 showed that the electability of the Democratic Party 
nosedived from its peak in December 2009 (32 percent) to only 8 percent in December 2012.
969
 
 Consequently, SBY relieved Anas Urbaningrum as Democratic Party Chair and took 
over the party.
970
 Ultimately, Anas was named a suspect by the KPK in relation to receiving 
bribes related to the Hambalang case In February 2013 and immediately resigned.
971
 This was 
the first time that the KPK managed to prosecute the Chair of the ruling party.  
 As the KPK was able to survive internal crises and external threats, they were able to 
refocus their investigation. Then, the KPK caught Head of Special Task force for Upstream Oil 
and Gas Business Activities (SKK Migas) Rudi Rubiandini at his home after receiving a bribe 
from Kernell Oil. The KPK confiscated US$400,000 in cash and a BMW motorcycle worth 
US$90,000.
972
 Again, Rudi‘s arrest was quite discouraging, since as distinguished academics 
there had been high hopes that he would reform corrupt oil and gas sector.  
 The most shocking arrest organized by the KPK in 2013 was when their sting operation 
managed to detect Chief of the Constitutional Court (MK) Akil Mochtar receiving a bribe at 
his official residence in October 2013.
973
 The raid managed to confiscate three envelopes 
containing S$284,050 and US$22,000 from Chairun Nusa, a DPR member, and Cornelis 
Nalau, a businessman from Central Kalimantan related to the case that implicated the head of 
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the regent of Gunung Mas, that was still pending in the MK.
974
 What was shocking was that the 
MK was one of the centerpieces of the democratic governance reform during the post-Suharto 
era. Under Akil‘s two predecessors (Jimly Asshidiqie and Mahfud, M.D.), the MK gained 
prominence as the bastions of Indonesia‘s justice system, with its credible ruling.975  
 The KPK under Samad‘s leadership was actively using the Money Laundering Law 
2010 in their prosecution in an effort to recoup money from corrupt officials.  For instance, the 
KPK was able to seize assets from Djoko Susilo worth around Rp.200 billion in September 
2013, like luxury houses in West Jakarta, a villa in Bali and vast lands in West Java.
976
 
Furthermore, the KPK managed to confiscate assets owned by the former MK Chair Akil also 
of around Rp.200 billion in January 2014, which included 33 luxury cars. However, the biggest 
assets that the KPK managed to confiscate were from former Democratic Party Treasurer 
Nazaruddin, from his share of the national flight carrier Garuda Indonesia, which was worth 
Rp.400 billion in July 2013.  
Moreover, after the Tipikor court was expanded to 34 regional courts with the 
enactment of the new Law on Tipikor in 2009, the court started to issue light sentences, 
contrary to the 100 percent conviction rate only based on the Jakarta Court.
977
  Furthermore, 
several regional Tipikor court judges were arrested for receiving bribes, like two Tipikor judges 
in the City of Semarang in 2012
978
 and, in 2014, former Tipikor judges from Bandung.
979
 As 
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Butt and Schutte argue, an important indicator was the need for tougher sentences for those 
guilty of corruption and that the regional Tipikor court issue more lenient sentences than the 
original Jakarta Tipikor Court.
980
 
 
Justice was served: the emergence of the Crime Chamber of the Supreme Court (MA) 
and the Fall of SBY’s Democratic Party 
 
In creating a deterrent effect, the KPK found an ally in the Chair for the Crime Chamber of the 
MA, led by the MA judge Artidjo Alkotsar. Artidjo became an MA judge as part of a non-
career judge batch who arrived in 2000, with expertise in handling criminal-related cases.  
Artidjo became more influential when the MA created the Chamber System in late 
2011, whereby MA judges would only work in cases related to their expertise to reach verdicts 
faster. As Chair of the Crime Chamber in MA, Artidjo had the influence to choose which cases 
he wished to preside over – usually those that attracted public attention – including corruption 
among 15 of his colleague judges.  
The case that catapulted Artidjo‘s public profile was his ruling on former Democratic 
Party leader Angelina Sondakh. After receiving a light sentence from the anti-corruption court 
of only 4.5 years imprisonment, with a US$25,000 fine, in January 2013, the ruling by the MA 
judge Artidjo in November 2013 extended her prison term to 12 years and Sondakh had to 
refund US$3.42 million in stolen funds.  Furthermore, in September 2014, in a corruption case 
related to the PKS Chair, Luthfi Hasan Ishak, the MA again added two years to his 18 year 
prison sentence, and also rescinded Luthfi‘s political right to seek public office and had to pay 
                                                                                                                                          
979
 ‗Eks Hakim Tipikor Bandung Ramlan Comel Ditahan KPK‘, RMOL.co, 15 August 2014, retrieved on 11 June 
2015 from http://www.rmol.co/read/2014/08/15/167839/Eks-Hakim-Tipikor-Bandung-Ramlan-Comel-Ditahan-
KPK-  
980Simon Butt and Sofie Arjon Schutte, ‗Assessing Judicial Performance in Indonesia: the Court of Corruption 
Crimes‘, Crime Law Social Change, Vol. 62, Issue 5, December 2014, pp. 614 – 615.  
290 
 
a fine of Rp.1 billion.
981
 As for former Democratic Party Chair Anas Urbaningrum, the MA 
increased his eight year prison sentence to 14 years, stripped him of his political right to run for 
office and ordered him to pay a fine of Rp.5 billion for his offenses and return a total of 
Rp.57.5 billion to the state coffers.  
 SBY‘s efforts to salvage the Democratic Party‘s fortunes proved unsuccessful as the 
2014 National election approached. According to a public poll in October 2014, SBY‘s public 
approval remained at a respectable 57 percent just before he ended his term. However, SBY‘s 
government was unable to match his personal appeal, with public approval at 42.3 percent. 
Even by October 2013, the poll showed that 76.8 percent of the public believed that SBY‘s 
government was implicated in corruption.
982
 
 Consequently, at the 2014 national legislative election, the Democratic Party attracted 
only 10.9 percent of the votes, placing them in fourth place.
983
 During the Presidential election 
of 2014, SBY attempted to hold presidential candidate conventions that would allow non-party 
figures to compete for the Presidential candidate. Minister of State Owned Enterprises Dahlan 
Ishkan won the presidential candidate race in May 2014, but his national electability, was very 
low only 2-2.9 percent.
984
 The lack of the Presidential candidate‘s electability, combined with 
the disappointing result at the legislative election, made it impossible for the Democratic Party 
to endorse its own candidate.  
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There was uneven progress under SBY‘s overall presidency in the context of the 
governance and anti-corruption efforts. Most observers argued that SBY brought a period of 
stagnation in terms of governance reform, but the source of this stagnation as outlined above 
was diverse – some focus on his leadership style, while others highlight the political structure 
where the Oligarchy was still powerful and hindered any attempt at progressive governance 
reform. This was linked to the first argument of the thesis that there was insufficient political 
support for reformers – including in the SBY period – to effect substantial reform. Therefore, 
according to leading political analysts and journalist, the SBY period was unimpressive, which 
was stagnant and a lost opportunity, as outlined by Aspinall et al,
985
 Mietzner,
986
 and 
McBeth.
987
 Although there was a perception of democratization stagnation, in my view, SBY is 
to be credited with maintaining the democratic governance structure in Indonesia during his 
decade-long reign. Especially after independence in 1945, Indonesia had experienced almost 
four decades of an authoritarian system, and showed that the survival of Indonesia‘s 
democratic system should not be taken for granted as there were always oligarchs that prepared 
to dismantle democracy. 
 There was also strong criticism of SBY‘s anti-corruption record, especially in the 
second term, where he was accused of providing only half-hearted support to the KPK. 
However, in his second term, there were two SBY legacies that were important in the context 
of the anti-corruption initiatives. Despite his visible discomfort about the growing ‗unchecked‘ 
influence of the KPK, SBY gave the KPK sufficient political space in which to prosecute high 
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level corrupt officials.
988
 Although the SBY legacy sounds minimalistic, in my view, this was 
an important endeavor, as shown by the similar fate of various anti-corruption task 
forces/institutions from the Sukarno to the post-Suharto presidencies that were easily being 
dismantled. This is linked to the third argument, as explained in the introduction, where the 
emergence of the KPK was an important milestone in Indonesia political history because they 
became the most effective anti-corruption institution since Indonesia‘s independence. 
Nonetheless, despite the scale plus the effect of the anti-corruption drive by the KPK 
was progressing, but its impact remained limited because SBY continued to accommodate the 
oligarch in his government. Therefore, the previous political, economic and social structure 
that underpinned the patronage, which breeds corruption, still largely persisted until the end of 
SBY‘s second term.   
Conclusion  
During the decade of SBY‘s presidency, there was uneven progress towards governance reform 
and anti-corruption initiatives as outlined above, due to the continuing existence of oligarchy in 
Indonesian politics that moderated, or even regressed, the reform. By applying Dahl‘s political 
pluralism analytical framework, the technocrats and professional ministers possess political 
resources in the form of education, knowledge, political networks, and prestige in pushing for 
governance reform to improve the democratic quality.  While the powerful oligarchs with their 
political resources especially their wealth, organization, vote buying and political organization 
managed to contain any progressive reform by the reformers especially in the second term of 
SBY‘s presidency.  
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 The maintenance of the democratic governance structure during the decade of SBY‘s 
presidency should be applauded considering that various attempts were made by the oligarchs 
and conservative forces to roll-back Indonesian democracy. However, it should also be 
realized, in my view, that there was no significant progress made under SBY‘s presidency that 
would constitute the achievement of democratic consolidation as Diamond, Linz and Stepan, 
Merkel, Croissant and Bunte envision, as explained in the introduction section. Therefore, 
democratic progress in the SBY period can be viewed as a status quo.  
 In applying Kingdon‘s analytical framework in the context of governance reform and 
anti-corruption initiatives, there were several policy entrepreneurs during the SBY period. The 
effectiveness of KPK in prosecuting high state officials changed the level of impunity among 
Indonesia‘s political elites that made them eligible to be identified as policy entrepreneurs. 
SBY, especially by letting reformist institutions like the KPK and the MK conduct their 
credible work in reforming the judicial sector and anti-corruption drive, in my view, also 
should be put in the category of policy entrepreneurs. The technocrats and professionals, due to 
their efforts in pushing governance reform especially in their respective institutions and 
confronting the oligarchs, in my view, should also be identified as policy entrepreneurs.  
 Lastly, in determining the leadership characteristics of Indonesia‘s political leaders in 
2004-2014 using Burns‘ leadership analytical framework in the context of governance reform 
and anti-corruption measures, SBY in my view can be viewed as a semi-transformational 
leader. As mentioned above, his effort in providing political space for the KPK and MK was 
crucial, but despite his strong political capital, SBY, especially in his second term, was unable 
to achieve further democratic consolidation. Also, in the case of the technocrats or professional 
ministers with support from civil society, while their governance reform effort in their 
respective institutions was commendable, as evident from SBY‘s second term, they were still 
outmaneuvered by the oligarchs that impeded their effectiveness in bringing about governance 
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reform beyond their respective institutions. Therefore, the technocrats and professional 
ministers, in my view, possessed a semi-transformational leadership trait. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned in the previous section, the KPK‘s emergence in the first term of SBY‘s presidency 
and the acceleration of their prosecution of high state officials including SBY‘s inner circle 
was unprecedented in Indonesia‘s political history. Consequently, despite the fact that the 
KPK‘s work remained limited in changing Indonesia‘s patronage structure, by setting a new 
standard in prosecuting high state officials, in my view, the KPK possesses transformational 
leader traits of anti-corruption initiatives.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
The thesis has presented a detailed account of a number of governance reform and anti-
corruption initiatives in Indonesia at the national level since Independence in 1945 until the 
end of the presidential term of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in 2014.  It has outlined the 
ebbs and flows of the dynamic competition between the political elites in Indonesia, in which 
each historical period had different political groupings or cleavages and a coalition set-up in 
the context of governance reform and anti-corruption initiatives.  Therefore, this conclusion 
section will assess the use of the political pluralism analytical framework regarding the 
governance reform efforts as well as anti-corruption initiatives based on important Indonesian 
political milestones in chronological order. In addition, the political pluralism approach will 
also assess the democratic consolidation as well as political actor theory, which identify the 
policy entrepreneurs and also take into account how these actors deal with problem 
identification, policy proposal and political events as outlined by Kingdon. As part of political 
actor theory, it will also attempt to examine the leadership traits of certain important political 
leaders who were crucial in determining the policy direction at the national level using Burns‘ 
modified analytical framework to identify the transformational leaders in the context of 
governance reform and anti-corruption initiatives, as discussed thoroughly in the introduction 
chapter.    The analysis will be divided into four periods, starting with the Sukarno period in 
1945-1968, from the democratic governance structure – parliamentary democracy – until the 
initial setting-up of an authoritarian structure in the form of Sukarno‘s ‗guided democracy.‘ 
This section will also highlight several limited anti-corruption measures that never gained 
ground due to insufficient political support. The following section will examine the New Order 
period (1968-1998), where the authoritarian governance structure was further consolidated, 
thereby making Suharto almost the embodiment of the state. It will also discuss the several 
anti-corruption measures pushed by students and the opposition during this same period. 
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Moreover, a number of limited governance reform measures, driven mainly by technocrats, 
will also be measured.  
The section on the post-Suharto period will scrutinize the important milestones, 
whereby major political governance reform at the national level was undertaken in 1998-2004 
from electoral democracy, the major constitutional amendments that laid solid foundations for 
the democratic governance structure and the establishment of important accountability 
institutions, particularly the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).  As for SBY‘s two 
terms (2004-2014), this thesis will examine his record in the context of strengthening the 
democratic governance structure as well as looking out for his fragile alliance with the KPK 
and other anti-corruption initiatives.  Moreover, it will discuss the arguments that underpinned 
this thesis. Furthermore, it will evaluate each Indonesian presidency in terms of governance 
reform and anti-corruption initiatives, utilizing various international indicators and analytical 
tools, like the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), World Bank Governance Indicators and the 
Freedom Index. Lastly, we will outline the three general conclusions of this thesis on 
governance reform and anti-corruption initiatives by Indonesia‘s central government from 
independence to the end of the SBY period in 2014 that is analyzed comprehensively in this 
thesis.  
The Short-lived Governance Reform and Anti-corruption Initiatives under Sukarno’s 
Period 
As mentioned in chapter one, Indonesia, after independence in 1945, through Sjahrir, was able 
to force President Sukarno to accept parliamentary democracy by reducing his role as a 
figurehead president in exchange for Sjahrir becoming the first Prime Minister in late 1945. 
Later, Vice-President Hatta, who was also Prime Minister in 1948-1950, and his like-minded 
colleagues were able to push the governance reform initiative, like civil service reform and 
military reform.  Subsequently, Hatta‘s allies, who succeeded him as prime minister or became 
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ministers in the crucial portfolio, who were mostly from the Islamic Masyumi party and 
Indonesia Socialist Party (PSI), initiated their disparate reform, but their political clout was 
receding. One of the main factors was that, because Sukarno‘s political currency was 
increasing, especially through his superb mass-mobilization skills, he was able to solicit public 
support. Meanwhile, the growing public dissatisfaction with politicians and the parliamentary 
democracy system in general was increasing due to a perception of implied corruption. 
Sukarno, who politically became more legitimate after his Indonesian Nationalist Party won 
the nation election in 1955, was able to capitalize on this public dissatisfaction by dismantling 
the parliamentary democracy and its political democratic governance structure officially in 
1959. 
 Applying the analytical political pluralism framework, it is clear that there was a 
reformist coalition that Feith categorizes as an administrator group, which was pushing for 
governance reform, led mostly by Vice-President Hatta with the Islamic modernist party 
Masyumi, the PSI and Catholic Party as its core group. In the context of military reform, the 
‗administrator group‘ with the Minister of Defense Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX formed an 
alliance reformist faction within the military, including Chief of Armed Forces T.B. 
Simatupang and Chief of Army A.H. Nasution, but this military reform effort faced a 
significant backlash that cost Nasution and Simatupang their job in the military in the early 
1950s. Therefore, since independence and before the election in 1955, the distribution of 
political resources was benefiting the administrator group, which was started by Sjahrir and 
later taken over by Vice President Hatta. This advantage of political resources by the 
administrator group was because, at least until the republic emerged, the administrator group 
received international support and therefore managed to apply a parliamentary democracy 
system.  According to the criteria of Dahl, in my view, the administrator group led by Vice 
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President Hatta possessed a political resource in the form of knowledge, organization, 
education and information.
989
 
Although during 1945-1957, parliamentary democracy was emerging in Indonesia, it 
did not qualify, as Indonesian democracy at the time was already consolidated in meeting the 
criteria outlined by Diamond, Linz and Stepan, Merkel as well as Croissant and Bunte in the 
introduction section. In my view, despite some progress, it did not meet the behavioral criteria 
of Linz and Stepan since there are still powerful political players, like Sukarno and his 
associates, who had significant political resources and was intending to replace the democratic 
system. This did not meet the criteria whereby all powerful political actors with their vast 
resources have to support and commit fully to democracy as the only framework for political 
participation.
990
  
 Therefore, using the Kingdonian framework, the policy entrepreneurs in the 1945-1957 
period, in my view, were Prime Minister Sjahrir, Vice President Hatta and, to a lesser degree, 
subsequent administrator-type prime ministers like Muhammad Natsir and Burhannudin 
Harahap.
991
 This policy entrepreneur identifies that Indonesia at the time needed a proper 
checks-and-balance system in its political governance structure as opposed to ‗unified‘ 
leadership that was centered on the president as proposed by Soekarno as a problem. As a 
result, they developed a policy proposal to apply the parliamentary democracy system and tried 
to apply it consistently amidst the fierce attack from the rival solidarity maker group and even 
from the army who were disillusioned at what they perceived as corrupt and self-serving 
politicians in that period. Then, in terms of political events, this policy entrepreneur was taking 
advantage of the momentum of international pressure during the international negotiations after 
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the Dutch military operations in 1946 and 1948. Furthermore, they also managed to maintain 
parliamentary democracy and enact limited governance reform by taking advantage of the 
political momentum caused by the consensus among political leaders to maintain democratic 
parliamentary with the goal of winning the national election in 1955.  
In terms of political leadership, using Burns‘ analytical framework, in my view, Prime 
Minister Sjahrir and Vice President Hatta could also be seen as transformational leaders in the 
context of governance reform during 1945-1957. They have a strong vision and determination 
regarding the application of a democratic system in Indonesia. They were able to inspire and 
convince their fellow Indonesian political leaders at least to accept parliamentary democracy as 
the formal political framework institutions for channeling their political aspirations in the hope 
of obtaining a positive national election result in 1955. Despite the disappointing result for 
Hatta and his associates in the national election in 1955, in my view at the very least, they were 
able to convince people at large of the merit of parliamentary democracy in channeling their 
political aspirations as shown by the strong popular enthusiasm and participation in the 
election. The ability of Prime Minister Sjahrir and Vice President Hatta as well as subsequent 
administrator-type prime ministers to enact and maintain the parliamentary democracy system 
with the outcome of a relatively free-and-fair election in 1955 with strong people participation, 
in my view, would qualify them as transformational leaders, based on Burns‘ notion.992 
Despite having huge political clout after Indonesia gained independence in 1945, 
gradually, the ‗administrator group‘ lost influence to their main rival, the nationalist populist 
group, known as the ‗solidarity-makers‘. Sukarno was the de facto leader of the ‗solidarity-
makers,‘ with his Indonesian Nationalist party (PNI), who formed a coalition mostly with 
Nahdlatul Ulama and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The army under Nasution – after 
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his reappointment – decided to change sides, providing crucial support for Sukarno‘s state of 
emergency in 1957 that led to the significant demise of the administrator group and later 
replaced parliamentary democracy with guided democracy. Sukarno and his allies won the 
battle that culminated in the 1959 formation of ‗guided democracy,‘ as the Army that was led 
Nasution became an important political player, along with the PKI. Consequently based on 
Dahl‘s conception, Sukarno had political resources advantage over the administrator group as 
gradually he consolidated his authority and increased his political leverage. Based on Dahl‘s 
criteria, in my view, the political resources that Sukarno deployed that led to his political 
triumph were charisma, communication and popular votes
993
 that feature his greater political 
oratorical skill.  In the end, both the army and PKI vied for approval and support from Sukarno 
who was at the peak of his authority.  
On the contrary, the ‗administrator group‘ was gradually losing its clout and in the end 
fell into complete disarray and became almost ineffectual, especially since the resignation of 
Hatta as Vice President in 1956. The effort of the anti-corruption drive by General A.H. 
Nasution in the early 1960s was too insignificant as he was being rotated from the Army chief 
post by Sukarno, and so the initiatives were easily ignored and later dismantled by Sukarno. 
Thus, the guided democracy period was completely dominated by Sukarno – with support from 
the PKI – over Nasution, whereby it constituted a regression of the governance reform agenda 
and also the corruption accelerated as the government was becoming more authoritarian.  
The Sukarno-led government was dismantling the parliamentary
994
 and judicial 
system
995
 —   the two institutions that ensure a checks-and-balance system.  Instead of leading 
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toward democratic consolidation, there was a democratic roll-back during the guided 
democracy period under Sukarno that started officially in 1959. This was possible because, 
after the successful national election, the political party leaders became deeply fragmented and 
the endless infighting among politicians, combined with their corrupt behavior as exposed by 
the media, reduced the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy. Sukarno with help from the 
army was able to capitalize on people‘s discontent with politicians and also dissolve 
parliament.  This democratic rollback can also be seen as a failure of governance as Diamond 
argues, especially after the national election of 1955, where the government consists of a 
coalition of political party supporters who were unable to deliver sufficient public services as 
demanded by people at large.
996
 However, with the dissolution of parliamentary democracy in 
1959 by Sukarno that in the end led to the formation of an authoritarian political structure that 
was centered on him in my view deserves to be put in the category of transactional leadership 
using Burns‘ political leadership analytical framework.  
During guided democracy in the context of governance reform, in my view, there was 
no policy entrepreneur, borrowing Kingdon‘s term, who was able to carry out governance 
reform, since they were mostly defensive and experienced a significant set-back. The 
monitoring of the state apparatus‘ wealth led by former Minister of Defense Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono and the anti-corruption drive led by General A.H. Nasution through the 
Committee to Retool State apparatus (PARAN) had to be carried out within a limited time 
frame and the outcome was not optimal as both institutions were dissolved by Sukarno before 
becoming effective. Political leaders who were expected to be policy entrepreneurs were 
unable to open windows of opportunity to change policy that constituted the merging of the 
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three main Kingdonian factors (problem, policy and politics) that would have a profound 
impact.
997
 
Meanwhile, during the guided democracy era (1959-1966), in my view and using 
Burns‘ framework, Sukarno had the traits of a transactional leader in the context of governance 
reform and anti-corruption efforts.
998
 Despite Sukarno‘s personal claim that guided democracy 
was groundbreaking and fitted the Indonesian model of political governance, it was evident 
that, in the end, it only became the instrument for centralizing the state authority under him as 
president. This trait was also seen in Sukarno‘s reduced enthusiasm for the anti-corruption 
drive and dissolution of institutions that were supposed to play a major role in curbing 
corruption, like PARAN and BAPEKAN as well as weakening the BPK. This effort was 
suspected of ensuring that Sukarno‘s political authority remained unchallenged, protecting his 
loyal advisors or ministers in government‘s uninterrupted supply of financial or other material 
resources for his political operations and maintaining his regime‘s durability.  In the end, as 
discussed comprehensively in chapter 2, Sukarno‘s guided democracy was unsustainable as 
Indonesia‘s economic performance was deteriorating and his political coalition fell apart as the 
army led by Suharto was able to take over his presidency, after basically dethroning the PKI in 
the 1960s.  
The Consolidated Authoritarian Governance Structure and Rampant Corruption in the 
New Order Era.  
In the early New Order period under Suharto, as described in detail in chapter 4, there were a 
number of anti-corruption initiatives by the government, especially as it was being driven by 
pressure from university students, critical of Sukarno era‘s corruption.   However, as Suharto 
corruption implicating his trusted aides and especially his wife, the alliance began to fall apart. 
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In the context of political pluralism, it was clear that there was an alliance between Suharto and 
the students in addressing corruption, but it was an unstable one, at best.  It seems clear that 
Suharto was never interested in addressing corruption systematically except in terms of cases 
that occurred during Sukarno‘s era. It was evident that, when his army officers‘ close aides 
were accused of corruption, his response was defensive. Instead of conducting a thorough 
investigation of corruption, Suharto began to dismantle the student movement; for instance, 
arresting the student leaders and opposition leaders, accused of triggering the mass riot in 
Jakarta, known as the ‗Malari‘ tragedy, in 1974.  Therefore, by applying the Dahlian 
framework, Suharto held vast political resources but not total domination since other army 
leaders remained influential and thus the inequality of resources was not substantial.  
 Furthermore, Suharto started to consolidate the authoritarian structure through 
intelligence operations undertaken by his trusted Ali Moertopo in the 1970s.  As the 
consolidation of the authoritarian governance structure was underway, in my view, there was 
rivalry among competing influential groups like the military and the Golkar, as each tried to 
increase their political leverage in the 1980s. Then, in the early 1990s, Suharto started to 
accommodate the Islamic modernist group through the emergence of the Minister of Research 
and Technology B.J. Habibie to balance the nationalist group in the Golkar and the military.  
Thus, by the early 1990s, Suharto at the peak of his influence indicated a move toward the 
personalization of the state and construction of patronage networks.  At this stage, Suharto had 
reached political domination compared to his main political adversary and using Dahl‘s 
analytical framework criteria, in my view, Suharto‘s political resource that was employed 
including physical force by using military, organization especially in establishing patronage 
and money to co-opt his political rival or to ensure the loyalty of his close advisors.
999
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 The almost total political domination by Suharto‘s not just only caused a democratic 
Rollback as Diamond and Merkel assert in the introduction section, but in my view it was a 
deepening of the authoritarian political structure. Building on the legacy of the ‗guided 
democracy‘ of Sukarno, Suharto dismantled almost completely the judiciary and the legislative 
during this period under the subjugation of the executive, so there was significant political 
governance degeneration, which was more significant than merely a democratic rollback.  
However, in my view, despite the concentration of power in the hands of Suharto, there 
were still other political actors who would be able to influence government policy. In other 
words, as Aspinall puts it, ‗although the New Order was repressive, it also tolerated many 
forms of independent and non-independent societal organizations‘.1000 This independent 
organization became an opposition or semi-opposition that contributed to the erosion of public 
trust in Suharto by highlighting the systemic cronyism/corruption by his family, through their 
public advocacy activity, within political parties or even inside government. These semi-
opposition and opposition groups consisting of critical NGOs, university students, critical 
parliament members or party leaders and opposition party can be categorized as policy 
entrepreneurs. Based on the Kingdonian approach, in my view, this semi-opposition and 
opposition group managed to identify the problem of the legitimacy of Suharto in the last 
decade of his presidency due to, among other things, the fact that his family were embroiled in 
corruption and cronyism, then this group developed a policy proposal that demanded a more 
democratic political structure with greater public say in policy making, and lastly they 
identified the political momentum of the major Indonesian economic crisis in 1997-1998 that 
shook the confidence of international investors and people at large in Suharto‘s government. 
Therefore, this group was able to capitalize on the economic crisis‘ momentum by stepping-up 
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the public pressure and eventually contributing toward forcing the resignation of Suharto from 
power.  
In terms of economic policy, the technocrats were one of the most influential groups 
during the period from the late 1960s to the early 1990s. However, they had to compete 
vigorously and even compromise with their rivals. The technocrats had to compete with the 
nationalist group led by the powerful CEO of the State Owned Oil Company (PERTAMINA), 
Ibnu Sutowo, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Afterwards, the nationalist group, led by 
Vice-President Sudharmono - until the early 1990s - was the main competitor for the 
technocrats. Eventually, as the technocrats‘ influence on economic policy diminished from the 
early 1990s, they had to face a number of powerful rivals and developed stronger ties with 
Suharto, such as Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie, Indonesian/Chinese major 
conglomerates and Suharto‘s own children.  Despite the technocrats‘ declining influence 
especially in the last decade of the New Order era, in my view, the Technocrats were policy 
entrepreneurs who successfully enacted a prudent economic policy that delivered economic 
growth of almost 8 percent per year for over quarter of a century, that benefited millions of 
people and took Indonesia from a poor country to a middle-low-income country, as outlined by 
Hill, Booth and Trimmer.
1001
 They managed to navigate the Kingdonian problem, policy and 
politics factors by convincing Suharto of the merit of the technocratic approach in economic 
policy making and taking advantage of several types of political momentum like a number of 
economic or major commercial crises - as described in detail in chapter 5 - in accelerating the 
economic reform.  
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In terms of assessing Suharto‘s three decade reign in the context of governance reform 
and anti-corruption measures by applying Burns‘ leadership analytical framework, in my view, 
it can be categorized into two aspects: political and economic development. As mentioned 
above, the New Order era was a period of consolidating the authoritarian political structure, 
which qualified Suharto as a transactional leader. In this sense, contrary to the expectations of 
his main supporters in his earlier years of a more democratic and open political structure, 
instead Suharto managed, in my view, to oversee the most consolidated authoritarian political 
structure since Indonesian independence.  This was done in what Burns described as 
transactional matters, in this case political co-optation through economic or business 
dealings/transactions or through coercion through military means by those who refuse to 
cooperate.  Therefore, as Burns outlined, the exchange values underpinning this type of 
leadership, projected no mutual or continuing pursuit of higher purpose.
1002
 No wonder that, as 
the economic crises and later political crisis unfolded in 1998, most of Suharto‘s supporters 
quickly abandoned him.  
Meanwhile, in terms of economic reform, in my view, it was widely acknowledged that 
the technocrats played an important role in pushing for economic reform and maintaining a 
fiscal discipline that contributed unprecedented economic growth that inter alia turned 
Indonesia from a rice importer in 1970 into a self-sufficient country by the 1980s, after which 
the poverty index fell dramatically.
1003
 This helped Indonesia to transform its economy and 
catapulted it at the time to become one of the 13 successful countries with high sustained 
economic growth mentioned in a report commissioned by, among others, the Economy Nobel 
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Prize winner Michael Spence in 2008.
1004
  However, as explained in chapter 5, the technocrats 
were politically vulnerable with limited constituents in government, so political support from 
Suharto was essential.  Nevertheless, Suharto had a mixed motivation. In the first twenty years, 
he certainly had an interest in empowering the technocrats as a vast amount of his political 
capital was dependent on him achieving high economic growth. Nevertheless, in the last 10 
years of his reign, it was evident that Suharto was more interested in sharing exclusively the 
economic growth benefits with his children and close associates that triggered corruption and 
nepotism.  Therefore, the technocrats, using Burns‘ modified leadership framework, should be 
credited with being transformational leaders while Suharto with being a semi-transformational 
leader in terms of economic reform at least until the early 1990s, during the peak of the 
technocrats‘ influence.  
Post-Suharto Indonesia: the Mixed Governance Reform Effort and Muddling through in 
terms of Anti-Corruption Efforts  
During the Habibie period, there were some breakthroughs in terms of electoral reform, with 
Habibie appointing professional academics and bureaucrats to design laws and regulations for 
a free-and-fair election, and also his efforts to ensure the freedom of the press as well as 
guarantee the growth of civil society. Also, there was some progress in military reform where 
the formal political role had been reduced and maintained its neutrality during the national 
legislative and presidential election of 1999. However, Habibie‘s government was tainted by 
the alleged corruption by his presidential campaign team related to BI‘s Bank Liquidity 
Assistance (BLBI) to the private Bank Bali. Also, Habibie was seen to be protective of his 
mentor, Suharto; therefore, the corruption cases under the New Order era were never resolved.  
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Under Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), in 1999-2001, there was an attempt to push for 
more significant military reform initially by sidelining powerful Coordinating Minister for 
Political Affairs Wiranto and conducting some pilot projects involving dismantling the two 
lowest levels of the army‘s territorial command in the urban areas. However, by sidelining the 
gradualist reformist camp due to the dwindling political support in the DPR, Gus Dur was 
forced to abandon the reform in exchange for military support.   
Then, in addressing corruption, Gus Dur established the Joint Team for Corruption 
Eradication (TGPTPK) in April 2000, which was supposed to be an interim anti-corruption 
team before the anti-corruption commission was established. However, the TGPTPK was 
facing a strong backlash especially from the Supreme Court (MA). In the end, the TGPTPK 
was being undermined by disunity and a lack of leadership, and later was dissolved after the 
MA approved the judicial review request that annulled the TGPTPK‘s regulations in March 
2001. 
It was perhaps during the Megawati era that the crucial governance reform was able to 
be enacted, through the third and fourth constitutional amendment in 2001-2002. The crucial 
third and fourth constitutional amendments ensured that the President and Vice-President were 
directly elected, established the constitutional court (MK), empowered by the accountability of 
institutions like the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), and ensured that the President could not be 
impeached solely due to policy differences but based on the MK‘s ruling.  
As MacIntyre and McLeod observe, after the fourth constitutional amendment, 
Indonesia resolved some of the primary institutional choices pertaining to ‗the relationship 
between the executive branch and the legislature; and the way elections are organized as well 
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as the type of party system that will result‘.1005  The constitutional amendments‘ effort should 
be credited to the Chair of Ad Hoc Committee I Jacob Tobing and his colleague in the People‘s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR), who more importantly were able to persuade Megawati to 
support the amendment.  During this period, it should be noted that the Law on the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2002 was enacted due to effective collaboration between 
the reformist elements in the government, civil society and also support from the progressive 
element in parliament.  
The interpretations during the post-Suharto period were quite different as the political 
resources using Dahl‘s framework were relatively dispersed, rather than concentrated around 
Suharto‘s presidential office as during the New Order era. With the growing influence of the 
oligarchs, with wealth as their main political resources, they were able to influence the 
outcome of national policy from the Habibie to the Megawati era.
1006
 In the post-Suharto era, 
the political actors involved were more diverse, with the parliament (DPR) becoming more 
empowered as well as civil society and, with regard to economic policy, the role of 
international donors was quite influential as the Indonesian state budget at the time was still 
heavily dependent on international aid especially from the IMF.  Therefore, subsequent 
presidents in the post-Suharto era were not the only dominant political actors who could have a 
significant influence on the outcome of national policy since it had to take into account other 
actors, like the parliament and civil society. Furthermore, the political coalition to effect reform 
was also more complex, diverse and fluid, encompassing different actors, both state and non-
state, as seen in the drafting and later deliberation of the KPK bill, as discussed in chapter 6. 
Although, formally, Indonesia became more democratic especially through the constitutional 
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amendment process of 1999-2004, as it had just emerged, democratic consolidation was not 
achieved, as described by Linz and Stepan, Diamond, Croissant and Bunte as well as Merkel, 
as mentioned in the introduction chapter.  
In determining the policy entrepreneur by applying Kingdom‘s analytical framework, 
the political actors varied quite considerably in the context of governance reform as they came 
from different institutions with different rankings.  Habibie could be considered a policy 
entrepreneur as he initiated, perhaps also due to pressure from civil society, a relatively free-
and-fair election in 1999 after 4 decades. Also, in terms of opening up freedom of expression 
and ensuring a free press, by correctly combining the three streams of situations by defining 
Habibie‘s political legitimacy as his main problem, therefore he proposed a reform of 
parliamentary elections amidst the political turmoil, after the major economic crises and fall of 
Suharto in 1998. By combining these three situations, Habibie managed to identify the political 
momentum in 1998-1999 at least to push for electoral reform and to some extent open up the 
press and ensure freedom of expression to burnish his democratic credentials.  
Meanwhile, during the Gus Dur period, in my view, there was a shortage of policy 
entrepreneurs who could deliver a national policy that led to significant and lasting governance 
reform. Most of the important reforms that Gus Dur tried to push, like military reform and anti-
corruption efforts in the judiciary through TGPTK‘s team, were easily dismantled. This was 
due to his erratic and combative leadership style that isolated him from his former political 
supporters especially in parliament, which led to his impeachment in 2001.  
Whilst, as mentioned above, the leadership of Ad Hoc committee I led by Jacob Tobing 
in the MPR for constitutional amendment was, in my view, one of the policy entrepreneurs. In 
addition, the alliance between the reformist element in government, civil society and the 
reform element in parliament played an important role in the deliberation and enactment of the 
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anti-corruption commission bill, as discussed in chapter five, in my view, also part of policy 
entrepreneur group. These two different reform initiatives were able to identify two main 
problems, which were the authoritarian political structure and rampant corruption within the 
state agencies. Then they developed each policy proposal to enact the reform to address each of 
the problems. They also managed to use a political event, in this case the constitutional 
amendment process and pressure from the public at large to address corruption more 
vigorously. In the end, these policy entrepreneurs were able to capitalize on the respective 
windows of opportunity by, among others, convincing Megawati the chair of the ruling party 
PDIP and president of the merit of their reform proposal as shown by the fact that the more 
democratic political structure in Indonesia and the KPK outlived their administration.  Also, 
the alliance between the reformist parliament members and government officials with civil 
society that successfully enacted a crucial law on KPK should be credited as being policy 
entrepreneurs for their contribution in the context of the anti-corruption efforts.  
In terms of political leadership, using Burns‘ framework, Habibie in my view is 
qualified as a transformational leader as he was willing to take a bold decision in the risky 
reform endeavor, such as electoral reform as well as freedom of expression and information. 
This was an important first step for building a democratic governance structure.  In 
combination with the corruption scandal that implicated his presidential election team, known 
as the Bali Bank scandal, this bold move by Habibie damaged his political career by losing him 
the 1999 national parliament election. He was forced to cancel his presidency bid after his 
accountability speech was rejected by parliament in 1999.  
As for Gus Dur, despite their reform rhetoric, in the end, the action constituted a 
transactional leader, based on Burns‘ analytical framework.  The transactional nature of Gus 
Dur was apparent when he tried to take over the economic patronage structure from the 
Suharto era that largely remained intact for financing his political activity with the ultimate 
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goal of winning the national election in 2004 and even tried to dissolve parliament in order to 
hang onto power as he was facing an impeachment process, thus risking reversing the 
democratic progress that Habibie had achieved. However, it should be admitted that not only 
Gus Dur but also Habibie and Megawati preferred to accommodate the oligarchs, the New 
Order elites as well as other vested interests in a political coalition to keep the economic 
patronage largely intact for the distribution of spoils rather than embarking on substantial 
governance reform and addressing corruption.  This informal channel for mobilizing funding 
that bred economic patronage in post-Suharto Indonesia, as Dick and Mulholland note, was 
‗the informal behaviors that govern the collection and distribution of slush funds have 
monetized relations even between the organs of the state and created a large political 
marketplace at its heart‘.1007 
Nevertheless, under Megawati‘s presidency, there was an important reform, like a 
constitutional amendment and the enactment of KPK law but the original ideas for this reform, 
as outlined in detail in chapter six, came from the reformist element of various state institutions 
that, in some cases, were working together with civil society and even international donors in 
pushing these reforms. Therefore, in my view, using Burns‘ modified analytical framework, 
the reformist element in the government, parliament and civil society that successfully pushed 
for constitutional amendment and the enactment of the KPK law can be credited with being 
transformational leaders, while Megawati‘s role in providing crucial support for these two 
important initiatives, albeit with more political motives, deserve to be credited as semi-
transformation leaders.  
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One Decade of President Yudhoyono:  Progress, Stagnation or Regression? 
As the transformation to a democratic governance structure had taken place in 1999-2004, the 
challenge for SBY was whether he was able to meet the democratic consolidation requirement 
as outline by Linz, Stepan, Diamond and Merkel.
1008
  In the context of anti-corruption, he was 
pressured to deliver his promise to address corruption through prosecuting high profile cases.  
During his first term, a number of governance reforms were conducted by SBY‘s appointed 
technocrats or professionals at the national level, albeit these were limited to their own 
institution, like civil service reform in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Also, the technocrats were used as SBY‘s proxy to contain the influence of the 
oligarchs in economic policy, especially with regard to policy that benefited their business 
disproportionately as discussed in detail in chapter 7 and chapter 8.  
 It is also noteworthy that, in 2004-2009, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) 
underwent successful institutional building. At the same time, SBY created the Interagency 
Coordination Team for Corruption Eradication (Timtas Tipikor) in 2005, led by Deputy 
Attorney General Hendarman Supandji, who initiated the effective prosecution of high profile 
corruption cases in the post-Suharto era. 
 During SBY‘s first term, there was an important milestone when the KPK emerged to 
become the most effective anti-corruption agency in Indonesia.  After the first term, the KPK, 
led by Taufiqurachman Ruqi, successfully oversaw the institutional building, gradually 
increasing their credential and public profile by prosecuting former Ministers under Megawati, 
then by handling corruption implicating the Chair of the National Election Commission (KPU). 
During the second term, led by Antasari Azhar, the KPK undertook a more aggressive anti-
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corruption campaign by increasing its prosecution from 7 cases in 2007 to 53 cases in 2008, 
including ones implicating the former Governor of the Indonesia Central Bank (BI) 
Burhanuddin Abdullah, SBY‘s father-in-law (who was also a former Deputy of BI Governor 
Aulia Pohan) and former Chief of Police Rusdihardjo.  Nevertheless, the KPK was starting to 
face a significant backlash, like the detainment of two KPK commissioners, Bibit Samad 
Riyanto and Chandra Hamzah, almost paralyzed the KPK as explained in chapter 6.   
 During the second term, despite winning the legislative and presidential elections 
overwhelmingly, SBY disappointed some critics who had hoped that he would achieve 
significant governance reform as his notable legacy. Throughout his second term, he preferred 
to maintain political stability by preserving broad coalition political support in parliament and 
cabinet at the expense of deepening the governance reform. Consequently, the technocrats and 
professionals were unable to push for governance reform as progressively as had been the case 
during the first term. Notwithstanding the work done by technocrats and professionals like the 
President‘s Delivery Unit (UKP4) and the Task Team for Eradicating Judicial Mafia, the 
progress for substantial reform remained very limited.   
 Also in the second term, SBY was mainly on the defensive with regard to the anti-
corruption agenda, as he was struggling to resolve the continuing conflict between the Police 
and the KPK‘s second and third term commissioners led by Abraham Samad. Nevertheless, 
since SBY was always susceptible to public opinion, he ultimately supported the KPK in their 
conflict with the Police. 
Despite the struggle among its commissioners, the KPK under Abraham Samad reached 
the peak of its influence by accelerating the prosecution of high profile cases including an 
unprecedented number of incumbent Ministers as well as Vice Ministers and Chiefs of the 
Constitutional Court. This had grave implications for SBY‘s government and Democratic Party 
in the second term, since a number of his close-aides, like Minister of Sports and Youth Andi 
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Mallarangeng and Minister of Mining Jero Wacik were being investigated by the KPK. As a 
consequence, this affected SBY‘s government and his Democratic Party‘s popularity, as 
reflected in its disastrous result at the legislative election in 2014. The Democratic Party lost 
more than 50 percent of its votes, which put them only in fourth position.   
Therefore, in applying Dahl‘s political pluralism framework in the context of 
governance reform and anti-corruption measures, the political resources were less dispersed 
than during the post-Suharto presidency era (2004-2009), but also not quite as concentrated as 
under Suharto in the New Order era.  SBY the first directly elected president who served his 
two full-terms clearly - using Dahl‘s criteria - had the almost complete political resources, in 
my view, to be an effective political leader, including popular votes, charisma, communication, 
knowledge and some cases organization, when his Democrat party won the legislative election 
in 2009.
1009
 Like other post-Suharto presidencies, however, SBY still accommodated oligarchs 
especially in maintaining the economic patronage and obtaining political campaign funding 
from their vast amount of wealth as their main political resources.  Meanwhile, to balance the 
influence of the oligarchs, the technocrats and professionals with knowledge, respect and 
education as their main political resources were installed by SBY to conduct a governance 
reform. The newly established Anti-corruption commission (KPK) certainly became one of the 
important political actor that could not be ignored by capitalizing their political resources 
(organizations, legal standing, knowledge) especially through their aggressive prosecution of 
high state officials such as active ministers, governors, ambassadors or other municipalities 
leaders during the SBY period.  
Therefore, while SBY was successfully maintaining the democratic governance 
structure during his decade in power, he struggled to carry it to the next level that would have 
left the legacy of a sustainable democratic system.  As Meitzner argued, SBY only achieved 
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the minimum criteria by preventing the institutional collapse of the democratic governance 
structure.
1010
 In my view, the difficulty during SBY‘s second term was his inability to form a 
cohesive and significant reformist critical mass in his party, government and legislative that 
would potentially be able to push for significant governance reform. According to Diamond, 
Linz, Stepan and Merkel‘s criteria, during the SBY period, there were still powerful figures 
that had a vast amount of political resources, which potentially could rollback the democratic 
structure, which made Indonesia unqualified with regard to democracy consolidation. 
1011
 
The emergence of the KPK marked an important milestone in Indonesia‘s political 
history. Compared to the grave failures of the various anti-corruption initiatives in the past, the 
KPK set a new standard for success in prosecuting high level officials and can be seen as one 
of the policy entrepreneurs, based on Kingdon‘s analytical framework.  They identify the 
problem of rampant corruption especially in Indonesia‘s public sector and in terms of policy 
the KPK started to shake the sense of impunity among high level officials, as shown by their 
ability to prosecute the Chief of the Constitutional Court, incumbent ministers, governors and 
other high officials. Then, related to a political event, the KPK exploited the fact that, during 
the SBY period, one of the government‘s priorities was to respond to the high demand from 
people at large to address the rampant corruption in Indonesia.   
Nonetheless, the success of the KPK should not be overestimated, since the KPK was 
still vulnerable to a backlash from the vested interests, as shown by their constant clashes with 
the police. Therefore, in my view, SBY should also be categorized as a policy entrepreneur, 
providing crucial support for KPK‘s institutional building effort as well as – albeit reluctantly – 
intervening in favor of the KPK when their conflict especially with the police became 
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contentious.  Also, as mentioned above, the technocrats and professionals ministers who 
embarked on their own governance reform especially in SBY‘s first term should also be 
credited as policy entrepreneurs in that era as they managed to leverage their influence when 
the political window opened.  
  In applying Burns‘ modified leadership analytical framework in terms of governance 
reform, in my view, SBY had the potential to be a transformational leader with his substantial 
political capital as the first directly elected president in 2004, but in the end turned into a semi-
transformational leader particularly when he preferred to maintain political stability by 
accommodating the political party leaders – some of them oligarchs – by allocating them seats 
in the cabinet. This was at the expense of broader governance reform to consolidate democracy 
further, although SBY managed to maintain that the democratic political structure should be 
appreciated considering that Indonesia had been experiencing almost 40 decades of 
authoritarian rule. Meanwhile, in my view, the technocrats or professional ministers who 
pushed their own governance reform especially in their respective ministries should be 
applauded, but compared to their predecessors in the New Order era, their policy implication 
was not far reaching. Thus, with the scale of their achievement, in my view, the technocrats 
under SBY can be placed in the category of semi-transformational leaders.  
KPK has created a breakthrough through their aggressive prosecution work in 
corruption cases, with credible conviction results in the anti-corruption court, which was 
unprecedented compared to the failure of the same initiatives during the Sukarno era to the 
post-Suharto era before the KPK emerged. Thus, in my view, related to their anti-corruption 
work, the KPK in 2004-2014 was qualified to introduce a transformational leadership 
qualification but the emergence of KPK as the most zealous anti-corruption commission in 
Indonesia‘s political history was impossible if there was no crucial support from SBY‘s 
government especially in the institutional building phase and not intervening, particularly in 
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the prosecution of cases involving high state officials who were part of his inner circle. The 
lesson learnt from the past anti-corruption initiatives from Sukarno until the Megawati 
presidency is that, once political support was retracted, then the anti-corruption body could 
easily be dissolved but, despite the fact that SBY‘s support for the KPK in his second term was 
less fervent than in his first term, in my view, SBY still qualifies as a semi-transformational 
leader due to the fact that at least he did not obstruct the KPK‘s prosecution work.  
Table 1: Type of Indonesia Political Leaders in each Era in the Context of Governance Reform 
and Anti-Corruption Initiatives 
Indonesia Political History 
Milestone 
Kingdon’s Policy 
Entrepreneur  
Modified Burns’s Type of Political leadership 
Transformational Semi-
transformational 
Transactional 
Parliamentary Democracy era 
(1945 – 1959) 
Sjahrir and Hatta‘s led 
Administrator Group 
Sjahrir  and Hatta‘s 
led Administrator 
Group 
 Sukarno 
Guided Democracy (1959 – 
1968) 
None   Sukarno 
New Order Era (1968 – 1998)  Opposition group, NGO, 
students (in politics) 
 Technocrats (in 
economy) 
Technocrats (in 
economy) 
Suharto (in 
economy)  
Suharto (in 
politics) 
Post-Suharto Era (1998 – 
2004) 
 Habibie 
 Leaders of PAH1 in 
MPR for constitutional 
amendments  
 The alliance of reformist 
parliament member, 
government officials 
with civil society for law 
on KPK 
 Habibie 
 The alliance of 
reformist 
parliament 
member, 
government 
officials with civil 
society for law on 
KPK 
 Leaders of PAH1 
in MPR for 
constitutional 
amendments  
 
Megawati Gus Dur 
SBY Era (2004 – 2014)  SBY (first term), KPK, 
Technocrats/ professionals 
ministers  
KPK SBY, Technocrats 
/professionals 
ministers 
 
Sources: the Author interpretation and analysis based on empirical chapters of this thesis.  
 
 
Indonesia’s Trajectories in the Context of Governance Reform and Corruption 
 
 As mention in the introduction, several international governance and corruption index 
indicators that measure country performance annually will be utilized as one of the analytical 
319 
 
tool.  In this section, Indonesia‘s trajectories in the context of governance reform and anti-
corruption initiatives from the Suharto to the SBY periods can be measured using these various 
international performance indicators. However, Transparency International‘s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), the World Bank Governance Indicators and Freedom Index will be 
utilized, that have only published data since the 1990s. Consequently, there are no data 
available that would make it possible to learn about Indonesia‘s performance by applying these 
international indexes to the period from Independence in 1945 until the mid-Suharto period.  
Also, the discussion on the rational in using these governance and corruption indicators as well 
as controversies regarding the methodology is already explained in the introduction chapter.  
Based on the CPI, Indonesia‘s performance was improving.  During the Suharto era, 
Indonesia‘s score was the lowest in the world in 1995, it being ranked the bottom of the 41 
countries surveyed, with a score of 1.97 out of 10, increasingly only slightly by 1998 to a score 
of 2.0, which ranked it at 80 out of the 85 countries.  During the post-Suharto period, 
Indonesia‘s CPI score fell in 1999 during the Habibie period to 1.7, ranking it as 96 out of the 
99 countries, toward the very bottom, with a slight increase during the Megawati period in 
2004, when it scored 2.0, which ranked it as 133 out of the 145 countries. After the end of 
SBY‘s second term period, Indonesia‘s CPI score rose significantly, from 2.2 (ranked 137 out 
of the 158 countries) to 34 (on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), which meant 
that it was ranked as 107 out of the 174 countries.
1012
 Based on the CPI index, the trajectories 
show that Indonesia is improving, albeit below the middle-ranking countries.  
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Chart 1: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) on Indonesia in 
1995-2014 
 
Notes: Each year, the number of country participants on the CPI index was different. All of the CPI‘s 
scores during the SBY era are on a scale of 1-100 so it is divided by 10 to turn the score into a 1-10 scale 
so that it is comparable with previous years.  All of the information about the methodology and data of 
CPI is available at http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview  
 
 Another international indicator is the World Bank Institute (WBI)‘s Governance 
Indicators that measure six aggregates over 200 countries – no ranking, only a scoring system – 
from the worst (0) to the best (100).  Based on the WBI Governance Index, corruption hit a 
peak during the late Suharto period when it plunged from a score of 31.7 in 1995 to the lowest 
score, in 1998, of 9.8. During the post-Suharto period, the score improved to 19.9 during the 
Gus Dur period in 2000 before slightly falling again to 17.1 during the Megawati Period. As 
for the SBY period, in terms of controlling corruption, Indonesia‘s WBI governance index 
score increased from 20.5 in 2005 to 34.1 in 2014.
1013
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 In other dimensions of the WBI governance index – voice and accountability – again, 
Indonesia fared worst during the later Suharto period, with its score falling from 23.6 in 1996 
to 17.3 in 1998. Then, the country recovered in 2000 in the post-Suharto era, from a score of 
34 during the Gus Dur period to achieving a score of 40.4 under Megawati. Then, during the 
SBY period, the score slightly increased, from 45.2 in 2005 to 53.2 in 2014.   
 As for the rule of law dimension of the WBI governance index, Indonesia had its 
highest scores during the later period before Suharto fell in 1998, with 39.7, before falling to 
27.3. In fact, in this dimension, Indonesia attracted its worst score during the post-Suharto 
period under Megawati (20.1), which slightly increased at the end of her term in 2004 (to 
25.4). In the SBY period, the score for this dimension saw its highest increase, from 25.4 in 
2005 to 41.8 in 2014.
1014
 
 Another dimension of the WBI governance index was regulatory quality, for which 
Indonesia received its highest score during the later period of Suharto (57.4 in 1996) before 
experiencing the greatest fall (to 36.8) by the end for his presidency in 1998. During the post-
Suharto period, the score continued to fall, after slightly increasing during the Gus Dur period 
(41.7 in 2000) to the lowest score under Megawati (20.6. in 2003) then slightly increasing in 
2004 (25.0). In the SBY period, the score increased from 31.4 in 2005 to 49 in 2014.
1015
 
 Then, with regard to the government effectiveness dimension of the WBI governance 
index, Indonesia attracted its lowest score during the Suharto period (37.1) in 1996, and then 
reached the lowest (29.3) during the political as well as economic crisis in 1998. During the 
post-Suharto period, the score increased to 44.9 in 2000 during the Gus Dur period, then 
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became relatively stable, with a score of 44.4 in 2004 during the Megawati period. In the SBY 
period, the score fell to 38.5 in 2004 before reaching its peak of 54.8 in 2014. 
1016
 
   As mentioned in the introduction section, there is a question about the methodology of 
the governance index when the result is quite different from Indonesia‘s political situation on 
the ground; for instance, it gives the highest score for the Rule of Law during the Suharto 
period, which was known for its disregard of the law enforcement process, and it is also 
puzzling that it gives the chaotic Gus Dur administration a high score in terms of government 
effectiveness. There was certainly a divergence between the perceptions of the sample that 
were used to aggregate the index and the political reality during the Suharto and Gus Dur era. 
This was perhaps due to the fact that the rule of law under Suharto was seen by the business 
players only in the context of settling commercial cases that were more ‗predictable‘ by then, 
compared to the high legal uncertainty during the post-Suharto era. In the case of Gus Dur, it is 
possible that, as the first truly democratically elected government, the europhia was still 
running high, especially in the first year. Thus, it was a reflection of the hope rather than the 
overall performance of Gus Dur‘s government. Nevertheless, the outlier is only those two 
particular cases, as the remaining indicators are quite consistent, in my view, with the political 
reality and the result of other governance indicators. The index shows a mixed trajectory, with 
certain indicators pointing to a positive trend from the Suharto period to the SBY period 
(government effectiveness as well as voice and accountability), while other indicator fell after 
Suharto (with regard to regulatory quality).  As for the control of corruption and rule of law, 
there was relatively little change from the Suharto period to the SBY period, albeit in positive 
direction. 
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Chart 2: World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) on Indonesia in 1996-2014. 
 
Notes: for the methodology and complete data of WGI index look at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c102.pdf  
  
In using the freedom index, published by Freedom House, it showed a positive 
trajectory from the Suharto to the SBY periods.  Using a scale from 0 (the freest) to 7 (the 
worst of all), based on Freedom House‘s assessment, Indonesia during the Suharto period was 
given a freedom rating score of 6.5 which put it in the category of not a free country. During 
the post-Suharto period, during the relatively free national election in 1999, Indonesia 
improved its score to 5, thereby placing it in the category of a partly-free country. For this 
same category, its score improved to 3.5 during the second, relatively free and fair, national 
election in 2004 under Megawati presidency.  During the SBY period, Indonesia reached its 
highest score of 2.5 in 2005, thereby placing it in the category of a free country, which 
remained stable until 2013. However, during the last year of the SBY period, Indonesia‘s score 
fell slightly, to 3, thereby designating it a partly-free country.
1017
 This downgrade, according to 
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Freedom House, was, among other things, ‗due to the adoption of a law that restricts the 
activities of non-governmental organizations.‘1018 
Chart 3: Freedom Index from Freedom House on Indonesia in 1995 – 2014. 
 
Notes: for the methodology and complete data look at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-
world-2015  
 
In sum, based on a historical comparison analysis and trends of governance and 
corruption indicators, in my view, Indonesia on balance has been on a positive trajectory in the 
context of the governance reform and anti-corruption initiative since the fall of Suharto, from 
1998 to 2014. This was in contrast to the grim assessment of the country‘s trajectory by the 
majority of Indonesia‘s national mass media or the highly skeptical Indonesian and 
international political analysts or journalist of that period.
1019
  
It should be admitted, however, that there was no dramatic progress in terms of 
governance reform and anti-corruption initiatives in that period that would have brought 
Indonesia via a faster trajectory to the next level as a high-middle-income country in an effort 
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to avoid ‗the middle income trap‘ as experienced by developing countries like Mexico, Brazil 
and South Africa in the period 1980s-2014.
1020
 Although progress has been made in terms of 
democratization that changed the political governance structure from the authoritarian streak 
under the New Order era into democratic one, the fundamental social and economic patronage 
structure of the previous regime remained largely intact, at least in the case of the post-Suharto 
to the SBY periods.  To add further complication, the oligarchs, the nationalist political elites 
and conservative elements from the previous regimes also remain largely politically influential. 
Therefore, the progress and set-backs in the governance reform and anti-corruption efforts in 
Indonesia at the national level from 1945-2014 have been largely based on the outcome of the 
compromise between the reformist and conservative elites at the expense of the potential for 
broader governance reform and more extensive anti-corruption efforts during that period.  
 
Indonesia’s Historical Baggage: Impediments to the Progressive Governance Reform and 
Anti-Corruption Effort 
 
The evaluation of Indonesia‘s governance reform and anti-corruption initiative from the 
Sukarno to the SBY era that is outlined comprehensively in this thesis has led to an extensive 
descriptive result and analytical findings with three general conclusions. First of all, from 
Indonesia‘s independence until the end of the SBY period in 2014, some of the reformer 
leaders, like the administrator group during Sukarno‘s era, the technocrats during Suharto‘s era 
or the technocrats as well as civil society during the post-Suharto era were unable to bring 
about comprehensive, deeper or sustainable governance reform. This was because, by using 
Dahl‘s political pluralism framework, the political resources that this reformist possessed, like 
knowledge, information, and education, were insufficient to overcome the other more 
traditional political resources possessed by conservative actors such as charisma (Sukarno era), 
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voters (Sukarno era), physical force (Suharto era) or wealth (Suharto era). However, in age 
post-Suharto era, this reformist group managed to push for some significant reform, like 
constitutional amendment and the empowerment of the KPK, by using their knowledge, 
information and organization through an alliance with more prominent politicians who were 
popularly elected, like Megawati or SBY.  This reformist individual/ group, or using 
Kingdon‘s terms, ‗policy entrepreneurs‘ or ‗transformational leaders‘, using a modified Burns‘ 
leadership framework, were unable to enact more comprehensive or sustainable reform 
because of the lack of political support. Therefore, as their effectiveness was dependent on this 
populist leader, the scale and depth of the governance reform was compromised with the 
political or commercial interests of the mainly conservative figures/oligarchs. These oligarchs 
or conservative figures zealously maintained the economic patronage in Indonesia‘s political 
system to finance and ensure their political influence at the national level.  
Nonetheless, until the end of the SBY period, in my view, Indonesia achieved the 
requirements that constituted basic democracy, like: free and competitive elections; more than 
one serious political party; and alternative sources of information. This was evident in the 
governance and democratic indicators, as discussed above. As evident from chart 2, after the 
fall of Suharto, there was a positive trend in most governance indicators by the World Bank as 
shown by the scores for: rule of law; voice and accountability; and government effectiveness. 
As for regulatory quality indicators, it shows that the score was worsening until the Megawati 
period and then increased during the SBY period. On the freedom index as outlined in chart 3, 
Indonesia started to become a partly free country after the fall of Suharto.  
However, in my view, it should be admitted that the quality of the democratic 
governance structure in Indonesia did not achieve substantial progress with regard to 
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governance issues such as transparency, rule of law and public accountability.
1021
 The 
conservative political actors were still able, from their political position, to moderate or even 
roll back some of the reforms. 
As for the second conclusion, the anti-corruption effort from independence in 1945 
until the emergence of the KPK in 2004 was arbitrary and mostly imbued with political 
motives that limited its impact.  Dahl‘s analytical framework again shows that the various anti-
corruption teams or institutions only possessed ‗high skilled‘ political resources such as 
knowledge, organization and education but the more traditional political resources, like popular 
votes, charisma, physical force and wealth, were clearly more influential in determining the 
national policy outcome during the Sukarno and Suharto periods. Accordingly, the number of 
anti-corruption drives during the Sukarno and Suharto eras was limited and fractured, since 
these were seen by both as politically motivated and not aligned with their political and 
economic interests. This was evident when the ‗policy entrepreneurs‘  as described by Kingdon 
or ‗transformational leaders‘ as defined by Burns during both periods had only limited 
opportunities and a short time frame for pushing the anti-corruption effort. For instance, 
Sukarno was unenthusiastic about providing support for Nasution‘s PARAN or 
Hamengkubuwono IX‘s BAPEKAN and BPK during his reign. Meanwhile, despite the early 
pledge to the student activists to address corruption in the late 1960s to early 1970s, Suharto 
was never enthusiastic about pursuing anti-corruption measures, especially involving his 
trusted aides.  Even if there were some anti-corruption initiatives, their scope was limited.  
Later, Suharto and his associates became part of the problem and even a symbol of the 
corruption, collusion and nepotism that were so pervasive during the New Order Era. These 
two periods also show that the economic patronage was not easily dismantled by the reformists 
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since it was one of the main instruments for these political leaders to maintain and even expand 
their traditional political resources to ensure their regime‘s durability.  It is also evident from 
the TI‘s Corruption perception index in chart 1 that Suharto‘s era was one of the low scores, 
with only the Habibie era earning a lower score. The World Bank governance index in chart 2 
also showed that, in the Suharto era, Indonesia had the lowest score for control of corruption.   
 The final general conclusion is that, in my view, the emergence of the KPK was an 
important milestone in Indonesia‘s anti-corruption history that started to change the sense of 
impunity of high state officials during the SBY period but, as the influence of the KPK was 
growing, it was hampered by a lack of resources and vulnerable to attack by vested interests, 
especially from the law enforcement institutions like the police and the attorney general. Using 
Dahl‘s political pluralism analytical framework, the emergence of the KPK as the leading anti-
corruption agency in Indonesia was clearly one of the rare occasions on which the reformists 
with high skill-related political resources (like knowledge, information, organization) were 
able to enact a policy change that had a significant political outcome. This was achieved, in my 
view, through effective collaboration with important actors with strong traditional political 
resources like strong constituents or popular support; for instance, the Ministry of Law during 
the deliberation of the KPK bill and SBY‘s government during the crucial KPK‘s institutional 
building effort. As one of the prime actors in the anti-corruption effort, the KPK was equipped 
with a strong mandate and authority, and supported by sophisticated organizations and 
competent human resources.  As a result, the KPK was able to prosecute high-ranking officials 
indiscriminately, as shown by the conviction rate of almost 100 percent. This was also 
supported by the TI‘s corruption perception index that showed that, during the SBY period and 
the emergence of the KPK, it has the highest score, as evident in chart 1. Furthermore, the 
World Bank governance index also shows that the score for control of corruption was highest 
during the existence of the KPK and SBY period, as shown in chart 2.   
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The change in the level of impunity among Indonesia‘s top political leaders through its 
prosecution work, in my view, led to the KPK becoming the main ‗policy entrepreneur‘ or 
‗transformational leader‘ in the context of the anti-corruption initiatives. However, the 
significant backlash and resistance by vested interests and the law enforcement agencies 
showed that the overall social, political and economic structure that incubated corruption in 
Indonesia remained largely intact.  One of the main sources of corruption was the continuing 
existence of economic patronage that helped these conservative figures or oligarchs to mitigate 
any robust anti-corruption efforts. Thus, due to the complexity and scale of the corruption and 
governance structural problem up until the end of the SBY period, the KPK were unable to 
tackle this by themselves. This is because, in my view, there were too few other policy 
entrepreneurs or transformational leaders who were able to work together or provide support 
for the reformers or KPK (in the SBY period) so that it could bring more robust and significant 
prosecutions of big corruption cases. Adding further complication, instead of being a reliable 
partner, the Police and Attorney General were actively trying to undermine the KPK‘s work 
that meant that the overall anti-corruption efforts could not achieve their full potential. 
Consequently, from independence until the end of SBY‘s presidency, the anti-corruption effort 
as a short term measure was not optimal for reinforcing the long-term measure in addressing 
corruption through governance reform to build a better quality democratic political system in 
Indonesia.  
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